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ABSTRACT
Bryan G. Behrenshausen: Information in Formation: Power and Agency in
Contemporary Informatic Assemblages
(Under the direction of Lawrence Grossberg)
This dissertation critically examines the concept of "information" in an 
effort to understand the ways it participates in contemporary relations of 
power. Chapter 1 surveys the contemporary social, political, and economic 
conditions under which information operates today, and elaborates four 
"grammars" of information prominent in popular discourse. It also unpacks 
various assumptions implicit in these discourses, and explains the limitations of 
such popular accounts for theorizing information's role in various social 
formations. Chapter 2 performs an historical genealogy of information, tracing 
the concept's articulation in the American context, especially during the 
postwar period. This chapter discusses the work of Claude Shannon and 
Norbert Wiener, who formalized and mathematized the notion of information 
during this time, their reasons for and aims in doing so, and these theories' 
implications for conceptualizing information today. Chapter 3 builds on this 
analysis in order to pinpoint the particular problematic an historical account of 
information discloses: namely, that of "agency." This chapter traces this 
problematic's motivating influence through writing in first- and second-wave 
cybernetics. It demonstrates that critical social theory's current preoccupation 
with nonhumanistic theories of agency has conceptual roots in this writing, and 
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offers a schematic for assessing accounts of agency that problematize accounts 
of the phenomenon inherited from the Enlightenment. Chapter 4 offers a 
"cartography" of contemporary theories of nonhumanistic agency in order to 
concretely connect these accounts with their forebearers in cybernetics and 
information theory; it then re-situates Shannonian and Wienerian theories of 
information in relation to this cartography. Chapter 5 concludes the dissertation
by returning to information's popular articulations. It explains how a "mixed 
semiotic" approach to information and information technologies might enhance 
critical discussions of information politics, and attends specifically to the ways 
in which various figures of agency shape accounts of these politics.
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PREFACE
The information is ravenous
The ticker tape feeds the mind ...
When the information comes
We'll know what we're made from
—Beck, "The Information"
This dissertation's title, Information in Formation, encapsulates twin 
impulses that guide the project's approach to something that (for the last half-
century and especially in the global West) many have called "information."
The first of these impulses is an effort to locate information in formation, 
amidst the field of multiple, overlapping processes, discourses, and practices, 
which grant information some definition or effectivity. This "field" is 
information's context, and, apart from this context (this loosely-coordinated 
formation of determinations), information has no definition, no self-evident 
identity. The current project asserts that (as Stuart Hall might say) information 
as such doesn't exist, that one can apprehend only "a diversity of practices and 
historical situations" through which some-thing called "information" is 
"produced, circulated, and deployed" (cited in Grossberg, 1986, p. 65). In other 
words, this dissertation assumes what Lawrence Grossberg (2010) calls a 
"radically contextualist" posture with respect to information (p. 20); wherever 
and whenever possible, it refuses to disembed or disassociate information from 
the very social, historical, cultural, economic, and political relations that in fact 
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constitute it. This project traces the links or the connections—the articulations
—between these relations, in order to specify the manner(s) in which they 
shape certain conditions for thought and action.
These connections are never stable, never final. Indeed, this is the second 
impulse guiding the present work: an appreciation for information in formation,
in the ongoing and dynamic (de- and re-) articulations that continually modify, 
shift, or reify the particular ways information is always taking shape, even 
today. Such a focus reveals something additional: to say (cheekily) that 
information doesn't exist is actually to insist that it doesn't exist necessarily—
that its particular taking-shape at a given moment (and nothing more) is 
precisely what defines its capacity to influence the field in which it's embedded.
In this way, information "exists" only as a distribution of pressures and 
discontinuities, a heterogeneous collection of relations between material 
technologies, embodied conducts, popular and technical discourses, and certain
knowledges—in Foucault's (1972) terms, a system of dispersion. For Foucault, 
such systems function according to particular rules, the "rules of formation" (p. 
38, emphasis in original), which an analyst can track to better understand the 
role something like information, "a blank, indifferent space, lacking in both 
interiority and promise," (p. 39) plays in organizing everyday practices. Crucial 
here is not so much what information is (for as we've already seen, it isn't 
anything apart from its various and varied articulations), but what it does: the 
way it participates in the field of relations that constitute it, reinforcing some, 
deflecting others, and modifying still more. For information is always in 
formation—always in motion, always coming-to-form in different and 
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noteworthy ways. This dissertation assumes that information traffics in certain 
regimes of power, and that a focus on the conditions of information's 
emergence, on the never-settled field of which it is indelibly a part, might reveal
something about the way such power operates today. Yes, information is both 
the product of and a motor for various relations—but the nature, valence, 
scope, and effect of the particular relations it mobilizes are never 
predetermined, and the shape of their (temporary) settlement(s) are important.
They are especially important with regard to one thorny and ambiguous 
concept in contemporary critical social and cultural theory: agency. Construed 
as some ability to act genuinely or authentically—or perhaps more modestly 
(though just as problematically) as simply some ability to have an effect
—"agency" is intimately bound to the problem of information, and has been 
since information's postwar American theorizers first grappled with the 
implications of a "new science" that seemed to challenge tenets of liberal 
humanism. Though they never used the term, "agency" preoccupied these 
thinkers; it both vexed and fascinated them, and their responses to it had 
repercussions in multiple fields (include continental philosophy) for years to 
come. Today, those responses have something to teach us about the ways 
popular struggles over "information" get articulated and framed.
The impulses guiding this dissertation, then, express something critical 
about the present search for knowledge about information. Its goal is not 
sheerly taxonomic or documentational; it does not necessarily seek to "clarify" 
some singular, objective thing that decades of research and writing across 
multiple discourses and domains have labeled "information." It approaches 
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information as something that belies a milieu the complexity of which is beyond 
the static frame of any single term: a certain formation always and already in 
formation. Generating knowledge about such a thing is not only an effort to 
better comprehend it―but also an attempt to intervene in its constant 
reconfiguration. For "knowledge is not made for understanding; it is made for 
cutting" (Foucault, 2010, p. 88).
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CHAPTER 1: THE INFORMATIONAL RESOURCE
The Grammars of Information
Much writing on information begins in frustration over the difficulty of 
definition. The task appears simple. "After all," Terranova (2004a) writes, 
"information has become such a common word and is used so freely and with 
such ease that we should have no problem at all defining it" (p. 6). Today, fewer 
words are as familiar as "information." But fewer words are also as elusive. 
Perhaps this is because information appears in so many discourses—what Day 
(2001) calls information's multiple "grammars"—and, he adds, "today the 
grammars of this term are extremely diverse" (p. 84). What follows is another 
attempt at definition, albeit one that does not seek to arrive at information's 
singular meaning. For what Raymond Williams (1983) writes of another 
complicated word, "culture," is also true of information: it "is a record of a 
number of important and continuing reactions to [...] changes in our social, 
economic, and political life, and may be seen, in itself, as a special kind of map 
by means of which the nature of the changes can be explored" (p. xvii). 
Tracking information's multiple, heterogeneous grammars is key to 
understanding what's at stake in the various social and political scenes in which
information appears today, scenes disclosing struggles that populate the 
current historical moment. Consider the following.
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***
Scene 1: To quell an uprising of users concerned by recent changes to 
Facebook's terms of service—changes specifically to the language regarding the
company's right to users' "information" after those users have terminated their 
accounts—public relations representative Kathy Chan takes to the blogosphere.
"Our philosophy," she writes (2009), "is that people own their information and 
control who they share it with" (n.p.). The company's pseudo-apology, "On 
Facebook, People Own and Control Their Information," continues:
People want full ownership and control of their information so they can 
turn off access to it at any time. At the same time, people also want to be 
able to bring the information others have shared with them—like email 
addresses, phone numbers, photos and so on—to other services and grant
those services access to those people's information. These two positions 
are at odds with each other. (Chan, 2009)
Call this information's political economic grammar, one in which 
information is a commodity of post-Fordist social formations. Here, information 
is a bounded and discrete object, something that can be bought, sold, and 
traded on a market. And it is quite valuable. As Verizon Wireless executive Bill 
Diggins notes when reports indicate that the mobile phone provider routinely 
gathers "information" (McCullagh, 2012) about its customers' usage habits and 
sells those details to marketers: "Data is [sic] the new oil" (n.p.). "Information" 
becomes "data" to the extent that it can be packaged, controlled, and 
manipulated to reveal some-thing about some-one. But it does not do this easily,
for information-as-commodity is a tricky kind of thing that often refuses to obey 
traditional laws of physics and complicates taken-for-granted market logics. It 
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can occupy two locations at once; it can transfer between parties without any 
essential loss. But it nevertheless "bears the stamp of society and history in its 
very core" (Schiller, 2007, p. 8), for it is, after all, an expression of certain 
configurations of capital, labor, and the state (Beniger, 1986). It is the principal 
stuff of "information societies" (Lash, 2002; Webster, 2006), where it appears as
both input and output for a particular mode of production.
***
Scene 2: John Perry Barlow (2008), co-founder of the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation and author of the provocative treatise "A Declaration of the 
Independence of Cyberspace," agrees to pen the foreword to science fiction 
writer and activist Cory Doctorow's essay collection, Content. He disagrees 
with the book's title: "Ha! Where's the container?" (p. xv). So-called "content," 
Barlow writes, is a term that "only arose when the institutions that had fattened
on their ability to bottle and distribute the genius of human expression began to
realize that their containers were melting away" (p. xvii). It's a conspiracy, a 
"plot to make you think that meaning is a thing" (p. xvii). But Barlow isn't 
fooled: "Information isn't a thing. It isn't an object. It isn't something that, when
you sell it or have it stolen, ceases to remain in your possession. It doesn't have 
a market value that can be determined" (p. xvi). "Information is simultaneously 
a relationship, an action, and an area of shared mind," says Barlow. "What it 
isn't is a noun" (p. xvi).
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Call this information's cultural grammar, in which information enjoys a 
distinct relationship with "meaning." Indeed, here the terms frequently slide 
into one another (as Barlow so easily demonstrates). Information is formless 
meaning, the result of human creative practices. It is the intangible and 
amorphous stuff that might be made to inhere in various "containers" but is 
never completely controlled or determined by them. Information-as-meaning 
becomes information-as-commodity through the incorporeal transformations of 
intellectual property law. But it exists then only as an impure, bastardized 
version of itself—something not quite in harmony with its essence as the free-
floating semantic. Popular writing in this grammar (like Barlow's) often 
celebrates information's uncontainability, its power to supersede constraints. 
More critical writing tackles the relationship of information and meaning head-
on. It might construe information as progenitor of particular cultural logics—
say, increasing skepticism of authoritative narratives and "expert" accounts 
(Andrejevic, 2013), the decline of representation as a singular locus of power 
relations (Terranova, 2004a, 2004b), or the fetishization of dematerialization 
(Hayles, 1999).
***
Scene 3: On his first day as President of the United States, Barack Obama 
issues a memorandum to all federal agencies: Subject: Freedom of Information 
Act. "The Government should not keep information confidential merely because 
public officials might be embarrassed by disclosure, because errors and failures
might be revealed, or because of speculative or abstract fears," he writes 
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(Obama, 2009, p. 1). President Obama hopes to "usher in a new era of open 
Government" (p. 1) characterized by transparency and accountability. The 
formula is simple: "A democracy requires accountability, and accountability 
requires transparency" (p. 1). And both of these require information. Obama 
instructs the Director of the Office of Management and Budget to "improve 
information dissemination to the public, including through the use of new 
technologies" (p. 1). A year later, Julian Assange disseminates information—
leaked military documents—to the public using new technologies. Obama calls 
the act "deplorable" ("Obama lashes out"). Assange claims he's simply carrying 
out the government's quest for total information awareness, conceptualizing the
government the same way the government conceptualizes terrorist 
organizations: as a set of networked nodes. "We extend this understanding of 
terrorist organizations and turn it on the likes of its creators where it becomes 
a knife to dissect the power conspiracies used to maintain authoritarian 
government," he writes (n.p.). Information is key to targetting those 
conspiracies, which Assange imagines as homeostatic systems capable of 
sustaining themselves through themselves. "Conspiracies take information 
about the world in which they operate (the conspiratorial environment), pass it 
around the conspirators and then act on the result," he says. "We can see 
conspiracies as a type of device that has inputs (information about the 
environment) and outputs (actions intending to change or maintain the 
environment)" (n.p.). Hacker and activist Aaron Swartz (2008) is more succinct:
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"Information is power. But like all power, there are those who want to keep it 
for themselves" (n.p.). The best way to fight an authoritarian conspiracy? 
Disrupt its information flows.
Call this information's documentational grammar, wherein information is 
the stuff of record, both a thing and a process of recording and retrieval 
(Buckland, 1991). While in the political economic grammar data emerge from 
information, the documentational grammar positions information between data 
(sensory stimuli) and knowledge (propositions that orient one in the world) (see 
Tweedale et al., 2014, pp. 2–4). Information bridges sensing and believing 
(Buckland, 1991). It operates on and reconfigures user's "knowledge 
structures" (Day, 2011; see also Day 2001). Information is what reveals; like a 
light, it shines on ignorance and dispels uncertainty. In theory, it brings one 
closer to the truth. Indeed, in civil societies, it is what free subjects require in 
order to be most free. Information is the mechanism of liberation.
***
Scene 4: Cryptologist Kristin Lauter of Microsoft Research wonders about 
the potential of the human genome. Using sample data, she computes a 
patient's risk of heart attack in two tenths of a second. She and her colleagues 
are working on a practical method for securing, through encryption, the 
"genetic information" (Sumner, 2014, n.p.) that will unlock the secrets of human
composition. Costs associated with sequencing the human genome are 
apparently plummeting, leading some to worry about the future security of 
"personal health information" (Sumner, 2014, n.p.). John Wilbanks, privacy 
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expert at Sage Bionetworks in Seattle, is one of those people. He imagines a 
world in which even the slightest physical interaction might disclose a person's 
deepest biological secrets:
In 50 years the cost of genome sequencing is expected to be very low. If 
there's a copy of your genome out there that's heavily encrypted, it would
just be better for me to shake hands with you and take some of your 
genetic material. The more we increase the penalty for getting an 
existing copy of a genome, the more the incentive is to just make a new 
copy. (cited in Sumner, 2014, n.p.)
Call this information's metaphysical grammar, where information is a 
universal substrate, the raw material for the universe's potentially infinite 
(re)configurations. Learning to manipulate this information gives humans 
control of the shape of the cosmos itself. This grammar leans heavily on a 
distinction (one Wilbanks' account activates) between two realms: the 
informatic, where patterns (and copies of patterns) proliferate endlessly, and 
the material, where those patterns get instantiated (even stolen). Black (2014) 
characterizes it as a relationship of "the perfect, eternal, and transcendent 
originators and determinants of messy, flawed, contingent matter" (p. 109)—an 
odd kind of neo-Platonism. It is an idea "already well established in the 
discourse of genetics" for example, where molecules like DNA and RNA serve 
as "the archetypal manifestations of molecules' power to mediate between pure 
information and physical materiality" (p. 105). As part of this grammar, Black 
writes,
7 
The concept of information, as an abstract means of describing material 
phenomena, is credited with an objective reality independent of material 
phenomena and so, because all material phenomena can be described in 
terms of information, information is reasoned to be a universal animating
principle behind all material phenomena. (p. 115)
It is a tendency pronounced not only in genetic discourses but also those of
quantum computing. For example, Davies (2014) elaborates "a view in which 
information is regarded as the primary entity from which physical reality is 
built" (p. 95, emphasis in original). Indeed, for scientists like Lloyd (2014), the 
universe is "a machine that processes information [...] a giant quantum 
computer" (p. 131). This is indisputable. "This is simply a mathematical fact" (p.
131); "the universe computes" (p. 123). Information is the expression of an 
infinite generativity. "It is the ongoing computation of the universe itself that 
gave rise naturally to subsequent information-processing revolutions such as 
life, sex, brains, language, and electronic computers" (p. 123). To discover 
information's natural dynamics is therefore to unlock not only the secrets of life
itself but also the keys to the organization of the entire cosmos—why things are 
the way they are and not some other way, or what Emeritus Regius Professor of 
Divinity at Oxford University, Keith Ward (2014), calls "the supreme 
informational principle for constructing universes" (p. 370):
[...] the ultimate ontological reality is indeed information, but that 
information is ultimately held in the mind of God, and such a hypothesis 
expresses one of the most coherent and plausible accounts of the nature 
of ultimate reality that is available to us in the modern scientific age. (p. 
378)
Information is a window to the divine.
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***
Four grammars of information. Four figures of information present in 
contemporary discourses. Four ways this thing called "information" gets 
invoked, policed, and mobilized. Each is not as tightly bounded as these 
descriptions might make it seem; boundaries bleed and overlap. Yet each is 
more than a definition. Each is a site: a site of contestation, a site of struggle. 
These struggles—over objects, over meanings, over truths, over a universal 
substrate—not only depend on certain notions of information, but also 
perpetuate them. These notions are neither fixed nor eternal; they are 
contextual, pieced together from contingent resources available in specific 
social and historical contexts. But this does not make them any less real, or 
their study any less pressing. Defining information may be difficult, but 
mapping its activities is even more so.
The 'Resource Doctrine' of Information
The point of elaborating information's grammars is not to reconcile them, 
to somehow synthesize them into a single definition that elides the particular 
nuances of each. Indeed, retaining information's very multiplicity—its ambiguity
and polysemy—is important for any analysis of the multiple ways the concept of 
"information" is able to productively function. Today, however, information has 
been effectively naturalized. So ostensibly ubiquitous is this thing called 
"information" that it seems propelled by its own internal and essential 
dynamics. According to many popular accounts, information shows little regard 
for the persons and institutions attempting to arrest, control, store, release, 
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secure, or monetize it. Byfield (2008) suggests contemporary discourses of 
information herald it as both a "cudgel," a "relentless, inevitable almost 
malevolent historical force that threatens institutions and forces adaptation," 
and a "carrot," "an enticing, endless, immaterial garden of delights in which 
instantaneous access to timeless knowledge promises the opportunity of 
transformation for individuals and for the globe as a whole" (p. 129). But 
information's apparent naturalness is of course part and parcel of its very 
historical construction. Information, as Day (2001) notes, continues to be rather
effective at eliding its own history, one that "must be forgotten within any 
'metaphysics' or ideology of information, because information in modernity 
connotes a factuality and pragmatic presence [...] that erases or radically 
reduces ambiguity and the problems of reading, interpreting, and constructing 
history" (p. 3, emphasis in original). Tensions exist not only between divergent 
notions of information—how can information be both amorphous and a 
commodity?—but also within seemingly coherent colloquial and institutional 
definitions of it. Such tensions invite exploration of the ways in which those 
definitions hang together, how they efface their own fissures and fractures 
while performing important work in the world.
Many popular definitions of information do, however, share one 
commonality: they treat information as a resource. This is to say that they 
interlock to form a particular epistemic formation, a way of knowing 
information Balnaves and Willson (2011) call the "resource doctrine of 
information" (p. 44). According to this view, information is a thing with some 
utility; it can be used, mis-used, or used up. Moreover, the resource doctrine of 
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information "carries with it explicit assumptions about rationality" (p. 43)—that 
is, it presupposes a certain mode of subjectivity that engages with informational
resources. As a resource that pre-exists certain engagements with it, 
information becomes disembedded from the relations that in fact constitute it. 
Popular discourses tend to treat it as either a motor of social and cultural 
change or some outcome or symptom of personal, cultural, juridical, scientific, 
or economic processes. Additionally, struggles over information are often 
likewise contests over resources, the informational objects or contents so 
central in contemporary debates concerning often disparate or divergent 
issues: privacy, creativity, ownership, communication, control, truth-telling, 
and/or liberation. Despite apparent disagreements between forces or factions 
struggling to define information's utility or limits, information's status as a 
resource remains unchanged, and it serves a powerful framing function. And 
because struggles over information often fail to displace this frame, it continues
to orient even the most seemingly radical interventions into these struggles. If 
we are to understand what is at stake when powerful forces deploy 
"information" as part of their discursive and material strategies or tactics, we 
must understand the ways in which a resource doctrine of information enables 
and constrains those repertoires.
Materials for doing this are already at our disposal. Interestingly, a 
"resource" view of information diverges considerably from those of 
information's mid-twentieth century theorizers—the mathematicians and 
engineers who, in the postwar United States, firmly rejected many notions that 
are today part and parcel of informational common sense. For them, 
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information was not an object—not something to be bartered, shared, disclosed,
or revealed—but a measure of relations, a particular manner of addressing 
contingency. Postwar theories of information responded to growing concerns 
about reality's ability to hold itself together, and suggested a desire to predict 
and control a world whose stability and coherence could no longer be taken for 
granted. "The beginning of the twentieth century marked more than the end of 
one hundred-year period and the start of another," writes polymath Norbert 
Wiener (1954) in the introduction to The Human Use of Human Beings, his 
bestselling book on "cybernetics," the science of self-regulating systems (p. 7). 
Indeed, Wiener's book expresses the anxiety of the age quite forcefully. It opens
on the image of a chaotic cosmos, a universe that persistently tends toward 
disorganization. Newtonianism—with its assurances that every element of the 
universe operates with wholly predictable and incontrovertible behaviors (see 
Hacking, 1990, 2006)—is under attack, both in the sciences and in 
mathematics. For Wiener, it is the dawn of a new epoch, one inaugurated by the
waning influence of strictly deterministic scientific imaginaries. The ascendancy
of probabilistic theory is part of an unavoidable "recognition of [...] an 
irrationality in the world," a "fundamental element of chance in the texture of 
the universe itself" (p. 11). The title of his book's preface names the source of 
so much trepidation: "The Idea of a Contingent Universe."
For Wiener and his fellow cyberneticists, the universe's absolute 
contingency is its only certainty. No longer can one assume that the universe 
holds together of its own accord. It offers no guarantees about its shape, its 
movements, or its temporary and local configurations. "It is a world of Process 
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[sic]" Wiener later writes in his memoirs, "not one of a final dead equilibrium to 
which Process leads nor one determined in advance of all happenings, by a pre-
established harmony" (Wiener, 1956, p. 328). And so, drawing on available 
resources from physics, calculus, and engineering, Wiener names that process. 
He develops a concept meant to assist in measuring the probabilities of the 
world's various arrangements, and calls it "information":
The needs and the complexity of modern life make greater demands on 
this process of information than ever before, and our press, our 
museums, our scientific laboratories, our universities, our libraries and 
textbooks, are obliged to meet the needs of this process or fail in their 
purpose. (Wiener, 1954, p. 18)
Articulated more than half a century ago, this definition of information 
diverges sharply from those circulating in contemporary discourses. But as this 
dissertation will argue, it is integral to understanding something about the way 
power operates today. To be sure, Wiener's writings (as well as those of Claude 
Shannon and others whose work this dissertation will examine) disclose 
dimensions of information occluded in information's popular accounts. But even
more importantly, they gesture toward a profound sense of shifting ground, the 
dissolution of relations that secured some (albeit loose and fissured) consensus 
about the way the world worked. By revisiting these writings, this dissertation 
seeks to understand how information might be more than some thing—some 
resource—over which people struggle today. In doing so, it does not seek to 
return to some "original" and therefore more "correct" definition of information,
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but rather suggests that renewed attention to the concerns motivating postwar 
information theories might disclose additional key dimensions of the 
contemporary political terrain.
The Problem(-Space) of Information
More appropriately, then, one might refer to the problem of information as 
the problem-space of information. As Scott (2004) argues, problem-spaces are 
historical conjunctures, conceptual-ideological thickets that pose genuinely new
questions to cultural analysts. Problem-spaces are those material and discursive
regimes in which the "meaning" of a particular object of inquiry might be 
disclosed through what Grossberg (2010) calls a "conversation between analyst 
and context" (p. 48), a conversation that both generates the problem-space and 
orients the critical inquiry going on in and around it. The idea of information as 
problem-space underscores the contested nature of the term (its status as 
multivalenced and overdetermined). It also highlights the fact that it points not 
to a single referent, but to an entire constellation of ideas, practices, 
discourses, effects, signs, and knowledges. This is to say that information is a 
problem-space insofar as what it discloses is not a singular object but rather a 
configuration of elements aligned to organize the activities that can and should 
take place in that space. This dissertation argues that the central problematic 
disclosed through investigations of information's effectivity today is that of 
agency.
Though the term does not often appear explicitly in them, agency becomes
central to information theories and informatic discourses—for empirical, 
theoretical, and political reasons. It is visible in the work of the American 
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scientists, mathematicians, and engineers who theorized the nature and 
function of both information and informatic technologies. Cyberneticists in 
particular grappled with agential concerns, especially when confronted with the
radically antihumanist implications of their work, which seemed to posit a 
certain symmetry between human and nonhuman actors, both of which, 
cybernetics claimed, embody the same behavioral propensities (see Hayles, 
1999). Indeed, in a world that constantly tended toward chaotic dissolution, 
"agency" was for the cyberneticists a matter of maintenance or stability, a 
capacity to remain coherent in light of this thoroughly contingent cosmos. 
Furthermore, many popularizations of Shannonian information theories (such 
as that of well-known collaborator Warren Weaver, for example) stressed 
information's indispensability for asserting influence over the actions of others; 
they rendered information a matter of exerting influence through the 
deliberate, rational selection and transmission of messages. While information 
theorists might not have claimed to be developing theories of agency, their 
work is rife with concepts and themes—choice, will, efficacy, possession, 
determination, change—that have traditionally clustered around this 
notoriously thorny problem.
An interest in nonhuman actors' agential capacities links cybernetics (and 
the information theories it mobilized) with some trends in critical social, 
cultural, and political theory, where nonhumanistic theories of agency have 
proliferated in recent years (see, for example, Barad, 2007; Bennett, 2010; 
Coole, 2005; Coole & Frost, 2010; Latour, 2005; Passoth et al., 2012; 
Whatmore, 2002). Such theories attempt "to undo the conceit that humanity is 
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the sole or ultimate wellspring of agency" (Bennett, 2010, p. 30), and they 
attempt to account for the dynamic effectivity of myriad entities (human and 
nonhuman, organic and inorganic) not only producing particular social 
formations but also maintaining, subverting, or recomposing them in ways that 
determine the activities those formations might afford. This work also embodies
key cybernetic impulses, like an emphasis on the relational complexity between 
heterogeneous actors and a tendency to think "machinically" about systems' 
behaviors. In fact, this dissertation demonstrates the historical, discursive 
linkages between ongoing work in cybernetics and a growing body of work that,
while intellectually indebted to it, nevertheless (and occasionally vociferously) 
rebukes it. For instance, the "machinic ontology" of Deleuze and Guattari owes 
much to the thinking of second-order cyberneticists, even as these two thinkers 
are at pains to distance themselves from any association with what they 
consider "information theory" (see Chapter 3). Cybernetics helped set the stage 
for decades of social, cultural, and political theorizing by clearing a discursive 
space in which the solitary, autonomous, efficacious subject—icon of 
Enlightenment political imaginaries—might undergo rigorous critique.
Exploring the problem-space of information has both theoretical and 
political consequences. For if information is today construed primarily as a 
resource, then one must ask for what or whom is it a resource? The resource 
doctrine of information often smuggles into contemporary discussions about 
information, information technologies, and information politics a view of agency
as some-thing located "in" a human subject, which struggles against social 
structures the principal aim of which is denying, restricting, or otherwise 
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delimiting this agency. Interestingly, while this Enlightenment notion of agency 
has recently undergone rigorous critique in the academy, it continues to exert 
powerful pressures in popular politics. The resource doctrine of information 
elides the question of agency, and the Enlightenment subject (reappearing now 
in its neoliberal re-figuration) remains the taken-for-granted locus of agency in 
discussions regarding struggles over information-things. Information's 
reification into a resource one might possess or use—with which one might 
truck, barter, and trade—involves the concomitant naturalization of this subject 
as agent in constant tension with the structures of a given social formation.
On the Agency of the Informatic
This view of agency tends to promote linear and reductionist models of the
otherwise complex relationship between information technologies and social 
formations. As Slack and Wise (2005) note, popular narratives regarding ways 
in which technology and society "interact" invoke specific notions of 
determinism often expressed through arguments about causality (see also 
Slack, 1984); these determinisms are themselves predicated on a dualistic 
model that separates humans activities and material technologies. As Williams 
(1974) suggests, in popular accounts of "technological change," two 
predominant forms of determinism prevail. The first is technological 
determinism, whereby a new technology enters into a given social arrangement 
and, as a consequence of its own essential and internal dynamics, alters that 
arrangement, or "sets the conditions for social change and progress" (p. 13). 
The second is social determinism, whereby broader social processes produce a 
new technology as a symptom of cultural values, a mere "by-product of a social 
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process that is otherwise determined" (p. 13). In these accounts, then, either 
technologies or human actors impinge on the other from a place somehow 
outside their interrelationship(s); implicit in them is an agent/structure dualism 
that imagines technology either as a useful resource for or an unfortunate 
impediment to human activities. The result is a zero-sum, linear relation of 
influence between people and things, "a stand-off between a person and a 
machine" from which critics must "determine on which side lies the central 
point of agency, the fulcrum of power on which the social rocks" (Wise, 1998, p. 
424). Posing questions about the nature and function of technology (including 
information technology) becomes a simple matter of choosing which of these 
"sides" to consider and analyze, which to narrate as the active subject that 
impinges on an otherwise passive object. Moreover, such linear thinking 
frequently rests upon a humanist bias that frames research projects in advance 
of actual investigation, encouraging researchers to either bemoan the 
"detrimental" effects of technology on already-existing social arrangements or 
celebrate ways in which technology augments some essential human capability. 
More useful instead are descriptions of relations among information, 
information technologies, and social formations that do not easily collapse into 
linear narratives featuring diametrically opposed forces whose nature and 
valence are prefigured in advance of research.
The resource doctrine of information both depends on and reinforces 
linear and dualistic models of technological causality. This is one effect of the 
doctrine's facility as a particular epistemic formation. Another is the tendency 
to posit certain qualities of information, namely:
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• Information is meaningful content; that is, information is the "stuff" of 
creative activity, the substance of some exchange between entities that 
makes sense to those entities because it can be "read" against some 
experiential horizon. Information is what is transfered as part of social 
interactions. But it is an odd kind of content, one that often refuses to 
obey certain physical laws. It replicates easily (for some, too easily), and 
needn't remain a single entity's exclusive property. What is more, 
information-content typically takes a specific form: amorphousness. As 
the content of transfer, this formless and ephemeral yet meaningful 
substance might inhere temporarily in or on various media, those storage
devices that attempt to contain it (books, hard drives, the brain). And yet 
one must never confuse the "meaning" of information with any specific 
material instantiation of information, as information's "natural" 
ephemerality complicates these attempts to contain it. Information 
operates primarily in semantic registers as both precondition for and 
outcome of some meaningful exchange. Indeed, struggles over 
information-as-content are typically struggles over enclosure. They 
comprise a political project aimed at either access (availability of 
information) or control (restriction of information).
• Information is representational; that is, information discloses something 
about the actions, proclivities, dispositions, and traits of a target or 
source. Information functions according to the logic of the semiological 
sign: it stands in for something that is less ephemeral and therefore more
real. And if information is representational, it often is so in the most 
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"transparent" way. Information is a vehicle of objectivity, providing some 
knowledge (unsullied by ideology) of a state of affairs. Information can 
disclose truths. Indeed, information cannot be "false," for then it would 
be "misinformation." Information represents to a conscious mind 
something essential or enduring. Struggles over information-as-
representational are therefore struggles over these representations or 
misrepresentations. They comprise a political project aimed at either 
demystification (dispelling "misinformation") or resignification 
(circulating "different information"), and spark never-ending debates 
regarding information's (in)ability to (in)adequately account for the traits
or conditions it supposedly represents (debates over identity and 
verisimilitude). Indeed, information's "facticity" makes it a public 
resource, the lifeblood of democracy. Information that accurately 
portrays a given state of affairs is exactly what "free" citizens require to 
make rational decisions and, consequently, to remain free.
Each of information's many grammars registers the effects of these 
qualities to varying extents, but all seem to converge on them—and with 
important consequences, as we will see. What motivates this dissertation is the 
sense that popular struggles over what is commonly known as "information" are
often misdirected, for they do not adequately apprehend the complexity of the 
object they claim to contest. Certain philosophical commitments (commitments 
bound up in and presupposed by commonsense notions of information) 
constrain their understanding of what is at stake in these struggles, and might 
actually undermine their success in securing the political victories they seek. 
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This work attempts not only to gain insight into the cultural, political, and 
economic dynamics that animate struggles over information today, but also to 
develop methods and conceptual tools better suited for intervening effectively 
in these struggles.
Approaching Information
This dissertation returns to a specific body of writing on information: that 
which emerged in American scientific, engineering, and mathematical 
literatures during and after the Second World War, a time of intensifying 
interest in the emerging field of information science and the communication 
and control technologies that might embody and demonstrate its important 
contributions. As Wiener indicates in the quotations above, this is also a 
moment that presents itself as the beginning of a new conjuncture, a novel, if 
temporary, settlement in the social forces aligned to produce and secure the 
conditions of everyday life. Undoing Newtonianism's assurances—dissolving the
certainty with which one could speak about the determinacy of events, of 
effects and their causes, of movements and their trajectories—gave rise to the 
problem of radical contingency. This is the problem information's postwar 
architects designed the concept to address and, ultimately, resolve. For the 
question of agency, the question of an entity's ability to make or be otherwise, 
became salient precisely in that historical moment when faith in the past's 
ability to precisely and irrevocably determine the future wavered (Hacking, 
1990). One way to glimpse the tensions present in this conjuncture—one way 
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into the problem-space of agency it disclosed—is through the question of the 
politics of information, which the scientific and engineering literatures under 
investigation here inaugurate.
This is, admittedly, not a popular brand of theory today. Many groups of 
communication scholars have for decades lodged their critiques of these 
models, rejecting them as unduly simplistic, tired, even politically and ethically 
dubious. Many critics paint the models with a broadly negative brush, insisting 
they imagine communication scenarios as largely disembodied, 
decontextualized, and dematerialized affairs (in other words, everything against
which contemporary theory rails). This dissertation does not dismiss these 
criticisms, but it does embrace their critical spirit in order to refute them. It 
reads American information theory closely—historically and critically—and it 
argues for recuperating what this body of work has to offer contemporary 
interventions into informatic politics. For the American information theorists 
thought and spoke about information in ways that frequently run counter to 
what we take for granted about information today; the figure of information 
they articulated during and after World War II in some respects differs quite 
dramatically from those that animate our everyday understanding of the 
concept. In particular, this dissertation argues that they understood information
as nonsubstantial, non-semantic, and non-representational. For them, 
information was not a resource to be used; it was not a matter of some object-
thing to be protected, hidden, deployed, or disclosed, but rather a matter of 
organizing possibilities for action.
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We tend to forget this definition's purchase when we fail to question the 
resource doctrine of information, and consequently our conceptualization of the
cultural politics of information suffers a kind of myopia. Framing information as
a resource entrenches the view that what's at stake in struggles over 
information is only something like ownership or access—in other words, 
something a sovereign subject either has or doesn't have, something an agent 
can or can't do in the face of the social institutions or structures that restrict it. 
The result is a cultural politics of information aimed solely at assessing an 
individual's ability to act in the world, to "own" or "protect" the information that
represents it, to "disclose," "circulate," or "tap into" the information that tells it 
something about the world. These are not unimportant political considerations, 
but they do not exhaust the scope or significance of informatic politics today 
(see Chapter 5). A return to the mid-twentieth century American literature on 
information helps make this point.
For the American information theorists were adamant: information is no 
substantial content-thing. Against contemporary images of information as a 
stable, unified, and self-evident object, these mathematicians and engineers 
posited something more processual. For Shannon, "information" names 
something about the certainty with which one can apprehend the arrangement 
of bodies in a given field, the precision with which those arrangements might 
guarantee accurate replication of signals. Shannon's information is intimately 
bound to a notion of measurement, and therefore speaks directly to relations 
between entities in a fluctuating field of forces. The same is true for Wiener and
other cyberneticists who spoke of information as something determined in and 
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through relations of bodies more or less organized. For them, information 
functions as a force of stability in a rapidly changing world; it ensures survival, 
salvation from a universe moving inexorably toward annihilation. In fact, 
Wiener (1961) thought information occupies its own ontological category. 
"Information is information" he writes, "not matter or energy" (p. 132). In the 
postwar American context, information functions not as discrete and bounded 
object-resource, but as a matter of relationality; it resists reification and retains
a significant degree of processuality.
Nevertheless, for American theorists information was not ephemeral, not 
some rarefied stuff that floats free of otherwise weighty and worldly concerns. 
As both a tool for measuring the relative organization of a given field and a 
process of taking shape against forces of disarray, information is for these 
thinkers incorporeal—while it might lack a physical body, it "is certainly not 
immaterial; it takes effect, becomes effect, always on the level of materiality" 
(Foucault, 1972, p. 231). Real as the forces that shape it, information 
participates in the very formations that give rise to it and is capable of affecting
those formations to a significant degree. Indeed, for the American engineers, 
therein lied its very utility. Conceived otherwise, it simply could not have 
addressed the problem its postwar progenitors wanted it to: the radical 
contingency of material relations.
If information inheres only in relations, then it tracks relations of a 
particular type. Certain as they were about information's non-substantiality, 
American theorists held equally that information is not a representational 
phenomenon. That is, information does not "stand for" anything in the 
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semiological sense; it does not traffic in economies of signification as a signifier 
of something outside or beyond itself. Upon committing his now-famous 
mathematical theory of information to writing, Shannon (1948) was quick to 
note that while popular discourses of communication tend to conceive 
informational messages as things that "refer to or are correlated according to 
some system with certain physical or conceptual entities," the "semantic 
aspects of communication are irrelevant to the engineering problem" (p. 379) 
his work addressed. The relationship of information to its referent is not one of 
re-presentation (see Chapter 2).
Posing the question of information in a decidedly non-representational 
register therefore complicates discussions of informatic "accuracy" or fidelity, 
as information that does not re-present anything to consciousness cannot be 
deemed true or false. Put another way, one might say that information in its 
American formulation operates outside an economy of verisimilitude; its ability 
to transparently reflect or transmit "facts," then, is in this sense questionable. 
For the American theorists, information was instead a matter of configuration, 
of arranging bodies in such a way as to modulate their potentials to function in 
specific ways (see Chapter 2). Precisely how it does so, of course, differs 
depending on the particular information theory in question.
This emphasis on ongoing configuration meant that American information 
theories embraced a specific nonlinear understanding of causality. Early 
cyberneticists, for example, introduced the concept of feedback into both 
engineering discourses and the philosophical lexicon (see Chapter 3). Indeed, 
cyberneticists like Ashby (1956) used this very concept to distance cybernetics 
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from traditional scientific and engineering pursuits. Feedback relations are 
those in which a process' output becomes its input, those in which the 
distinction between "cause" and "effect" is blurry indeed. In this way, then, 
feedback complicates linear understandings of the relationship between 
singular actors and/in social formations, and poses rather dramatically the 
question of action and efficacy in complex constellations of human and 
nonhuman entities. Moreover, feedback relations' particular temporal 
orientation toward a future that might be otherwise puts the cyberneticists in 
conversation with continental philosophers and social theorists who framed the 
question of power as something machinic, as something that inheres in a field 
of forces to control current and future actions. Somewhat curiously, however, 
these thinkers (such as Deleuze, Guattari, and Foucault) tended to uncritically 
adopt received notions of information—information as a resource, as the 
content-stuff of a unidirectional transmission from one mind to another—and for
this reason often failed to glimpse all they held in common with their American 
forebearers (see Chapter 4).
Toward a Cultural Studies of Information
Pieced together from disparate resources in statistical mechanics, 
electrical engineering, calculus, and neuroscience (among other fields), 
theories of information are themselves contingent entities specifically designed 
to address the problems of contingency and agency at a particular moment. A 
critical approach to information must therefore embrace contingency not only 
as an object of inquiry but also as a methodological imperative.
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This dissertation is a work of cultural studies, a politically-motivated 
intellectual project concerned with providing useful analyses of ways in which 
social and historical contexts are produced and maintained as unequal relations
of power. This project seeks a better understanding of the specific ways 
theories of information—those both historical and contemporary, scientific and 
popular—couple with particular technological apparatuses to naturalize and/or 
transform specific contexts.
To do this, it addresses the way these contingent resources get articulated.
Articulation involves forging non-necessary (but nevertheless real and effective)
connections that define the capacities of the elements thus connected (see 
Grossberg, 1992, 2010; Hall, 1986; Slack, 1996), and articulations are the 
contingent linkages between activities, signs, experiences, affects, 
subjectivities, and discourses that produce and determine the elements in a 
given social formation. As Slack and Wise (2005) suggest, complex collections 
of articulations are assemblages, dynamic constellations of connections that 
organize capacities for action, movement, connection, and investment. Indeed, 
assemblages must be defined by the very articulations they manage to achieve, 
sustain, and decompose, for articulations define an assemblage's capacities, 
what it can do (what it draws together, what it makes possible through the 
relations it establishes). Theories of information (as well as those technological 
apparatuses and practices one might call "informational") are articulations 
inasmuch as they produce, facilitate, or foreclose certain modes of relation. 
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Moreover, information itself consists of nothing but articulations, and 
conceptualizing informatic theories, practices, techniques, and technologies as 
articulations means grappling with their irreducible contingency.
To say that cultural studies is concerned with (re)constituting context(s) is 
to say that it seeks to map those relations (or articulations) that define the 
contours of possibility in a given social formation. Cultural studies treats a 
context as "a structured field, a configuration of practices" that map conditions 
of existence (Grossberg, 1992, p. 60). As Grossberg (2010) explains, "context" is
the object of cultural studies in a dual sense. First, it is the object of inquiry for 
cultural studies. A context is a field of forces out of which elements are 
produced through various (and changing) articulations, and these elements 
cannot be thought apart from the relations that constitute and reconstitute 
them. Cultural studies is in this way radically contextualist; it considers context 
not as the background for but rather the complex actuality of any social 
formation. For Grossberg (2010), "the identity, significance, and effects of any 
practice or event (...) are defined only by the complex set of relations that 
surround, interpenetrate, and shape it" (p. 20). Cultural studies thus sets itself 
the task of mapping these relations in an attempt to generate some insight into 
their effects. In this second way, then, context is also the goal of cultural 
studies, it's object-ive. In sum, cultural studies aims to reconstitute the contexts
that make any given element or formation what it is, if only so that it can offer 
strategies for addressing that formation and assessing its consequences for the 
ways in which power is distributed in, through, and by it (and, if possible, for 
dis- and re-articulating the connections that shape it).
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In light of this relationship between contexts and their articulation(s), 
Slack (1996) argues that articulation is indeed the method of cultural studies, a 
way of addressing and intervening in the complex and contradictory relations 
researchers encounter when confronted with a particular problem-space. 
Articulation, she suggests provides not only a way of avoiding "the twin traps of
reductionism and essentialism" (p. 113) that often plague studies of culture and
technology, but also an ethos of engagement with a context, one that stresses 
the importance of intervening in contexts in order to reshape them. This 
dissertation embraces thinking and working with articulation as a way of 
maintaining cultural studies' ongoing commitment to foregrounding relations 
and connections in thought and in practice, and as a way of producing the kind 
of politically useful knowledge characteristic of cultural studies. It attempts to 
do what Grossberg (2010) insists is the aim of any cultural studies project: to 
tell stories that permit the possibility of transformation and change.
To begin, then, this dissertation reconstitutes the postwar American 
context in which scientists, engineers, and mathematicians articulated 
information for the purpose of confronting contingency. It aims to partially and 
provisionally reconstruct the field of forces in which "information" (and 
information theories) took shape. It seeks to track the multiple, overlapping, 
and frequently contradictory articulations of information, and understand their 
deployments in certain fields of power. That is to say, it seeks to understand 
how information accumulates a certain capacity for authorizing and 
accomplishing particular goals.
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CHAPTER 2: THE FORMATION OF INFORMATION
Articulating Information
This chapter historicizes "information" by tracing its articulation in an 
American context. More specifically, it unpacks the scientific, mathematical, 
and engineering literature that circulated through and across multiple, 
overlapping spaces and institutions—universities, think tanks, governmental 
organizations, and popular culture—during and immediately after the Second 
World War, a time of intensifying interest in potential applications of electronic 
computing technologies for both military and civilian ends.
Forged from curiously disparate intellectual, social, and historical 
resources gathered amid a rapidly shifting social, political, cultural, and 
economic wartime landscape, information is never easily or cleanly dissociated 
from the context of its production (on this, see Beniger, 1986; Edwards, 1996; 
Mindell, 2002; Schiller, 2007). And yet many popular and academic attempts to 
address "information"—its characteristics, say, or its uses—tend to ignore 
critical aspects of this context. They instead speak unproblematically of 
"information" as a coherent, stable, and bounded object of study. But like other 
terms that comprise a vocabulary for thinking and speaking about 
contemporary social and cultural dynamics, "information" refers to no such 
object. Instead it opens, as Raymond Williams (1976) suggests in the 
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introduction to his Keywords, onto an entire formation, a complex and 
overdetermined series of practices, discourses, artifacts, and moods: "ways not 
only of discussing but of seeing many of our central experiences" (p. 13). Words
like "information," Williams stresses, are important not for the singular 
meanings they clarify, but rather for the problems they disclose; they cannot 
"really be thought through [...], cannot even be focused until we are conscious 
of the words as elements of problems" (p. 14) that prompt their construction, 
takeup, and circulation.
For this reason, Williams (1976) says, studies of word-problems must be in 
some way historical, aimed at recognizing what Grossberg (2010) calls the 
problematics that seem to define the particular field of forces in which they act.
This chapter concerns what Geoghegan (2008a) calls "official histories" (p. 68) 
of information, those technical accounts of information the work of which 
constituted information and rendered it intelligible in the wartime and postwar 
conjuncture. These accounts, along with their attendant narrations (see Ashby, 
1956; Aspray, 1985; Cherry, 1951; Pierce, 1973, 1980), depict information as an
object awaiting scientific and mathematical discovery, particularly by Claude 
Shannon and Norbert Wiener, two figures widely considered the intellectual 
fathers of information. Their accounts of information—published in technical 
journals, scientific monographs, and popular books alike—have become 
"benchmark documents of information and communication theory" (Edwards, 
1996, p. 180), undeniably responsible for constituting modern information and 
positioning its uptake in the mid-20th century. Popular narratives to the 
contrary, these theories of information did not spring forth "full grown" (Gleick, 
31 
2001, n.p.) in "complete form" (Waldrop, 2001, n.p.), but were instead the result
of painstaking and rigorous articulatory work that instantiated information as a 
natural phenomenon available for scientific inquiry and mathematical 
explication.
The information theories of Shannon and Wiener are in fact especially 
illustrative of the fractures and inconsistencies that characterize the concept of 
information; indeed, exploring the patchy and frequently tenuous connections 
these theories marshal and sustain makes "the flat, two-dimensional 
information 'birthed' in 1948 [become] promiscuous, lively—even 
schizophrenic" (Geoghegan, 2008a, p. 75). This chapter does not offer 
something like a definitive or comprehensive account of information in the 
postwar period. Rather, it concerns the present, explicates those particularities 
of information that have been elided or misconstrued in many accounts of both 
Shannon's and Wiener's work, and reconstitutes where necessary and 
appropriate the contexts surrounding them in order to expose their motivating 
questions and concerns. These concerns indicate ways in which information 
might be more than some thing over which people struggle today, and they 
suggest that a renewed focus on these literatures might disclose additional 
dimensions of the contemporary political terrain in which information seems to 
be playing an increasingly significant role.
So this chapter does not advocate a return to some "original" and 
therefore more "correct" or "pure" definition of information as a tool for quickly
or easily diagnosing contemporary formations of power (as if, like Williams 
notes, simply clarifying a term does anything to address or even resolve the 
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problems its various uses disclose). But it does suggest that mathematical and 
technical literatures offer valuable resources for potentially assessing and 
intervening in these formations—resources those who readily dismiss these 
histories risk ignoring. The following reading of early American information 
theory does run against the grain of popular interpretations of this literature in 
certain strands of contemporary communication studies, which tend to brush off
informatic and cybernetic models of communication as ostensibly too linear, too
reductive, too mechanistic, or too decontextual. Instead, this chapter joins 
Genosko (2012) in "refusing to rehearse well-known criticisms that would leave 
[these texts] behind for the sake of a critical communication and cultural 
studies, whether it is explained in terms of signification, media, political 
ecology, or poetics" (p. 31). It offers an unabashedly materialist reading of 
information that attempts to dissociate information from various connotations it
has accrued in recent decades—and recuperates a means of conceptualizing 
information that in fact gestures toward theoretico-political problem-spaces 
(Grossberg, 2010) occluded by its more popular narrations. In short, these 
literatures express a profound concern with the ways in which seemingly 
unpredictable, heterogeneous collections of elements might be organized and 
their capacities for current and future action productively modulated—a 
problem one might call agency.
A Mathematical Theory of Communication
Nearly all historical accounts of modern information, both popular (Gleick, 
2011) and academic (Pierce, 1980), begin with the figure of Claude Shannon. As
an undergraduate at the University of Michigan, Shannon straddled 
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mathematics and electrical engineering (he earned a bachelor's in each), twin 
interests that would occupy him for practically his entire life. In 1936, Shannon 
began a master's program at MIT, where he assisted Vannevar Bush with work 
on the differential analyzer—an analog computer that was, at the time, the 
world's most powerful (Nahin, 2013). During WWII, Bush served as chairman of
the National Defense Research Committee (NDRC) under President Roosevelt, 
and his work with the analyzer was directly related to anti-ballistics research. 
Shannon's advisor indelibly linked him to the war effort.
Shannon's master's thesis, "A Symbolic Analysis of Relay and Switching 
Circuits," married Boolean algebra with the science of electrical switching 
circuits (Nahin, 2013). In a 1939 letter to Bush, Shannon concedes that he had 
"made some progress in various outskirts of the problem" of performing 
mathematical operations with machines, but was "still pretty much in the 
woods" (Shannon, 1993e, p. 456). While he toiled away on that effort, however, 
Shannon idly experimented with another interest—one sparked by an 
undergraduate encounter with engineer Ralph Hartley's work on signal 
transmission (e.g., Hartley, 1928): "an analysis of some of the fundamental 
properties of general systems for the transmission of intelligence," something 
he felt had "not been rigorously proved" nor "thoroughly investigated" 
(Shannon, 1993e, pp. 455-456). His letter to Bush contains rudimentary 
equations representing the process by which various messages (rendered 
mathematically as discrete functions of time) might be transformed into signals 
for eventual transmission and replication.
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After a brief fellowship at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, 
Shannon began his career at Bell Labs, where he would produce the theory that
made him a household name. But Shannon's initial work at Bell in 1940 did not 
concern the theory of signal transmission for which he became famous. 
Shannon published that work only after eight years in the lab. Cryptography 
was for Shannon the more immediate pursuit, and his efforts here placed him in
productive conversation with British mathematician Alan Turing (Gleick, 2011). 
In this arena, Shannon composed a paper that would eventually bear the title 
"Communication Theory of Secrecy Systems" when published in The Bell 
Systems Technical Journal in 1949. But the title Shannon initially gave to the 
piece—classified upon completion and released only in 1945—resonates with 
Shannon's later contributions: "A Mathematical Theory of Cryptography."
In 1948, Shannon published (in two installments) the document that 
brought him widespread acclaim: "A Mathematical Theory of Communication." 
The essay addresses the seemingly straightforward problem of efficiently 
encoding a message into a signal for transmission through a channel with 
minimal interference from noise and therefore maximal chance of reproduction 
by a receiving entity. The problem was not "new" to Shannon; the first pages of 
his essay explain Shannon's debt to fellow Bell Labs researchers Hartley and 
Harry Nyquist, whose work on information predated Shannon's by decades (see
Sterne, 2012, for an explanation of the extent of these contributions, 
particularly in telegraphy and telephony). But Shannon's approach specified the
problem in a way his predecessors' had not: it assessed signals as probability 
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functions. With resources from statistical mechanics (resources that had also 
assisted his cryptographic analyses), Shannon explained information with the 
following equation:
Here, H is the "amount of information," which is equal to the sum of the 
logarithms of the probabilities of the occurrence of a particular message from a 
set of possible messages. Shannon writes "pi log pi" to indicate the relative 
likelihood of one event over others (as we will see presently, information is 
intimately related to the certainty with which one might assess this likelihood). 
Summing the logarithms of these probabilities (the role of big sigma in this 
equation) produces a negative value between 0 and 1. K is for Shannon simply 
"a choice of a unit of measure" (Shannon & Weaver, 1963, p. 50)—and the 
minus sign that precedes it is significant indeed (as we will soon see). 
Quantities that take this form, Shannon writes, "play a central role in 
information theory as measures of information, choice and uncertainty" (p. 50). 
Shannon preferred a single word to describe the relationship between choice 
and uncertainty that "information" was to measure: "entropy."
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Illustration 1: Shannon's equation for information
A New Theory of Entropy, Again
Shannon's mathematical theory of communication articulates information 
in physical terms. For Shannon (1993b), information "can be treated very much 
like a physical quantity such as mass or energy" (p. 190). This is to say 
"information" describes some property of an ensemble, situation, or state; like 
"mass" or "energy," it names an abstract characteristic available for 
measurement. Just as "mass" refers to the degree of gravitational pull on a body
and "energy" to the relation between force and distance, "information" 
measures the relative amount of entropy in a closed system.
By designating "entropy" his operative term, Shannon reinforces links 
between information, physical science, statistical mechanics, and probabilistic 
logic. As Wicken (1987) explains, the concept of entropy "has had a long and 
interesting history" (p. 177), one that spans more than a century and traverses 
disparate disciplines. In particular, Shannon's mathematical formula for 
calculating an amount of information strikingly resembles those of Austrian 
physicist Ludwig Boltzmann (see Wicken, 1987; Johnston, 2008), whose work 
attempted to describe the relative distribution of particles in a closed system by
calculating the probabilities of various arrangements of those particles (with 
results that correspond to one's degree of certainty about those distributions). 
Yet while Shannon recognizes his debt to Boltzmann (Shannon, 1993a, 1993b), 
his eventual adoption of the term may owe more to a conversation with 
mathematician John von Neumann, who suggested Shannon use the term "for 
two reasons: first, the function is already in use in thermodynamics under the 
same name; second, and more importantly, most people don't know what 
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entropy really is, and if you use the word entropy in an argument, you will win 
every time" (cited in Floridi, 2010, p. 46, emphasis in original). Shannon would 
later dispute this alleged conversation (in Price, 1985).
Nevertheless, as Wicken (1987) notes, Shannon's use of the term ushers 
his work into the "enormously broad connotative field" in which entropy traffics,
for while Shannon's equation is "symbolically isomorphic" with Boltzmann's 
equation from statistical mechanics, "the meanings of the symbols in the 
respective equations bear little in common" (p. 179-180). Exploiting this 
ambiguity was, however, critical in the eventual uptake of Shannon's work—and
the popularization of the concept of information itself.
Physical scientists will describe entropy as disorder (the relative level of 
dispersion among elements in a closed system); Shannon will instead speak of 
uncertainty. For Shannon, information is "closely associated with uncertainty" 
(Shannon, 1993a, p. 173) insofar as an increase in the former indicates an 
increase of the latter. In other words, information is directly proportional to 
uncertainty and therefore synonymous with entropy. The concept is therefore 
useful for predictively calculating the probability that a certain event—and not 
others—will occur. The greater the likelihood of this occurrence (the greater the
certainty that it will occur), the less information present in that situation. 
Shannon (1993a) offers the following explanatory example:
The information I obtain when you say something to me corresponds to 
the amount of uncertainty I had, previous to your speaking, of what you 
were going to say. If I was certain of what you were going to say, I obtain 
no information by your saying it. (p. 173)
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Information is a matter of novelty and unpredictability—both of which are 
closely associated with uncertainty.
Placing Shannon's theory of information into an engineering context better
illuminates its particularities. Doing so is especially important as Shannon 
conceived his theory here, and often noted its limited applicability elsewhere 
(Shannon, 1993c). The principal task motivating Shannon's articulation of a 
theory of information was the construction of technical apparatuses capable of 
reliably (that is to say, predictably) transmitting signals across channels in ways
that protected them from forces threatening to render them unintelligible—or 
replicating "at one point either exactly or approximately a message selected at 
another point" (Shannon & Weaver, 1963, p. 31). Closer examination of 
Shannon's model for these apparatuses indicates critical subtleties popular 
glosses of the schema frequently elide.
A Model 'Suitably Idealized'
Shannon's schematic for modeling a communication system is by now 
quite familiar, and has become undeniably entrenched in Western popular 
imaginaries of communication. Despite Shannon's (1993c) skepticism 
concerning over-extensions and universalizations of his work (as if, he wrote, "a
few exciting words like information, entropy, redundancy [could] solve all our 
problems" [p. 462]), his model continues to inform contemporary 
conceptualizations of communication in multiple contexts. Shannon makes clear
his goal: to abstract the functions of elements in a communicative situation 
from the specificity of their concrete conditions. In considering "certain general
problems involving communication systems," Shannon (Shannon & Weaver, 
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1963) thought it "first necessary to represent the various elements involved as 
mathematical entities, suitably idealized from their physical counterparts" (p. 
34). He illustrates his model this way:
Famously, Shannon's (Shannon & Weaver, 1963) model "consists of 
essentially five parts" (p. 33): an information source which selects a message to 
be encoded via a transmitter, or that which transforms the message into a 
signal for its distribution through a channel and its eventual reception by a 
receiver, which operates on the signal to produce a message for a destination. 
Information figures prominently in Shannon's elaborations of the model but not 
in the way most popular accounts assume.
Proponents and critics alike often refer to Shannon's schema as a model of
"message transmission." But doing so is wholly incorrect. In Shannon's account,
no message is ever transmitted; only signals are. For Shannon, the problem of 
the message is therefore not a problem of transmission but rather one of 
selection. Recall Shannon's (Shannon & Weaver, 1963) definition of "the 
fundamental problem of communication": "that of reproducing at one point 
40 
Illustration 2: Shannon's communication model
either exactly or approximately a message selected at another point" (p. 31). 
Note, too, the location of the "message" in Shannon's diagram. It appears only 
before and after a transmission (tellingly, the "message" is not one of Shannon's
five "essential" parts of a communication system). Calling Shannon's model one 
of "message transmission," wherein messages are "loaded" with content 
(content some will call "information") and sent to a receiver that assesses it 
with varying degrees of accuracy, drastically misconstrues the nature and 
function of messages in Shannon's work. Messages are for Shannon not vessels 
or vehicles for information-content. Messages are the very events that generate
or ameliorate information.
Inform-ative Events
"Message" is simply Shannon's name for an event. The moment of message
selection is one in which a source activates one likelihood from an array of 
possibles. Message-events are either more or less likely to occur, and 
information is an index of the probability of this occurrence: that a source will 
select one message (i.e., that one event will occur), and not another. In 
Shannon's (1993f) terms, "we consider information to be produced by a suitable
stochastic process" (p. 180). This process is the unfolding of the message-event 
as an information source's selective operations activate that message (or 
sequence of messages) from a system of discrete symbols. Information is 
therefore dynamic; it modulates in accordance with the varying levels of 
predictability or unpredictability that inhere in the situation as a event unfolds. 
Shannon (1949, 1993f, 1993g) models message-events as specific spatio-
temporalities; events of selection involve successive modifications to a time 
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series that spatialize certain arrangements (as, e.g., in an early paper that 
depicts "messages and the corresponding signals [as] points in two 'function 
spaces,' and the modulation process [as] a mapping of one space into the other"
[Shannon, 1949, p. 10]; for more on this, see Chapter 4). Shannon's concern is 
the probability of activation, and information is crucial for addressing this 
concern.
One can calculate the amount of information in a given situation, Shannon 
suggests, by summing the logarithms of the probabilities of all messages in a 
given set of possible messages. High-information systems are those in which a 
larger number of potential message-events might occur (i.e., be selected for 
eventual transformation); low-information systems are those in which relatively 
few selections are likely (in which the probability of the occurrence of a 
particular message-event is high). Information fluctuates as a communicative 
event unfolds; selecting one element from a field of possibilities enables or 
constraints possibilities for future activations. A telegraph operator producing a
message in English by selecting from a finite set (e.g., the English alphabet) the
symbol "q" will see the field of possible subsequent selections narrow 
significantly, as convention stipulates a narrow field of characters that could 
potentially follow "q." (Mobile telephone users sending SMS messages via 
predictive T-9 word completion will be familiar with this phenomenon, as T-9 
uses probability-based mechanisms for predicting precisely what users wish to 
compose.) Selecting "q" is an act that generates little information, as those 
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arrangements to which it leads are rather certain. The result is unsurprising; it 
is not very informative, and the communicative situation is therefore not 
remarkably entropic.
As a physical quantity, information is available for measurement. If 
information is only a concern when selection is possible, assessing, then 
calculating, or gauging the amount of information present in a situation is only 
necessary in the presence of indeterminacy. Systems demonstrating no degree 
of potentiality—no uncertainty—are without information. But even the most 
fundamental choice, that between one possible message-event and another, 
affords measurement. Indeed, a choice between two possibilities is at the 
conceptual center of Shannon's mathematics (the reason calculations for 
amount of information involve logarithms with a base of 2). Adopting a term 
from mathematician J. W. Tukey, Shannon gives a name to the unit for 
measuring the number of selections a source can (or must) make: the bit (short 
for "binary digit"). As the gram is to mass, so the bit is to information; the 
greater the number of choices between binary pairs necessary for determining 
the message, the greater the number of bits, and the greater the amount of 
information inherent to a particular situation. For Shannon, an information 
source does not send a message; it activates a series of probabilities by 
selecting some elements and not others, and in this way generates information 
as a degree of undecidability.
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Signal and Noise
But for Shannon communication is not simply a matter of message 
selection. Subsequent to the event of selection, a transmitter performs work on 
messages "to produce a signal suitable for transmission over the channel" 
(Shannon & Weaver, 1963, p. 33). Shannon's mathematical theory of 
communication addresses the possibility of constructing devices for the 
encoding of messages into signals and transmitting those signals through 
channels in ways that resist forces threatening to divert, dissolve, or confuse 
them—forces Shannon called "noise." Shannon's preoccupation with calculating
the probability of a message-event's occurrence is directly related to this goal 
insofar as the success of a communication system—its effectively reproducing 
at one point the message selected at another—depends on that system's ability 
to anticipate the generative actions of an information source. Regarding 
message selection and encoding, Shannon's principle concern is a channel's 
capacity to modulate and transmit that which an information source produces—
the adequate production of a signal. Shannon's demonstration of various 
methods for efficiently encoding a signal for effective transmission through a 
channel is one of his most influential contributions to communication 
engineering, as it "suggested unexpected ways to encode the message to take 
advantage of the statistical properties of a particular channel" (Johnston, 2008, 
p. 139). Shannon's theorems indicate methods for ensuring predictability and 
replicability, not simply by increasing the strength of a transmitter, but via 
means that are rather more nuanced: establishing reciprocal, predictable, and 
context-specific patternings, or redundancies, from an array of uncertainties.
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If information is for Shannon synonymous with novelty and 
unpredictability, then information's foil is redundancy. Redundancy is inversely 
related to information inasmuch as a communication system's relative degree of
redundancy determines its potential for variability—its openness to fluctuation. 
For Shannon, no information is present in a completely redundant system, 
where systems exhibiting no redundancy are maximally informative (completely
unpredictable). In this sense, information measures the precise relationship 
between signal and noise (that is, between predictability and unpredictability, 
redundancy and entropy, certainty and surprise). In part, then, Shannon framed
the problem of information as a design problem: one of creating technical 
apparatuses capable of generating clear signals—uninterrupted connections, 
prolonged and sustained contact (Terranova, 2004a)—that pierce through noisy 
environments and facilitate the replication of a message-event. Put another way,
for Shannon the problem of information is one of ensuring the effective 
propagation of a probabilistic sequence, the ongoing activation of certain 
elements from a field of possible ones.
Yet Shannon's identification of information with uncertainty seems to 
introduce an odd conflation: if information is directly proportional to entropic 
unpredictability (and therefore inversely proportional to redundancy), and noise
is by definition something that threatens the stability of redundancies, then 
information and noise would appear synonymous. Indeed, according to 
Shannon, signals subject to noisy distortions can actually produce more 
information for a receiver than that generated by a source, for they acquire a 
degree of uncertainty through their propagation. In systems designed 
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specifically for increasing the probability of an event, information would thus 
act as a threat to be eliminated. Warren Weaver, author of what is perhaps the 
most influential interpretation of Shannon's work, grappled with (and 
attempted to resolve) this ambiguity in a way that demonstrates several 
consequences of extrapolating Shannon's work into domains for which it was 
never intended.
The Meaning of/in Weaver's Shannon
In what is perhaps his most famous definitional maneuver, Shannon 
dissociates the mathematical study of information from any concern with 
meaning. In the second paragraph of his Mathematical Theory, he 
acknowledges that messages often "refer to or are correlated according to some
system with certain physical or conceptual entities," but asserts that "these 
semantic aspects of communication are irrelevant to the engineering problem" 
with which he is concerned (Shannon & Weaver, 1963, p. 31). Clearly Shannon 
(1993a) was aware of potentially confusing differences between his definition of
information and "everyday usage," which "usually implies something about the 
semantic content of a message" (p. 173). But he never equivocated on this 
issue. For Shannon, information is simply not a semantic matter.
And yet Warren Weaver tried to make it one. Weaver's commentary, 
"Recent Contributions to the Mathematical Theory of Communication," first 
published as a popular essay in Scientific American magazine, appeared 
alongside Shannon's essays in 1949, when they first saw publication as a book-
length monograph. Weaver also worked with Bush as head of fire control 
research for the National Defense Research Committee (Conway & Siegelman, 
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2005). For a time, he was director of the Rockefeller Institute in New York, in 
which capacity he circulated copies of the Mathematical Theory among early 
structuralists, including Levi-Strauss and Jakobson (Geoghegan, 2011). In that 
book's initial printings, Weaver's essay follows Shannon's work, functioning as a
kind of summary comment and speculative rumination on additional 
implications of the work readers have just encountered. Later printings saw 
Weaver's essay precede Shannon's, where it could act more like a preface or 
primer suitable for laymen. An increase in the book's popularity with non-
technical audiences—such as students in the blossoming interdisciplinary field 
of communication studies, who, as Ritchie (1986) notes, were "being advised to 
'read Weaver first'" (p. 279)—may have motivated the reorganization (Rogers & 
Valente, 1993). Weaver offers struggling readers an account of Shannon's work 
nearly devoid of the mathematics that might make it appear impenetrable. 
Those interested in learning about not only the technical but also the social 
import of Shannon's work could presumably read Weaver instead, and with 
much less difficulty. But "it is questionable," Ritchie writes, "whether they 
should read Weaver at all" (p. 279). For Weaver (Shannon & Weaver, 1963) 
attempts to turn Shannon's non-semantic theory of information into a template 
for the study of meaning—indeed, into an entire theory of human 
communication in general, as "the relationships it reveals indiscriminately apply
to all [...] forms of communication" (p. 25)—and, in the process, inflects 
Shannon's work with a liberal humanism that persists in many of its 
contemporary renditions.
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Weaver acknowledges the seemingly limited applicability of Shannon's 
work. The mathematical theory of communication, he notes, chiefly addresses 
technical problems (e.g., problems of organizing redundancies for the purpose 
of successfully transmitting a signal). Weaver (Shannon & Weaver, 1963) calls 
these "Level A" problems (p. 4). But one might also bring Shannon's work to 
bear on additional problems, Weaver suggests: semantic problems ("Level B" 
problems, or those "concerned with the identity, or satisfactorily close 
approximation, in the interpretation of meaning by the receiver, as compared 
with the meaning of the sender" [p. 4]) and effectiveness problems ("Level C" 
problems, or those "concerned with the success with which the meaning 
conveyed to the receiver leads to the desired conduct on his part" [p. 5]). 
Weaver believes all messages are constrained in the first instance by 
considerations at Level A (e.g., technical limitations determine a message's 
ability to "convey" meanings and "affect conduct" in desired ways), but insists 
that an analysis of Level A "discloses that this level overlaps the other levels 
more than one could possible [sic] naively suspect," and that "the theory of 
Level A is, at least to a significant degree, also a theory of levels B and C" (p. 6).
For Weaver, the mathematical theory of communication is a skeleton key that 
unlocks the mysteries of human communication in ways Shannon never foresaw.
The first sentence of Weaver's treatment advances a particularly revealing 
definition of communication as "all of the procedures by which one mind may 
affect another" (p. 1). From the start, then, Weaver's conception of 
communication is decidedly cognitive. It is also brazenly personological. 
Weaver's definition of communication in fact "shifts us from the discourse of 
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engineering to that of social theory and philosophy" (Balnaves & Willson, 2011, 
p. 22), domains in which Shannon had little, if any, interest. Though he does not
elaborate any theory of "mind," Weaver makes clear throughout his text that 
mind is an exclusively human faculty, and that the study of communication is 
therefore the study of "in fact all human behavior" (p. 1). Less clear is whether 
Shannon viewed persons as essential for the process of communication. 
Shannon (Shannon & Weaver, 1963), for example, will define one of his 
"essential" components of a communication system, the destination, as "the 
person (or thing) for whom the message is intended" (p. 34). For Shannon, 
communication needn't necessarily entail any faculty called a "mind."
Weaver's emphasis on the mind's role in communication systems is 
especially significant because it facilitates a rationalistic interpretation of 
Shannon, one that strategically re-reads Shannon's definition of information 
humanistically. Weaver (Shannon & Weaver, 1963) understands that in Shannon
the term "information" is "used in a special sense" and "must not be confused 
with meaning" (p. 8). Weaver additionally acknowledges that for Shannon 
information is a measure of signal to noise—of certainty to uncertainty—and not
something easily reduced to some "content" of a signal or message. The study 
of information is thus (as it was for Shannon) a concern with selection. But 
Weaver reads "selection" humanistically, as a synonym for rational choice, and 
therefore arrives at a shorthand definition of information imbued with volitional
overtones: "Information is a measure of one's freedom of choice when one 
selects a message" (p. 9).
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To be clear, Shannon occasionally described information-generating events
as choices. To ask the question of information, he writes, is in some sense to 
ask, "Can we find a measure of how much 'choice' is involved in the selection of 
the event [...]?" (Shannon & Weaver, 1963, p. 49), for "information exists only 
when there is a choice of possible messages" (Shannon, 1993a, p. 173). But 
Shannon rarely speaks of making a choice (note his cautionary scare quotes in 
the preceding statement); instead, he uses the term "choice" in its 
cryptographic sense to refer to the relative variability of a field of potential 
messages (the greater the number of potential messages available for selection,
the greater the degree of "choice" associated with that field). Weaver 
humanizes choice, suggesting that "human choice and uncertainty are 
constrained in the same way that source choice and receiver uncertainty are 
constrained in cryptography" (Balnaves & Willson, 2011, p. 24). Unsurprisingly, 
then, he will describe information's opposite, redundancy, as that "fraction of 
the structure of the message which is determined not by the free choice of the 
sender, but rather by the accepted statistical rules governing the use of the 
symbols in question" (Shannon & Weaver, 1963, p. 13). Weaver transforms 
information from a matter of predicting and encouraging the occurrence of 
particular message-events to one of an agent's conscious and willful intention in
opposition to constraints.
This is perhaps nowhere more apparent than in Weaver's proposed 
correction to Shannon's conflation of information and noise. Recall Shannon's 
description of "noise" as that which can scramble a signal and hinder a 
message's accurate reproduction. Introducing noise into a communication 
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system enhances the degree of uncertainty inherent to that system and 
therefore increases the amount of information present in that system. So 
Shannon might be read as suggesting symmetry between information (the 
desirable) and noise (the undesirable), and therefore introducing a kind of 
paradox.
Weaver (Shannon & Weaver, 1963) proposes a solution to this paradox by 
suggesting that information can be either "good" or "bad":
Uncertainty which arises by virtue of freedom of choice on the part of the
sender is desirable uncertainty. Uncertainty which arises because of 
errors or because of the influence of noise is undesirable uncertainty. (p. 
19)
For Weaver, "good" (desirable) uncertainty is that which permits a sender 
the greatest degree of latitude in selecting a message, because in this case a 
receiver can be less certain about his intentions, allowing the sender to remain 
relatively unpredictable in (read: undetermined by) his relationship with the 
receiver. But "bad" (undesirable) uncertainty is that which grants too much of 
this latitude to the receiver, who might incorrectly reconstruct the message 
from a signal, and prevent the sender from achieving some desired goal. A 
sender strives for maximum freedom while wishing for her receiver only the 
degree of freedom necessary for replicating the message. Weaver makes 
information a psychological matter.
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Shannon disliked this tendency. During a 1950 presentation on the 
redundancy of the English language, he clearly explained how his definition of 
information avoids the ambiguity Weaver and other attribute to him. "I never 
have any trouble distinguishing signals from noise because I say, as a 
mathematician, that this is signal and that is noise," Shannon says:
But there are, it seems to me, ambiguities that come in at the 
psychological level. If a person receives something over a telephone, part
of which is useful to him and part of which is not, and you want to call 
the useful part the signal, that is hardly a mathematical problem. It 
involves too many psychological elements. (p. 155)
Weaver's understanding of the communication process, however, is 
undeniably speaker-centered, and, as Rasch (2000) notes, "hinges on the notion
of authorial intention" (p. 60). A sender attempts to replicate conscious 
intentions and meanings in the mind of another, and communication is 
successful if the receiver can reproduce these meanings or re-enact these 
intentions. Weaver must posit "good" and "bad" information to distinguish 
between those situations in which a sender is capable of achieving some 
desirable correspondence between one mental state and another and those in 
which this correspondence fails.
In his analysis of Weaver's Shannon, Genosko (2012) suggests that this 
desire for correspondence is endemic to communication theory as a whole:
[T]he production of an identity between encoded and decoded messages 
remains the fundamental problem in communication, no matter if we are 
considering signal accuracies or the asymmetry (non-identity) between 
meaning structures at either end of the model. (p. 32)
52 
Genosko emphasizes the necessity of restoring those socially, historically, 
and technologically specific models implicit in both Shannon's and Weaver's 
respective theories of commuication in order to better apprehend "the techno-
cultural scene of information 'handling' embedded in their groundbreaking 
efforts" (p. 31). He proceeds to demonstrate the telegraphic imaginary 
underpinning Weaver's conceptualization of the communication process, one 
that also undergirds his description of information.
A similar recontextualization of Shannon might be similarly beneficial (a 
recontextualization Genosko does not pursue). Indeed, Shannon's postwar work
on information is heavily indebted to his earlier work in cryptography—so much
so that his now-famous model of communication distinctly resembles one he 
developed to depict the process of transporting encrypted messages (Shannon, 
1993g; see also Gleick, 2011). Cryptography is one "techno-cultural scene" in 
which one cannot necessarily presume a desire for correspondence between 
sender and receiver. As Geoghegan (2008b) has already convincingly argued, 
cryptographic work articulated and circulated a communicative imaginary 
(borne of a broader epistemic formation Geoghegan calls "crypto-intelligence") 
predicated not on symmetry and harmony, but rather on agonism and duplicity. 
From a cryptographic standpoint, then, Shannon's paradox is no paradox at all: 
a signal that accrues additional uncertainty en route to a source is welcome, as 
the message encoded in that signal therefore becomes more difficult to decode 
(i.e., decrypt). In this context, noise (entropy) is desirable to one seeking to 
encourage aberrant decodings.
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Shannon himself recognized the reciprocal relationship between his work 
on cryptography and his efforts in communication theory. While he began 
experimenting with applications of stochastic modeling to signal transmission 
at Princeton in 1940, Shannon applied his early findings to cryptography "as a 
way of legitimatizing the work" (in Price, 1985, p. 169). Wartime political 
pressures certainly motivated his turn to cryptography (though Shannon, who 
enjoyed playing with cryptograms, insists he would have tackled the problem 
anyway), as "I was not yet ready to write up information theory. For 
cryptography you could write up anything in any shape, which I did" [in Price, 
1985, p. 169]). A more general mechanic—entropy—provided insight into both 
secrecy systems and signal transmission, which Shannon viewed as simply two 
dimensions of the same problem:
There is this close connection; they are very similar things, in one case 
trying to conceal information, and in the other case trying to transmit it. 
(in Price, 1985, p. 170)
Recontextualizing Shannon's model demonstrates the futility of a priori 
assumptions regarding information's positive or negative valence (as if one 
could say that mass was categorically either "good" or "bad," desirable or 
undesirable). In the context of secrecy systems, information is precisely that 
which introduces a significant degree of uncertainty into a communication 
system, enough to keep unwanted receivers sufficiently confused (see Shannon,
1993d). Shannon's cryptographic background underscores the inadequacy of 
speaker-centered interpretations of his work as well as charges of its penchant 
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for correspondence or symmetry. Any characterization of "good" and "bad" 
information is, as the mathematical theory of communication itself, entirely 
contextual.
A New Science of Communication and Control
While at Bell Labs, Shannon would frequent MIT's campus for visits with 
another of Vannevar Bush's close collaborators: Norbert Wiener. Wiener, a 
polymath trained in philosophy, zoology, and mathematics, welcomed Shannon 
into confidential conversations regarding antiaircraft ballistics research (which 
occupied them both at their respective institutions), and insider accounts of 
their meetings at MIT recall the two men filling blackboards with early 
expressions of communication problems (Conway & Siegelman, 2005). The pair 
also corresponded (Gleick, 2011). While Wiener tended to lament the degree to 
which the younger mathematician would "pluck my brains" (cited in Conway & 
Siegelman, 2005, p. 126), the two scientists related surprisingly well. Shannon 
(Shannon & Weaver, 1963) would later readily admit that conversations with 
Wiener "considerably influenced" his contributions to information theory (p. 
115).
Like Shannon, Wiener owed his deepening relationship with Bush to war 
efforts. In September of 1940, as German attacks on Britain intensified, Wiener 
(1985c) wrote to Bush expressing his sincere desire that the head of the NDRC 
might "find some corner of activity in which I may be of use during the 
emergency" (p. 124). Bush had been soliciting from his scientifically- and 
technically-minded peers some advice for setting the nation's wartime technical
agenda (Conway & Siegelman, 2005). Obviously aware of Bush's expertise with 
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early computing machines (like the differential analyzer), Wiener wrote to 
suggest that the NDRC prioritize experiments with a relatively new type of 
computing apparatus: one that functioned numerically rather than through 
analogical measurement, via electronics instead of gears, with a base-two logic 
and not a base-ten one, by way of programmed software stored in the machine 
itself (not fed to it by human operators), and with some internal storage device 
for maintaining these instructions (Wiener, 1961, p. 4). In short, Wiener 
proposed exploring what are today the principal features of digital computing 
devices.
Bush was uninterested. In his response to Wiener, he regretted that 
Wiener's ideas seemed to be "of the long-range type"; more pressing, he wrote, 
were those "matters of more immediate promise" (cited in Conway & 
Siegelman, 2005, p. 106). Of "more immediate" concern to Bush was anti-
ballistics research, perhaps because British military officials had just visited 
Washington seeking assistance on this very problem (Conway & Siegelman, 
2005). More specifically, the British sought methods and devices for tracking 
warplanes' flight patterns, predicting their future positions, adjusting artillery 
accordingly, and firing with precision. And all this should be done with as little 
human intervention as possible—preferably none at all.
Bush recruited Wiener to the cause, recognizing in the mathematician's 
early contributions to the study of Brownian motion (the seemingly random 
movement of gas particles as a result of their collisions with other particles 
traveling with myriad velocities and trajectories; on this, see Wiener, 1938) an 
effectively stochastic approach to a science of prediction, and within months 
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Wiener had developed a prototype for a device he called the "antiaircraft 
predictor" (Galison, 1994). In early 1941, Wiener hired Julian Bigelow to assist 
with the device's construction. An MIT-trained engineer and former IBM 
employee who came highly recommended by Warren Weaver (then still head of 
NDRC fire control operations), Bigelow would become one of Wiener's most 
prominent and trusted collaborators. Wiener (1956) called Bigelow "a quiet, 
thorough New Englander, whose only scientific vice is an excess of scientific 
virtue" (p. 242). Together the two set about implementing Wiener's designs.
By the middle of the year, Wiener and Bigelow were prepared to offer a 
"Summary Report for Demonstration," a preliminary statement regarding their 
progress with the antiaircraft predictor. In it, they bemoaned a lack of usable 
data concerning actual pilot activity with which they could test the machine:
We realized that the "randomness" or irregularity of an airplane's path is 
introduced by the pilot; that in attempting to force his dynamic craft to 
execute a useful manoeuver, such as straight-line flight or 180 degree 
turn, the pilot behaves like a servo-mechanism, attempting to overcome 
the intrinsic lag due to the dynamics of his plane as a physical system, in 
response to a stimulus which increases in intensity with the degree to 
which he failed to accomplish his task. (cited in Galison, 1994, p. 236)
Here Wiener and Bigelow liken the activity of a human pilot to that of a 
electro-mechanical servomechanism, suggesting that the two behavior similarly
in response to ongoing stimuli that feed back into their operations and cause 
them to adjust their activities. It is, as Galison (1994) notes, the germ of an 
ever-multiplying series of conflationary analogies that in Wiener's hands will 
blossom into a unified theory of human, animal, and machine behavior.
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This vision took root in another report Wiener filed in 1942. He titled the 
120-page technical document, which offered in dense detail the results of his 
work on predictive fire control, The Interpolation, Extrapolation of Linear Time 
Series and Communication Engineering (see Masani & Phillips, 1985). Weaver 
immediately had it classified; the MIT press published it in 1949 as 
Extrapolation, Interpolation, and Smoothing of Stationary Time Series: With 
Engineering Applications. Only a handful of cleared scientists and engineers 
had access to it, and even among these privileged few the paper became 
notorious. Its unforgiving impenetrability and brightly-colored cover earned it 
an unflattering nickname: the "Yellow Peril" (Masani & Phillips, 1985; Conway 
and Siegelman, 2005). The work, however, was profound. To those with the 
gumption to tackle it, Wiener's perilous treatise offered more than an exposition
of automated anti-ballistics. It portended a new scientific endeavor: the study of
communication and control.
Shannon (Shannon & Weaver, 1963) called The Yellow Peril "the first clear-
cut formulation of communication theory as a statistical problem, the study of 
operations on time series" (p. 85). Tukey (1952) described it as "a book which 
can reward long and careful study, and which requires it" (p. 321). The book 
articulates Wiener's (1949b) concern with "the study of messages and their 
transmission" and defines messages as "an array of measurable quantities 
distributed in time"—something that could be "corrupted by a noise" (p.2). 
Communication, moreover, was not merely the "conscious human effort for 
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transmission of ideas" but rather that which is principally "carried out by 
electrical or mechanical or other such means" (p. 2) by entities partaking of the 
same resource: information.
By now, Wiener's theories had their adherents, who decided that the 
newfound science needed a unifying moniker. Adopting the Greek word for 
"steersman," Wiener gave it one: cybernetics. The term reflected his science's 
particular emphasis on ongoing adjustment, and Wiener appreciated its 
historical resonances with notions of government. He called "cybernetics" a 
"neo-Greek expression" (Wiener, 1961, p. 11), recalling Plato's use of the term 
to name a form of self-governance. And in the early 1800s, French physicist 
André-Marie Ampère had similarly used the term as an umbrella label for all 
sciences of government. "Cybernetics" helped Wiener (1961) and colleagues 
stress "the fact that the steering engines of a ship are indeed one of the earliest
and best-developed forms of feedback mechanisms" (p. 12). The name stuck.
Wiener viewed cybernetics as a universal project, applicable to any 
number of diverse scientific domains. It would "cover those aspects in which the
theory of communication in instruments, the theory of control apparatus, and 
the theory of the nervous system and other modes of communication and 
control within the body, and the theory of social control[,] resemble one another
and justify the use of parallel methods" (Wiener, 1985d, p. 203). Wiener was 
determined to convince other scientists of cybernetics' value, and in 1948, the 
same year Shannon published his mathematical theory of communication, 
Wiener's proselytism took shape in Cybernetics, or Control and Communication
in the Animal and the Machine, a book aimed at technical audiences. A popular 
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book, The Human Use of Human Beings, followed in 1950. Both works heralded
cybernetics as the science of a new epoch: "If the seventeenth and early 
eighteenth centuries are the age of clocks, and the later eighteenth and the 
nineteenth centuries constitute the age of steam engines, the present time is 
the age of communication and control"—its principal concern, "the accurate 
reproduction of a signal" (Wiener, 1961, p. 39). "Fundamental" to any 
investigation of the selfsame processes by which systems of humans, animals, 
and machines utilize signals to adjust their behavior and organize themselves, 
Wiener (1985d) writes, is "information" (p. 203). And central to that problem 
was a matter with which Shannon was equally concerned: entropy.
Another Theory of Entropy
While Shannon acknowledged his theoretical inheritance from Boltzmann 
and Gibbs, he did not necessarily elaborate the philosophical ramifications of 
these connections, concerned as he was with the practical matter of 
constructing technical apparatuses for signal transmission. Wiener not only 
explored (and therefore constituted—see Geoghegan, 2008a) this lineage but 
also leveraged it as part of his effort to legitimize cybernetics as a universal 
science, and to stress the importance of information on a cosmic scale.
Once again, entropy played a key role in these endeavors. Before Wiener 
began writing his cybernetic treatises, Boltzmann and Gibbs had already 
disarticulated the concept from its traditional location in thermodynamics and 
given it "a much more general formulation by defining it as a probability 
function" not limited to heat engines (Hayles, 1999, p. 101). As previously 
noted, the work of Boltzmann and Gibbs addressed the relative distribution 
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(e.g., the relative organization) of particles in a closed system and the certainty 
with which one might know the location of those particles at a given moment. 
Because of its cryptographic legacy, Shannon's formulation of information 
utilized the language of uncertainty inherent to a statistical mechanic view of 
the universe. To construct his "cosmological drama of chaos and order" (Hayles,
1999, p. 100), Wiener preferred tropes of disorganization.
For him, entropy is an incontrovertible tendency of the universe "to move 
from the least to the most probable state, from a state of organization and 
differentiation in which distinctions and forms exist, to a state of chaos and 
sameness" (Wiener, 1954, p. 12). Wiener was completely resigned to the 
inevitability of entropic dissipation, and he does not spare readers of his 
popular work from a rather disheartening portrait of a moribund universe:
Sooner or later we shall die, and it is highly probable that the whole 
universe around us will die the heat death, in which the world shall be 
reduced to one vast temperature equilibrium in which nothing really new 
ever happens. There will be nothing left but a drab uniformity out of 
which we can expect only minor and insignificant fluctuations. (p. 31)
But Wiener finds solace in seemingly improbable moments in which 
entropy's effects might be staved off, those "local enclaves whose direction 
seems opposed to that of the universe at large and in which there is a limited 
and temporary tendency for organization to increase" (p. 12). He uses a single 
word to denote "all phenomena which locally swim upstream against the 
current of increasing entropy": "life" (p. 32). Clearly aware that this designation
might meet with resistance, Wiener presses for a definition of life as anything 
that "can exemplify locally anti-entropic processes" (p. 32). His goal was not to 
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demonstrate how nonorganic and mechanical systems were somehow more like 
the biological than previously thought—"I do not for a moment mean that the 
specific physical, chemical, and spiritual processes of life as we ordinarily know
it are the same as those of life-imitating machines" (p. 32), he says—but rather 
a complete reworking of the category of life itself. Life is simply "pockets of 
decreasing entropy in a framework in which the large entropy tends to 
increase" (p. 32). Humans, animals, and machines are alike in that they are all 
"but whirlpools in a river of ever-flowing water": "not stuff that abides, but 
patterns that perpetuate themselves" (p. 96).
"Information" is the name Wiener gives to these organizing patterns. 
Consequently, Wiener defines information in a manner directly opposite that of 
Shannon: as the inverse of entropy, not its synonym. Information is for Wiener a
principally negentropic force, a foil to the workings of a universe driving toward
maximum disorder. "Just as the amount of information in a system is a measure 
of its degree of organization," Wiener (1961) says, "so the entropy of a system is
a measure of its degree of disorganization; and the one is simply the negative of
the other" (p. 11; see also pp. 62-64). But like Shannon, Wiener stressed that 
information was not a thing but a process, a taking-form in coordination with 
ever-changing environmental conditions. Information could of course be "built 
up" (p. 31)—not stockpiled like an object, but accumulated through the 
accretive process of becoming-organized. In this way, information was 
paramount to any effort at resisting entropy—essential to life itself.
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Control and/is Communication
As it was for Shannon, the fundamental problem of communication is for 
Wiener the replication of patterns or redundancies. Yet Wiener's communication
schema does not involve a transformational moment of encoding; the message 
is that which is transmitted. Recall that for Shannon messages are selected 
(activated) from a field of possibilities and subsequently transformed through 
the operations of a transmitter such that they might be recomposed at another 
site. For Wiener, messages are form, and the very process of their transmission 
is an exercise in control. Wiener suggests that messages themselves replicate 
form as they propagate through systems of heterogeneous elements. As the 
study of messages' function in systems of communication and control, 
cybernetics is thus an entire social theory, for "society can only be understood 
through a study of the messages and the communication facilities which belong 
to it" (p. 16).
When human and nonhuman bodies engage in what Wiener (1954) calls 
"communication," they participate in a process of mutual in-formation that is 
synonymous with control. "When I control the actions of another person," 
Wiener writes, "I communicate a message to him" (p. 16). Moreover, 
information is that which maintains relations between bodies and environments,
as "the commands through which we exercise our control over our environment
are a kind of information we impart to it" (p. 17). Because for Wiener an 
organism is nothing but its particular pattern, communication is the very 
process by which life negotiates its relationship to the entropic environments 
threatening to scramble it. Communication is fundamentally a matter of 
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regulation for Wiener, as messages themselves are not representational as 
much as they are operational. They exist, Wiener states, "in the imperative 
mood," and "the technique of communication does not differ from that of a 
message of fact" (p. 16). Statements about things are statements that do things.
Successful communication is that which effects desired behaviors by 
successfully inculcating form: "if my control is to be effective I must take 
cognizance of any messages from [another] which may indicate that the order is
understood and has been obeyed" (p. 16). To use messages is to in-form through
organizational imperative: "When I give an order to a machine, the situation is 
not essentially different from that which arises when I give an order to a 
person" (p. 16, emphasis added). Every message is (quite literally for Wiener) a 
form of control that organizes an entity's present and future behaviors: an order
that orders.
Though his descriptions of communicative processes tend to depict 
communication as the rational and deliberate exchange of idea-objects between
discrete individuals, Wiener (1954) stresses repeatedly that the "stuff" of 
communicative encounters is not a thing, but a form. He suggests that 
"messages themselves are a form of pattern and organization" and that "it is 
possible to treat sets of messages as having an entropy like sets of states of the 
external world" (p. 21). Nowhere is Wiener's emphasis on this materiality of the
message-form stronger than in "Thermodynamics of the Message," a brief piece
Wiener published in a 1955 issue of the journal Neurochemistry. In typical 
fashion, Wiener claims to demonstrate the applicability of cybernetic 
discoveries to ongoing work in another field—in this case, biochemistry. He 
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aims to "emphasize the need for a mode of thought which will take account of 
resonance phenomena in all those phenomena which seem to have to do 
specifically with life," but does not "wish to saddle any of my colleagues with 
more than a suggestive discussion of the matter" (Wiener, 1985b, p. 211). Yet 
Wiener's evocative, "suggestive" intervention spans the topics of statistical 
mechanics, thermodynamics, electro-mechanical engineering, quantum physics,
biology, and chemistry in the course of five pages. Wiener suggests that the 
message-form, as a fundamentally negentropic force, is "subject to the various 
possible transformations which may be performed on it" and therefore tends "to
lose order and not gain it" (p. 206). In other words, Wiener says, "a message 
may be garbled, but never ungarbled" (p. 206); to do so would be "to 
unscramble an egg" (p. 207). Forms are for Wiener as material as the realities 
they organize, subject as they are to the same incontrovertible laws of 
thermodynamics. Messages are not re-formed as much as they are re-
constituted; Wiener says he considers "the ungarbling of a message as simply 
the replacement of the message" under conditions appropriate to the receiving 
entity (p. 206). Here Wiener echoes Shannon's emphasis on the work of 
reproduction involved in communication, as when (in Shannon's model) a signal
is subject to the work of a decoding entity that replicates a particular series of 
selections for a receiving element. Communication is not the passive 
transmission of a message; it is that active organizational work of reproducing 
(in)form(ation).
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If life is enduring form, and communication is fundamentally the 
replication of form, then communication technologies might some day transmit 
life itself. Indeed, Wiener (1954) grappled with the prospect of this "phantasy" 
(p. 95) in a chapter of The Human Use of Human Beings entitled "Organization 
as the Message." Here Wiener speculates about the viability of "travel by 
telegraph," which he considered "not intrinsically absurd, far as it may be from 
realization" (p. 103). Indeed, Wiener was entirely comfortable with the idea of 
decomposing, transmitting, and recomposing body-patterns, an inevitability he 
portends through a string of metaphoric associations between bodies and 
messages (on the role of metaphor in Wiener's writing, see Hayles, 1990a, 
1999). Wiener stresses that bodies do not possess intrinsic properties that 
might dictate their functions and distinguish them from other bodies; instead, 
an individual is "a certain continuity of process" (p. 101)—more like "a flame 
rather than [...] a stone, [...] a form rather than a bit of substance" (p. 102). 
Organisms are chiefly patterns, and the same is true of messages. Both resist 
entropy: "Organism is opposed to chaos, to disintegration, to death, as message
is to noise" (p. 95). Messages are bodies and bodies are messages, delicate and 
contingent associations struggling against entropic forces. Communicative 
control assists them both.
'Control by Informative Feedback'
For Wiener, communication involves not the linear transfer of discrete 
information-objects, but a reciprocal patterning that may enhance or attenuate 
an entity's coherence or trajectory—what Wiener calls feedback. "Feedback" 
names a kind of mutual in-formation in which body-patterns loop back on 
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themselves via processes whose twin aim is boundary negotiation and 
performance calibration. The concept allows Wiener to pinpoint methods by 
which human and nonhuman bodies organize themselves—adjust conduct and 
behavior—through the transmission of and response to informational message-
patterns. Recall that for Wiener informative messages are not those that 
successfully transfer some content, but rather those whose organizational 
"imperatives" take hold; feedback is the ongoing process by which messages in-
form.
Feedback was crucial to Wiener's early wartime efforts to produce anti-
ballistic apparatuses capable of predicting enemy aircraft flight paths (Conway 
& Siegelman, 2005; Edwards, 1996; Galison, 1994). But his later writing 
extrapolates the concept into one that defines a capacity of life itself. As Wiener
(1954) writes, feedback is the function that permits an entity some degree of 
control over "the mechanical tendency toward disorganization" and allows it "to
produce a temporary and local reversal of the normal direction of entropy" (pp. 
24-25). Wiener (1961) considered feedback the hallmark of a cybernetic theory 
of society, for "it is certainly true that the social system is an organization like 
the individual, that it is bound together by a system of communication, and that 
it has a dynamics in which circular processes of a feedback nature play an 
important part" (p. 24). Wiener makes clear that "the social system" is not an 
exclusively human system, but a collectivity of humans, animals, and machines 
that relate through feedback systems: "it is my thesis that the physical 
functioning of the living individual and the operation of some of the newer 
communications machines are precisely parallel in their analogous attempts to 
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control entropy through feedback" (p. 26). Wiener offers a theory of sociality 
predicated on an ability to share information—to both impel and respond to 
message-forms.
The problem of information is thus for Wiener a problem of making-
redundant, of establishing replicable patterns that permit little deviance, of 
understanding how stability is not only possible but probable in a world 
characterized by constant fluctuation. In "Feedback and Oscillation," one of the 
most densely mathematical chapters of his Cybernetics, Wiener (1961) explains 
the pertinence of feedback to human and nonhuman bodies alike—and explores 
the possibility of constructing technical apparatuses for maintaining beneficial 
homeostatic states. Of concern to Wiener are those systems that fail to 
effectively (re)calibrate behavior through some communicative malfunction 
(some breakdown in a system of control via transmission of message-forms). 
Such systems are prone to "violent oscillations" (p. 97) that inhibit coordination
—the becoming-out-of-sync of a system's various patternings. Wiener admits 
that what he calls "control by informative feedback" (p. 113, emphasis in 
original) is a complicated affair precisely because no single entity is capable of 
independently or completely determining the overall functioning of a system. 
He sketches an example involving a railroad signal tower, a complex human-
machine apparatus that regulates railway track switching. Via a series of levers,
a human signalman operating in this system might issue a command to change 
the position of the tracks; however, he can never be sure that this operation has
succeeded without some report from the switches themselves "in what we shall 
from now on call the chain of feedback" (p. 96). Signalman, switches, levers, 
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tracks, and signals exist in a tightly-bound series of connections that together 
maintain the operation of the elements thus connected. For Wiener "it is true 
that the signalman is not altogether a free agent" in this system, "that his 
switches and signals are interlocked, either mechanically or electrically, and 
that he is not free to choose some of the more disastrous combinations" (p. 96).
But the signalman does act on the various parts of the ensemble, just as 
the other components of the switching apparatus act on the signalman to 
regulate his behavior in some way. Cyberneticists like Wiener were in fact only 
interested in relationships like these, in which elements reciprocally act on one 
another in attempts to bring their collective function into some kind of loose 
coordination. Relationships without such reciprocity are simply uninteresting 
from a cybernetic perspective, as Ashby (1956) writes in his Introduction to 
Cybernetics. "'Feedback,'" he says, "exists between two parts when each affects
the other" (p. 53). Unidirectional relationships, in which, for example, element 
P affects element R but R does not affect P, are not feedback relations. In this 
case, says Ashby, "P is said to dominate R" (p. 53, emphasis in original), 
affording R no recourse for mutual affection. Such relationships of domination 
actually preclude the possibility of control-through-feedback, which is 
predicated on "a circularity of action [...] between parts of a dynamic system" 
(p. 53). Resisting the dissipative effects of entropy through feedback is an 
enterprise involving the coordination of actions among "freely" operating 
elements—a multidirectional affair in which components of a cybernetic system 
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mututally inform one another by modifying their actions. In a 1949 essay for 
Electronics, Wiener flatly states that the concept of information itself is 
irrelevant to situations that do not involve this type of relation:
What, then, is information? One important feature of information is that 
it cannot be described or measured merely by specifying any single 
message. Obviously information is significant only if there are several 
courses of action open to the recipient and if the information might have 
been something else. (Wiener, 1985a, p. 197)
Information addresses the mutuality of processes aimed at controlling a 
pattern-entity's being-otherwise; as for Shannon, information indexes the field 
of possibilities that actions and events open or foreclose.
Feedback is of course most effective when the elements whose actions it 
coordinates can embody and recall a history of adjustments as part of self-
regulation; entities might begin to embody those modifications to their behavior
effected by feedback in order to avoid behaviors destructive to the system. In 
this way, feedback is for Wiener (1954) also "the property of being able to 
adjust future conduct by past performance" (p. 33). Wiener (1954) called this 
process learning. Humans, animals, and machines might be said to learn when 
"information which proceeds backward from [a] performance is able to change 
the general method and pattern of performance" (p. 61). In his final popular 
book, God & Golem, Inc., Wiener (1966) offers an extended comment on the 
ways a nonhumanistic theory of learning challenges some (principally religious)
biases around the term. He writes:
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[...] An organized system may be said to be one which transforms a 
certain incoming message into an outgoing message, according to some 
principle of transformation. If this principle of transformation is subject 
to a certain criterion of merit of performance, and if the method of 
transformation is adjusted so as to tend to improve the performance of 
the system according to this criterion, the system is said to learn. (p. 14, 
emphasis in original)
Wiener here depicts learning as a kind of feedback process: an ongoing 
process of coordinating, translating, and managing multiple, overlapping forms
—a trans-formation. Learning is a process whereby organized systems accrue 
information that influences their relative abilities to reduce entropy through an 
ongoing series of adjustments. Again, recall that for Wiener information is not 
something representational; its role in learning is therefore not the adequate 
reflection of prior knowledge but instead the inculcation of forms. Halpern 
(2005) offers a compelling account of the ways in which Wiener's writing 
expresses a desire to rework traditional notions of representation as part of a 
broader shift away from modernist formulations of temporality, perception, and 
memory. She suggests that cybernetic discourses like Wiener's were "invested 
in developing a universal language temporally uninterested in referentiality 
through description, producing instead a statistical grammar of prediction" (p. 
293). "Learning" serves a pivotal role in the articulation of such a discourse 
insofar as it names a cybernetic capacity for regulating behavior according to 
criteria for "proper" conduct (conduct that adheres to acceptable levels of 
deviation). As that which establishes and maintains order in systems of 
heterogeneous elements, information plays a critical role in the regulation of 
conduct. A human, animal, or machine may "learn" information, but because 
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information is for Wiener not simply representative of some prior state of 
affairs, information does not mediate in the representationalist sense. Instead, 
it functions probabilistically to coordinate. Halpern writes:
Mediation, which has long been the foundation of the idea of 
"representation," was therefore [for cyberneticists] no longer a site of 
problematization or obfuscation. Rather, it become the site of potential 
and probability. We are no longer focused on the "meaning" or origin of 
the signal, but rather on its transmission. (p. 293)
Cybernetic learning involves the recollection of information only insofar as
those re-collections might be useful for feeding-back into present and future 
behavior for the purpose of (dis)allowing certain possibilities. "I repeat," Wiener
(1954) stresses, "feedback is a method of controlling a system by reinserting 
into it the results of its past performance" (p. 61). Information mediates not by 
representing the past, but by coordinating action in the future tense.
A Contingent Universe
Both Cybernetics and The Human Use of Human Beings begin not with 
mathematical demonstrations but with philosophy. In them, Wiener traces the 
intellectual developments that have made cybernetics desperately necessary in 
the postwar era. Most critical among these is the gradually waning influence of 
Newtonianism—a trend, according to Wiener, whose consequences are nothing 
short of revolutionary.
For Wiener (1954), Newtonianism's comforting assurances—"a universe in 
which everything happened precisely according to law, a compact, tightly 
organized universe in which the whole future depends strictly upon the whole 
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past" (p. 7)—are no longer tenable. A Newtonian worldview, Wiener claims, 
presupposes both a determinism and a precision that are simply impossible. 
"No physical measurements are ever precise," he writes, "and what we have to 
say about a machine or other dynamic system really concerns not what we must
expect when the initial positions and momenta are given with perfect accuracy 
(which never occurs), but what we are to expect when they are given with 
attainable accuracy" (p. 8). Because the universe is never entirely predictable, 
because the behavior of any body is never completely determinable, science 
must settle for knowing "not the complete initial conditions, but something 
about their distribution" (p. 8). In other words, Wiener says, we "cannot escape 
considering uncertainty and the contingency of events" (p. 8).
Naturally, Wiener (1954) attributes to Boltzmann and Gibbs the application
of probabilistic logic and statistical mathematics to physical systems that 
throws Newtonian certainties into crisis. The stochastic "revolution" means that
"physics now no longer claims to deal with what will always happen, but rather 
with what will happen with an overwhelming probability" (p. 10). Thus, for 
Wiener, science can no longer be merely a matter of mapping the world; it must
engage in projects that attempt to anticipate and control its contingent 
manifestations, to bring about those desirable distributions of elements. 
Cybernetics, of course, would become the master science of such control.
Centuries of scientific, mathematic, and philosophical work had already 
cleared the terrain cybernetics would eventually claim to occupy. Indeed, 
cybernetics can be seen as a twentieth century effort in what Hacking (1990) 
calls "the taming of chance" (see also Halpern, 2005). A fundamentally 
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stochastic universe is conceivable only in a world where chance ceases to be 
the province of misguided superstition. Loss of faith in deterministic models of 
the universe was "the most decisive conceptual event of twentieth century 
physics" (Hacking, 1990, p. 1), and fostered the worldview Wiener's books 
expressed so anxiously. As Hacking suggests, a probabilistic world also became 
a calculable one, and calculation served as a means of controlling a world that 
ceased to make itself perfectly known. "This fact is instructive," Hacking notes, 
for "it is now common to speak of information and control as a neutral term 
embracing decision theory, operations research, risk analysis and the broader 
but less well specified domains of statistical inference" (p. 3). Cyberneticists 
spoke this language as it brought stochastic, probabilistic reasoning to bear on 
problems of communications engineering (Halpern, 2005). As Hayles (1999) 
notes, theorizing information "was an active extension of a probabilistic 
worldview in the new and powerfully synthetic realm of communication theory" 
(p. 90). Wiener was concerned with "a fundamental element of chance in the 
texture of the universe itself" (p. 11), an "incomplete determinism, almost an 
irrationality in the world" (p. 11). The conception of a fundamentally 
uncoordinated universe prompted the development of theoretical tools for 
coping with an entropic and ultimately contingent reality. Information was one 
of those tools.
The Minus Sign
Reading both Shannon's and Wiener's respective accounts of information 
through a rather mundane operator illustrates their seemingly radical 
divergence. That operator is a minus sign. Despite commentators' attempts to 
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downplay its significance, this single horizontal stroke belies a crucial 
difference between Shannon and Wiener, one closely related to certain 
presuppositions inherent in their individual accounts of information.
Both Shannon and Wiener calculate the amount of information by 
computing the logarithm of a set of probabilities—an act that results in a 
negative number. Shannon prepends his formula with a minus sign so that its 
result might be read positively. Wiener does not. The effect is two seemingly 
different accounts of information, each of which acts as the inverse of the other.
This did not go unnoticed. Ashby (1956) notes that
A little confusion has sometimes arisen because Shannon's measure of 
"entropy," given over a set of probabilities [is] multiplied by -1 whereas 
the definition given by Wiener in his Cybernetics for "amount of 
information" is the same sum [...] unchanged (i.e., multiplied by +1). (p. 
177)
And in a footnote to his explanation of Shannon's Mathematical Theory, 
Weaver (1949), too, remarks on the minus:
Any probability is a number less than or equal to one, and the logarithms 
of numbers less than one are themselves negative. Thus the minus sign is
necessary in order that H be in fact positive. (p. 15)
Both men are rather nonplussed by what they perceive as a mathematical 
triviality. "There need however be no confusion," Ashby (1956) writes, "for the 
basic ideas are the same" (p. 177); "there is obviously no real discrepancy 
between the two methods" (p. 179). Weaver is even more dismissive: "Do not 
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worry about the minus sign" (p. 15). Yet Shannon did. In an October 13, 1948 
letter to Wiener, he explained the fundamentally different approaches their 
respective equations embodied:
I consider how much information is produced when a choice is made from
a set—the larger the set the more information. You consider the larger 
uncertainty in the case of a larger set to mean less knowledge of the 
situation and hence less information" (cited in Gleick, 2011, p. 281; 
emphasis in original).
Taylor (2001) likewise characterizes the difference as one of emphasis: 
"Whereas Shannon focuses more on the information one lacks, Wiener focuses 
on the information one gains upon receiving a message" (p. 121, emphasis in 
original). Hayles (1990b) makes a similar point: Shannon's theory of 
information emphasizes the uncertainty generated at its source; others begin 
from the vantage of the destination (p. 58). Shannon's account of information 
begins with a state of pristine clarity, absolute redundancy, in which an 
information source and its destination are in perfect agreement—"the special 
case in which the received message is known with certainty" (Ashby, 1956, p. 
178)—unlikely as this state may be in a given arrangement, preceding as it does
an act of selection that establishes relationalities. Wiener's account begins with 
utter uncertainty (the overwhelming threat of thermodynamic entropy), and 
describes life's struggle to establish the redundancies that give it viable form. 
Shannon theorizes a perfectly redundant environment and describes a means of
keeping that dynamic and unpredictable system intact; Wiener starts with a 
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universe of chaos and considers the force that organizes it. For the former, 
information can be a threat to an arrangement's coherence and stability; for the
latter, it is the very mechanism of survival.
The Problem of Information
The preceding accounts of information in the wartime and postwar 
American scientific and engineering literatures demonstrate at least four 
characteristics of information as articulated in this conjuncture: information is 
non-substantial; information is non-representational; information is non-
semantic; and information is a matter of organization.
Information is Non-Substantial
"Information" refers not to some bounded and stable object but to 
something relational, mutable, and processual. Both Shannon and Wiener agree
on this point. In a commentary on the "economic point of view" of information, 
for example, Wiener (1954) writes that information is "unsuited to being 
commodified" (p. 116) because, as an index of entropic activity, it is never 
stable or final. One cannot arrest an inform-ative process without some 
"depreciation of its value" (p. 120), for information is borne of dynamic 
interrelationships between cybernetic entities mutually affecting one another's 
activities. "Information is more a matter of process than of storage" (p. 121). So
when Wiener suggests that "to live effectively is to live with adequate 
information" (p. 18), he is not insisting on the need to cultivate what might 
today be called a kind of "information literacy" (a repertoire of sensibilities 
about protecting one's information, sorting the "good" information from the 
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"bad"); he is commenting on the importance of recognizing how specific 
organizations made redundant through processes of information affect the way 
pattern-entities may thrive. The problem of information is the problem of 
maintaining organizational coherence among forces tending toward dispersion, 
not necessarily the control or management of some specific content.
For Shannon, too, information can be defined only through a series of 
relations—relations of successive symbols selected to create a message for 
encoding into a signal, or relations between an information source and a 
receiver. As another name for a situation's relative degree of uncertainty, 
"information" joins "mass" or even "height" as a way to describe some aspect of 
that situation, not some object in it. In other words, to speak of "the 
information" inherent to a given situation would be to invoke an entire series of 
relationships—symbol to symbol, source to receiver—just as speaking of some 
object's "mass" evinces that object's relationship to gravity. Recall Shannon's 
(1993a) anecdote: "The information I obtain when you say something to me 
corresponds to the amount of uncertainty I had, previous to your speaking, of 
what you were going to say" (p. 173). To "obtain" information is not to take 
possession of some-thing; it is to gather a certain definition, a new 
comportment. Information does not somehow "pass" unidirectionally between 
two stable individuals as much as it is produced out of the ongoing becoming-
symmetrical or becoming-asymmetrical of entities establishing some minimal 
degree of relationality (the becoming-probable or becoming-improbable of an 
event with regard to a given arrangement of things).
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In these American accounts, information may be insubstantial, but this is 
not to say it is immaterial. Information is as real and effective as the entities in 
whose relationships it participates, as real as the conditions out of which it is 
produced and into which it intervenes. Some popular accounts of information 
tend to depict information as ephemeral, and some academic accounts construe
it as a kind of pure form possessing "no dimensions, no materiality" (Hayles, 
1999, p. 18). But as Taylor (2011) writes (with a nod to Derrida), "the opposition
between form and content, or information and matter, upon which such 
arguments rest is no more defensible than the opposition between speech and 
writing" (p. 106). Information does in fact participate in the very material 
processes and practices it organizes. It is not immaterial but incorporeal; it 
subsists alongside the processes into which it intervenes. And it cannot be 
reduced to a function or some property of a situation.
Information is Non-Semantic and Non-Representational
Shannon's (1948) now-famous remark that "semantic aspects of 
communication are irrelevant to the engineering problem" (p. 379) of 
transmitting signals neatly encapsulates one hallmark of American information 
theory: its refusal to treat "meaning" as a concept relevant to the study of 
information. For Shannon, "messages have meaning" when they "refer to or are 
correlated according to some system with certain physical or conceptual 
entities" (p. 379, emphasis in original). Messages are not significant for what 
they represent or signify (the "concepts" to which they are attached or that 
otherwise give them some semantic dimension), but are notable instead for 
what they generate (the entropy they create or resolve).
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Of course, semantic theories of information exist (see Floridi, 2010, 2011, 
for an overview). Floridi (2010) likens the difference between Shannon's 
mathematical account of information and semantic theories of information "to 
the difference between a Newtonian description of the physical laws describing 
the dynamics of a tennis game and the description of the same game as a 
Wimbeldon final by a commentator" (p. 48). Unlike mathematical theories of 
information, semantic theories attempt to address questions like "how is 
information related to error, truth and knowledge?" (p. 52). Information 
becomes relevant to these issues only when its definition expands beyond the 
scope Americans like Shannon and Wiener ascribed to it; it must become that 
which functions to represent some state of affairs with greater or lesser fidelity.
In this way, then, information can be "true" (if it accomplishes this task) and 
"false" (if it doesn't)—unlike in mathematical theories of communication, where 
this distinction is untenable (as if the "mass" of an object could be "false").
To demonstrate the seeming singularity (or idiosyncrasy) of American 
information theory's eschewal of semantics, critics will often juxtapose the work
of Shannon and Wiener with theorists working in alternative contexts (see Day, 
2001). Hayles (1999), for example, contrasts American information theory with 
the work of British physicist Donald MacKay (see also a discussion of MacKay in
Hansen, 2004, pp. 77-79). Hayles suggests that MacKay's theory of information 
(developed years after Shannon and Wiener had solidified their positions in 
information's official histories) differs from American accounts in that it 
"triangulated between reflexivity, information, and meaning" (p. 56). Hayles 
argues that while American cyberneticists, engineers, and mathematicians 
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effectively decontextualize information (rendering it a "quantity weightless as 
sunshine, moving in a rarefied realm of pure probability, not tied down to 
bodies or material instantiations," [p. 56]), MacKay's theory conceives 
information as representational, "links it with reflexivity" (p. 57), and makes it a
matter of embodied subjectivity. Though the preceding account of information 
challenges a view of American information as dematerialized and 
decontextualized, MacKay's understanding of "meaning" remains illustrative of 
the particular problematic motivating theories of information in multiple 
contexts.
MacKay (1969) did in fact develop a representational dimension of 
information, which he offered as a complement to both Shannon's and Wiener's 
respective theorizations. He does not deny that information involves a selective 
function of influencing possibilities by modulating uncertainty and 
unpredictability in specific situations. But he claims to supplement 
mathematical theories by elaborating what he calls information's descriptive 
function, one that is (unsurprisingly) of particular use to "biologists or 
physicists looking down a microscope or taking readings on a measuring 
instrument" (pp. 12-13):
Our first problem here is to transform our experience into a symbolic 
picture or description of what we believe to be the case. Our picture, be 
it a graph or a drawing, or a scientific statement, depends for its every 
feature on our actual observations. Each element in the picture therefore
formally represents and has its origin in one corresponding elementary 
feature of the experience pictured. Nothing can legitimately appear in 
the picture, in other words, unless we have evidence for it by way of 
experienced observations. (p. 13)
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For MacKay, then, descriptive information generated through scientific 
observation functions to reflect the material world by standing, to a certain 
degree, outside it. This facet of information is useful to a knowing subject 
working to achieve adequate representation of some natural state, and 
MacKay's empiricism allows for the possibility that information might pertain to
problems of fidelity (precision or reliability, as MacKay writes, or something 
that can be true or false). And yet this is not what MacKay meant by "meaning."
MacKay stresses that the selective and descriptive functions of information
are not antithetical or mutually exclusive. Indeed, he sought to reconcile 
information's mathematical and semantic—or what he called its "mechanical" 
and its "meaningful" (p. 21)—dimensions. To do this he advances a strategic 
definition of meaning that has more in common with Shannon and Wiener than 
perhaps some commentators admit. For MacKay, "meaning" is not a matter of 
reading descriptive information against the object(s) it (ostensibly) re-presents, 
but of activating certain possibilities for action.
Behavioristic signal theories, which consider some desirable change in a 
target entity's behavior an adequate criterion for "effectiveness," made MacKay
(1969) uncomfortable. So, too, did two approaches to semantics MacKay 
indicates were popular at the time: the "structuralist" approach (which MacKay 
identifies in the logical atomism of Bertrand Russell) and the "operationalist" 
approach (which he associates with Wittgenstein). The former assert, MacKay 
claims, that the meaning of a message is a matter of that message's formal 
composition from a set of irreducible units; to understand the meaning of the 
message, one need simply understand the logical structure of its component 
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parts, which align with facts about the world. Operationalists, on the other 
hand, suggest that a message's meaning is its use; the formal composition of a 
message guarantees nothing about the role it plays (or might play) in everyday 
interactions. MacKay found both these theories of meaning insufficient for 
describing the function of a message.
Information systems, he recalls, are equally concerned with the future as 
they are with the present; messages do not influence "necessarily what you do—
as some behaviourists have suggested—but what you would be ready to do if 
given (relevant) circumstances arose" (p. 22, emphasis in original). MacKay 
called this anticipatory comportment a state of conditional readiness. In this 
way, "it is not your behaviour, but rather your state of conditional readiness for 
behaviour, which betokens the meaning (to you) of the message you heard" (p. 
22, emphasis in original). In this way, "it is not your behaviour, but rather your 
state of conditional readiness for behaviour, which betokens the meaning (to 
you) of the message you heard" (p. 22, emphasis in original). Receivers can, of 
course, comport themselves in ways that information sources don't anticipate 
(MacKay called this the "effective meaning" of a message), but the "meaning" of
a message is always its nondeterministic effect on an entity's capabilities: "its 
selective function on the range of your states of conditional readiness" (p. 24). 
Rather than contradict Shannon and Wiener, MacKay here reinforces their 
depictions of information as something involving non-representational acts of 
selection, something equally pertinent "in relation either to human beings or to 
mechanical systems" (p. 22).
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Indeed, for MacKay (1969) "meaning" is this very "selective power" (p. 26),
what he calls the "readying function" (p. 491) a message performs on one's 
state of conditional readiness. To explain this power, he invokes an example 
familiar to Wiener: the railroad switching station. Through this example Wiener 
made communication a matter of feedback loops that organize actions into a 
homeostatic regime (message-forms spreading into and feeding back from the 
loosely coordinated actions of signalman, levers, and tracks); MacKay likewise 
thematizes the coordination of actions, but with an emphasis on the 
organization of potential:
Think of a railway signal-box controlling a large shunting-yard. At any 
given moment, the configuration of levers in the box defines what the 
yard is ready to do to any waggon that happens to come along. There 
may in fact be no waggons moving; there may be some tracks on which 
no waggons will move for years; but this is no obstacle to a definition of 
the total state of conditional readiness of the yard, as betokened by the 
total configuration of lever-settings, which determines what would 
happen if any given circumstance arose. A change of a lever that controls
a disused siding may cause no visible change in the activity of the yard; 
but it makes a perfectly definite change in its state of conditional 
readiness. (pp. 22-23, emphasis in original)
Here MacKay describes the way in which a particular configuration of 
material relations is capable of channeling action in both the present and 
future. Through processes and practices of what MacKay calls 
"communication," this configuration might change, and with it, the range of 
actions it makes possible. "The object of communication," MacKay (1969) writes
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[...] is to select some particular conditional readiness in the recipient 
from the range of states that are possible. The intended meaning of the 
communication is then definable as the selective function that it is 
intended to exercise on the range of possible states. Its effective meaning
is the selective function that it actually performs. (p. 28)
For MacKay, communication is the act of selecting from a set of 
possibilities the range of states that might take effect; meaning is the particular
configuration activated.
Like Shannon and Wiener, MacKay's theory of information addresses the 
role messages play in communicative situations. For Shannon they are events; 
for Wiener they are forms; for MacKay, they are keys. A message is not a 
"bearer" of meaning or a "descriptor" of reality but a trigger that actuates 
selective power. To explain this metaphor, MacKay (1969) returns to the railway
yard, focusing this time on the role of the signal-box that locks or unlocks 
certain configurations of train track. Into these boxes, drivers insert keys that 
activate the track-switching levers, performing certain selective functions. 
"Insert a key of a given shape into the box," writes MacKay, "and you make a 
certain selection from the range of possible configurations of the signal-levers. 
Insert another, and the selection you make is different" (p. 25). MacKay stresses
that selective power does not reside "in" the key (such that the key might be 
applied to any situation with vaguely repeatable effects that can simply be 
"read off" its form, as structuralists might claim), nor can it be located in the 
box itself (such that the key's ability to take effect can be attributed to some 
function of another machine, as the operationalists would have it). The 
message-key, says MacKay, exercises its selective power amidst a field of 
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elements specifically arranged to facilitate its effects (remember MacKay's 
previous qualification that messages have meaning "if given (relevant) 
circumstances" [p. 22, emphasis in original]). Message-keys are not matters of 
reference but of actuation. They trigger nonlinear and nondeterministic series 
of material relations that attempt to modulate activity. These modulations are 
their "meaning," and the information they "convey" is their selective power.
For Shannon, Wiener, and their British interlocutor MacKay, then, 
information is a matter not of semantic interpretation but non-semantic 
activation: differentially channeling certain fluctuations in particular directions,
replicating pattens at numerous points, and reducing the likelihood that 
aberrations in those patternings might interfere with their seamless 
transmission and integration. For this reason, Floridi (2010) distinguishes 
semantic theories of information from mathematical ones—or what he calls 
syntactic theories of information, predicated as they are on arrangement and 
organization.
Information is a Matter of Organization
For both Shannon and Wiener, information is relevant and applicable only 
to some collectivity. More specifically, it is a matter of that collectivity's 
becoming (dis)organized. As Terranova (2004b) notes, because the question of 
information is "not so much a question of meanings that are encoded and 
decoded in texts but a question of inclusion and exclusion, connection and 
disconnection," the target of informatic operations is always the dynamics of 
the milieu (p. 52), the overall field of forces in which it operates. Information 
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pertains to the likelihood that certain organizations of elements will occur 
instead of others, that particular moments of selection will open or foreclose 
certain distributions of those elements.
When discussing information's target domain, Shannon and Wiener use the
term "ensemble," an artifact of their interest in statistical mechanics, where 
ensembles are collections of all those possible states that might characterize a 
system (every potential arrangement of particles in a set) along with the 
probability that any distribution of elements actually occurs. Shannon's (1948) 
formula for calculating the amount of information present in a system is 
predicated on such a probability distribution; so is Wiener's (1985a). Both are 
attempts to characterize an ensemble's actual and potential configurations 
(what is produced through an event of selection and what is therefore excluded;
for more on this relationship, see Terranova, 2004a).
Shannon may have been concerned with transmission, but his work with 
signal modulation addresses the problem of message replication from the 
standpoint of the ensemble. For Shannon (1993a), information is always 
"associated with a given situation" (p. 173) as a particular selected sequence 
determines that situations's relative degree of entropic uncertainty. Information
is only relevant and discernible "when there is a choice of possible messages" 
that might be activated (1993a, p. 173); messages themselves are simply "one 
sample from the ensemble of possible messages that might have been produced
by the information source" (1993f, p. 180). For this reason, Weaver (Shannon 
and Weaver, 1963) will speak of "message situations" (p. 17) rather than simply 
messages; fundamental to a message-event is its effect on a probabilistic field.
87 
Wiener (1985b) felt similarly, stressing that a message does not somehow 
autonomously "carry" information in isolation, "but only as a possible form of 
communication among other forms which might have replaced it" (p. 844). 
Elsewhere he writes (uncharacteristically adopting Shannon's language):
[...] the significance of a signal is determined not only by that signal 
itself, but by the whole set of signals I might have sent in place of the 
actual one. In other words, significance is a property belonging to 
ensembles. (Wiener, 1964, p. 433)
For Wiener, messages and other pattern-entities depend on their 
relationship to a fluctuating field for their significance or singularity. What 
specific organizations of patterns take hold? How are activities controlled and 
coordinated through the amplification or diminution of signals between and 
among them? In light of constant pressures to dissipate, how do systems self-
organize without recourse to some transcendent or prime mover? These are the
questions concerning a cyberneticist.
Toward a New Problematic
Many popular glosses of American postwar information theories depict 
them as theories of something ephemeral, decontextualized, dematerialized, 
and unsuitably abstract. In these accounts, information is principally a matter 
of transmission and fidelity, of replicating meaning or instruction across a 
chasm, of rational and individual "choice." But an historical and conjunctural 
analysis of American information theories discloses a project with different 
concerns—not least of which, the exigencies posed by universal contingency. 
Here information offers not simply a means of more accurately replicating 
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symbols at a distance, but rather salvation from a world constantly threatening 
to come undone, a world with no guarantees but the promise of entropic 
uncertainty and diffusion.
And yet it was a promise doubly valenced. Indeed, the writing of both 
Shannon and Weaver expresses both the anxiety and the hope generated by the 
realization that "things could be otherwise than they are because 'things' are 
the result of selection" (Rasch, 2000, p. 52). The technical work of information's
twin fathers, the apparatuses they designed and constructed, demonstrate a 
preoccupation with the (never decontextualized but always quite situated and 
material) problem of controlling human and nonhuman bodies by arranging 
their environments in attempts to anticipate their actions and harness their 
potentials, a problem of effecting changes in what certain configurations might 
do—a problem, that is, of agency. This concern persisted in particular 
throughout cybernetics' development as an intellectual project, one indebted to 
the theories of information it helped foster in the first half of the 20th century. 
The second half of that century would see cybernetics' distinctive approach to 
machines extrapolated in productive ways across a diverse number of fields. 
But thinkers in those fields retained an important interrogatory posture toward 
those machines, one Ashby (1956) explains on the first page of his cybernetic 
primer:
Cybernetics [...] is a "theory of machines," but it treats, not things but 
ways of behaving. It does not ask "what is this thing?" but "what does it 
do?" (p. 1, emphasis in original)
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The cybernetic emphasis on effects over essences—on capacities over 
properties—influenced a generation of thinkers concerned with the problem of 
agency, and they are the subject of the following chapter.
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CHAPTER 3: HOW TO THINK ABOUT MACHINES
The Cybernetic Problematic
While Wiener and Bigelow struggled to engineer devices that could track, 
predict, and react to aircraft flight patterns, they also wrestled with the 
ontological implications of these machines that seemed to act with purpose. 
They advanced their universal theory of human, animal, and machine behavior 
not only in technical reports on the intricacies of servomechanisms, but also in 
the domain of philosophy.
In 1943, they published "Behavior, Purpose and Teleology," an austere, 
seven-page position paper in Philosophy of Science. It concerned scientific 
approaches to studying the activities of a wide range of actors. Written with 
Arturo Rosenblueth, a Harvard neurophysiologist and one of Wiener's closest 
friends and collaborators, the essay "has two goals": "The first is to define the 
behavioristic study of natural events and to classify behavior. The second is to 
stress the importance of the concept of purpose" (Rosenblueth et al, 1943, p. 
18). But both these aims served another: to unhinge the concept of "purpose" 
from its more traditional, humanistic moorings and give it purchase in studies 
of a wide range of entities. The authors sought "a uniform behavioristic analysis
[...] applicable to both machines and living organisms, regardless of the 
complexity of the behavior" (p. 22). What would be the scientific implications, 
91
they wondered, of acknowledging that both living and nonliving beings 
demonstrate purposeful, goal-oriented behavior? Does this seemingly shared 
propensity for non-random, directed activity indeed trouble the very distinction 
between living and nonliving? What does it mean—to use a term Rosenblueth, 
Wiener, and Bigelow do not—to say that nonhuman animals and machines 
demonstrate agency?
In order to understand the ramifications of cybernetics' particular 
response to this question, this chapter maps post-cybernetic theoretical and 
analytical trajectories that emerged across the globe following cybernetics' 
wartime articulation. This (albeit partial) history demonstrates ways in which 
key cybernetic tenets—particularly its emphasis on the complexity of relations 
among heterogeneous actors and a penchant for thinking "machinically" about 
these systems' activities—persisted in multiple iterations of the cynernetic 
project. While these iterations frequently counterpose themselves against one 
another as a way of highlighting the uniqueness of their respective 
contributions, each might be read as a response to the cybernetic problematic 
that prompted the development of American information theories: the 
organization of chaos into contingent relations that define the capacities of 
various actors. In other words, each advances a theory of agency that 
complicates Enlightenment accounts of unencumbered, individual, efficacious 
behavior, a theory concerned instead with the ways in which ageny is the 
product of specific relationalities in complex systems of heterogeneous actors.
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Cyberneticists stressed repetition when describing the force that 
instantiates such organization (that arrests the flux of an entropic universe and 
installs in it some semblace of order). Post-cybernetic accounts of this force 
offer different tropes (e.g., redundancy, recursion, the refrain) to articulate this 
process. These accounts (re)iterate cybernetic impulses in provocative ways, 
even if most were unable to completely evade the liberal humanism that 
haunted cybernetics from the start.
The Purpose of Purpose
By strategically leveling the agential playing field, cyberneticists signaled 
a specific analytical comportment toward the objects they both studied and 
constructed. They treated both humans and nonhumans as agents capable of 
action that might significantly alter the world. Rather than view nonhumans as 
inert objects entirely available to scientific investigation, they approached their 
objects as mysterious, opaque, (even surprising) things—like "something," 
Ashby (1965) writes, "that has just fallen from a Flying Saucer" (p. 87). Ashby 
called these objects "Black Boxes," or "systems whose internal mechanisms are 
not fully open to inspection" (p. 86; for a brief genealogy, see Galloway, 2014). 
Instead, cyberneticists insist scientific inquiry has available to it only actions 
(Ashby describes these as "inputs" and "outputs"), which one might use to 
characterize the nature and abilities of the entity under scrutiny. Black boxes 
tend to obscure the complexity of their makeups by directing attention to the 
work they do: what they accomplish, facilitate, or obstruct. In this way, they 
participate in constructing the results of scientific investigation, for they enter 
into feedback relations with those attempting to study them and therefore open 
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themselves to the reciprocal play of actions that characterizes these relations. 
"By thus acting on the Box, and by allowing the Box to affect him and his 
recording apparatus, the experimenter is coupling himself to the Box, so that 
the two together form a system" (p. 87, emphasis in original). Like any other 
feedback relation, scientific inquiry is mutually informative.
Rosenblueth, Wiener, and Bigelow (1943) demonstrate this cybernetic 
imaginary, calling their approach to non-humanistic agency "behavioristic" 
because it positions the locus of purposive activity outside the acting entity. 
This move represents a radical departure from more psychologically-inflected 
"behavioristic" modes of analysis, which typically attend to ways in which 
environmental stimuli generate internal alterations in their targets. Purpose 
and will, the scientists argued instead, cannot be deduced from that entity's 
internal properties (an approach to the study of organisms the trio called 
"functionalism") but are instead discernible only through analysis of that 
entity's ongoing relationships with other entities and its environment. Behavior
—"any change of an entity with respect to its surroundings" (p. 18)—is 
purposeful when undertaken in pursuit of some goal, "a final condition in which 
the behaving object reaches a definite correlation in time or in space with 
respect to another object or event" (p. 18). Some entities are involved in action 
but are themselves passive, acting as the result of some transfer of energy 
generated in a relationship (e.g., a baseball moves, but only because someone 
throws it); others achieve goals but are not purposeful (the authors suggest, for
example, that a roulette wheel seems specifically crafted to act this way).
94 
The cyberneticists, however, were concerned with those entities 
demonstrating teleological behavior: active, purposeful behavior that achieves 
some goal through a series of decisive adjustments in coordination with the 
particular set of relationships of which it is a part—that is, through feedback. 
"All purposeful behavior may be considered to require negative feed-back" 
(Rosenbleuth et al, 1943, p. 19). Purposeful behavior is teleological insofar as 
the goal toward which an entity directs its behavior influences the nature of the
behavior itself. The goal exerts this influence when the behaving entity adjusts 
its behavior in response to feedback about its progress relative to the goal, 
feedback that may reveal some gap or "difference between the state of the 
behaving object at any time and the final state interpreted as the purpose" (p. 
24). Linear, uni-directional causality is the stuff of functionalism; "teleology is 
concerned with behavior, not with functional relationships" (p. 24).
The philosophy proved popular enough that in 1944 Wiener convened the 
first meeting of the Teleological Society, a working group devoted to elaborating
its implications across the physical, engineering, and social sciences (Galison, 
1994). But not everyone found Wiener's refashioned notion of purpose so 
revolutionary or appealing. Responding to "Behavior, Purpose and Teleology" 
seven years after its initial publication, philosopher Richard Taylor accused 
Wiener and his co-authors of advancing a definition of purpose "so broad that it 
fails to distinguish, even in some general way, the feature that it is intended to 
describe" (Taylor, 1950a, p. 311). That feature, Taylor explained through 
multiple critiques (see also Taylor, 1950b) was intent. Wiener and his colleagues
had in his view completely ignored this fundamental facet of purposeful 
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behavior. In a response to Taylor, for example, Rosenblueth and Wiener (1950) 
assert the centrality of observable behavior to the study of purpose by 
suggesting that "if a man wakes up at night and shoots his gun at his image in 
the mirror, his reaction is quite as purposeful as if he had shot at a burglar" (p. 
312). Taylor found this explanation of the scenario ridiculous, "for the question 
immediately arises, What is the man's purpose? Is it to destroy his mirror, or to 
shoot a burglar? [...] Presumably, the man's purpose might be to shoot a 
burglar, and yet, unhappily, he behaves as if his purpose were to destroy his 
mirror" (Taylor, 1950b, p. 328, emphasis in original). Taylor considered 
observable behavior a necessary but not sufficient component of purpose, for 
purposeful behavior involves some desire for a given object, event, or 
correlation as well as a belief that such an object, event, or correlation is indeed
achievable through a certain ensemble of behaviors. In short, an entity must 
wish to pursue a goal if it can be said to act with purpose. Purpose implies 
intent, something decidedly internal to an entity and unavailable to someone 
observing that entity's behavior (someone like a cyberneticist, for example).
Taylor thought the breadth of the cybernetic definition of purposeful 
behavior rendered it analytically useless. If "purposeful behavior" is simply any 
behavior one might interpret as directed toward a goal, toward a final condition
in which an entity reaches some "correlation" with another, then purposiveness 
"appears to be ubiquitous" (Taylor, 1950b, p. 330). After all, "Any behaving 
object, it would seem, ultimately reaches some 'final condition' or 'definite 
correlation' with respect to other objects or events" (p. 330, emphasis in 
original). Taylor began eying the objects in his study and contemplating their 
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activities: the pipe smoke drifting above his head in "a definite correlation with 
certain features of the environment, viz., air-currents in the room," the rocking 
chair sitting motionless by his side, which "may, I suppose, be interpreted as 
directed to a final condition, rest, relative to another object of its environment, 
the floor" (p. 330). Surely these objects seemed to meet Rosenblueth's, 
Wiener's, and Bigelow's criteria for purposeful entities—but then, what didn't? 
And more importantly, "what [...] is to be gained by thus calling tobacco pipes 
[and] rocking chairs [...] purposeful? What, for example, is science able to learn 
about these objects [...] by regarding them in this light?" (p. 330, emphasis in 
original). What (to borrow a phrase from cyberneticist Heinz von Foerster) is 
the purpose of purpose? What does one gain by attributing agency to nonhuman
entities?
A Cybernetics of Cybernetics
The crux of Taylor's issue with the peculiar definition of purposeful 
behavior Rosenblueth, Wiener, and Bigelow advance in "Behavior, Purpose and 
Teleology" rests on a vexing turn of phrase. The cyberneticists suggest that "the
term purposeful is meant to denote that the act or behavior may be interpreted 
as directed to the attainment of a goal [...]" (p. 18, emphasis added). By defining
purposeful behavior this way, Wiener and his colleagues seem to make such 
behavior a matter of perspective, a matter of an observer's ability to attribute 
agency to an entity by reflecting on observations regarding the relationships 
among particular entities in a field. In short, they appear to render cybernetic 
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agency a matter of interpretive attribution—an epistemological rather than 
ontological enterprise—opening the door to waves of speculation regarding the 
role observing entities play in systems defined by an ability to self-direct.
This very issue would define cybernetics' second age. Heinz von Foerster, 
the Austrian physicist widely credited as the father of "second-order 
cybernetics," attributes the break with Wienerian thinking to a shift in analytic 
comportment. "The cybernetics of observed systems we may consider to be 
first-order cybernetics," Foerster (2003a) writes, "while second-order 
cybernetics is the cybernetics of observing systems" (p. 285, emphasis added). 
Second-order cybernetics concerns the ways in which the entity observing a 
complex system (an entity that is itself a complex system) is always already 
imbricated in that system to the extent that the pair are mutually constitutive. It
addresses the consequences of extending the effects of feedback relations to 
the entity observing those relations. Second-order cybernetics is, in von 
Foerster's terms, "a cybernetics of cybernetics" (p. 286, emphasis in original).
The epistemological issues this shift portends may not have overtly 
concerned Rosenblueth, Wiener, and Bigelow, and yet second-order cybernetics 
owes one of its principal epistemological insights to the trio's particular spin on 
teleological behavior. Second-order thinkers like von Foerster took seriously the
first-order mandate against disembedding an actor from the complex system of 
feedback relations that govern its activity. The circular causality inherent to 
these systems (whereby an entity's goal is in fact the cause of its current 
behavior, and the effects of that behavior feed back into the entity as causes of 
future behavior) troubled the simplicty of behavioral models predicated on a 
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neat linearity that would secure a singular agent as simply either the source or 
target of a stimulus. Using the neuroscience of his day, von Foerster 
demonstrated that such linear explanations were untenable. In a 1973 essay 
entitled "Constructing a Reality," von Foerster explains multiple ways in which 
human physiological systems work not merely to represent reality (i.e., "take in"
the objective world through various receptors that transmit that world to an 
agent) but rather to construct that reality in and with the agent. The eye and 
the brain, for example, work on the material they receive from their 
environment in ways that correlate with the relative degrees of openness to it. 
What's more, they do so recursively: the cognitive products they construct 
from/with their inputs inform the organizations they subsequently use to work 
on additional inputs. Von Foerster (2003b) calls this activity "computing": "any 
operation (not necessarily numerical) that transforms, modifies, rearranges, 
orders, and so on, observed physical entities ('objects') or their representations 
('symbols')" (p. 216). Cognition is the computation of a reality.
To compute a reality is to reduce its overwhelming complexity in such a 
way as to render it both intelligible and manageable. Von Foerster (2003c) 
considered this "the essential contribution of cybernetics to epistemology": "the
ability to change an open system into a closed system, especially as regards the 
closing of a linear, open, infinite causal nexus into closed, finite, circular 
causality" (p. 230). A cybernetics of observing systems investigates ways acts of
perception are constitutive. "Cause" and "effect," for example, are the products 
of an activity whereby an observing system parses a flow of stimuli and 
straightens what would otherwise be a never-ending cycle of events. This is why
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von Foerster insisted that "an epistemology is, for all practical purposes, a 
cybernetics" (p. 231): the way the world is known is precisely the way that 
world is constructed through the circularity of cuts that in-form an ability to 
make cuts. What we know is what we compute; what we compute is what we 
know. "Closed circular causality, thus, bridges the gap between effective and 
final cause, between motive and purpose" (p. 230).
But von Foerster did not limit the purchase of his constructivism to 
epistemology alone. He saw in cybernetics a renewed existentialism: becoming 
aware of the fundamentality of parsing operations stressed the constructedness
of autonomy from a field of overlapping relationalities. My cutting a flow of 
recursions always already implicates another in ways that enable and constrain 
its possibilities. In this way, von Foerster (2003c) writes, cyberneticists "have 
the responsibility to partake in the solution of the social and ethical problems of
our times" (p. 244). This is cybernetics' ethical imperative: "Act always so as to 
increase the number of choices" (von Foerster, 2003b, p. 227). From a 
cybernetic perspective, ethical behavior is that which both recognizes and 
values agents' responsibilities for defining fields of action. In von Foerster's 
explanation of recursive cutting's constitutive power is the inkling of a second-
order cybernetic theory of agency.
Just as first-order cyberneticists dispered action across a milieu of 
heterogenous entities, so too did second-order cyberneticists address their 
epistemology and their ethics to a field. Thinking cybernetically involves a 
characteristic manner of thought, what anthropologist and second-order 
cyberneticist Gregory Bateson (1972a) calls "cybernetic explanation" (p. 405). 
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Cybernetics, Bateson suggests, examines not singular entities but the fields of 
possibilities in which those entities are embedded; it comports itself to the 
complexity of an environment of open-ended possibilities, then questions why 
that environment affords certain occurrences and not others. Bateson writes 
that cybernetic explanation eschews the positivity of the autonomous actor and 
focuses instead on the system of constitutive "restraints" (p. 405) that govern 
any actor's abilities (that define, in other words, what an actor is by what it is 
capable of doing). These restraints, he says, "can in all cases be regarded as 
factors which determine inequality of probability" (pp. 405-406), that encourage
some forms of behavior and thought while discouraging others. Because (as von
Foerster, too, had already demonstrated) second-order cybernetics refuses to 
conceive an actor as something disembedded from its environment, Bateson's 
description of cybernetic explanation cannot be read as yet another 
instantiation of some agent/structure dichotomy. Agency here is never a matter 
of force outside the system, but rather of a force immanent to the system itself, 
as that system finds ways to implement patterns or redundancies among those 
material, energetic, and informational forces responsible for giving it some 
stability (see also Bateson, 1972b). Despite Bateson's unfortunate choice of the 
term "constraints" as a marker of determination (a term that unfortunately 
invokes a dualism between an agent-positivity and a structure-negativity), 
second-order cyberneticists gradually fashioned a systemic understanding of 
agency, one in which a system of overlapping forces itself acts as agent.
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Like his second-order counterparts, Bateson acknowledged that pure 
redundancy in such systems was unlikely, untenable, and unwelcome, for 
cybernetic systems are always open to (indeed, they rely on) some outside that 
they themselves demarcate as a consequence of their own parsing activity. Self-
regulating systems emerge from a complex interplay of forces that instigate 
those systems by troubling their ability to maintain coherence and triggering 
further organization-maintaining practices. Bateson (1972a) claims, therefore, 
that "noise [is] the only possible source of new patterns" (p. 416, emphasis in 
original). Redundancy is a repetition of the same; recursivity is a repetition that
generates the new, as a system returns to itself only in relation to the alterity to
which it must repond.
In this way, second-order cyberneticists pose a challenge to 
conceptualizations of agency as autonomy in the face of external 
determinations. For von Foerster (2003b), for example, autonomy is precisely a 
system's ability to regulate its own regulatory mechanisms, a process that 
necessarily implicates that system's coupling with its outside. This is the 
principal aim of those recursive computations that construct worlds: the 
"regulation of regulation" (p. 226, emphasis in original). In their overview of the
contributions second-order cybernetic thinking makes to contemporary social 
theory, Clarke and Hansen (2009) recognize the centrality of recursive 
regulation to a renewed understanding of nonhumanistic agency, noting that "in
stark constradistinction to any naive conception of autonomy as the absolute 
self-sufficiency of a substantial subject, this concept demarcates the paradoxical
reality that environmental entanglement correlates with organismic (or 
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systemic) self-regulation" (p. 7). Second order cyberneticists embraced this 
paradoxical relationship between openness and closure as a way of accounting 
for the emergence and durability of complex systems, perhaps no one more so 
than Chilean biologists Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela.
Autopoiesis and Machinic Autonomy
For Maturana and Varela (1972), the ability to parse a complex system (to 
enact a constitutive cut that organizes a world) is pivotal not only to those 
processes by which an observer comes to know that world but also to the 
production of reality itself. "A universe comes into being when a space is 
severed in two" (p. 73) they write in Autopoiesis and Cognition, a work that, 
while extraordinarily influential among second-order cyberneticists concerned 
with the epistemological implications of circular causality, recuperates 
something of the ontological imperative Wiener and other first-order 
cyberneticists stressed decades prior.
The constitutive severing of space into two is an act of distinction that 
abstracts a collection of elements from an environment and makes of them 
some unity. In his solo-authored introduction to Autopoiesis and Cognition, 
Maturana explains that distinction is the "basic cognitive operation" (p. xix) an 
observer (human or nonhuman) performs. Distinction separates an entity from 
its background; it distinguishes, in Maturana and Varela's terms, a "unity" from 
a "medium." At the same time, it characterizes each "with the properties with 
which this operation endows them" (p. xix). Any unity, any system of elements 
constitutively cut-from (and therefore defined-against) its environment, is a 
simple unity. But for Maturana and Varela distinction can become a recursive 
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operation when it comes to bear once more on a simple unity and makes an 
additional distinction between that unity's "organization" and its "structure." 
The result is a composite unity. A composite unity-system's structure is "the 
actual components (all their properties included) and the actual relations 
holding between them that concretely realize a system as a particular member 
of the class (kind) of composite unities to which it belongs by its organization" 
(p. xx). Its organization is "the set of relations between its components that 
define it as a system of a particular class" (p. xx). A unity's structure, the 
concrete and specific relations among its elements in space, might change as a 
result of relations with other unities or with its medium; a unity's organization 
cannot change if that unity is to remain what it is. Maturana says simple unities
generate a spatiality logically distinct from the spaces of their components; this 
is "a space that it defines through the properties that characterize it as a simple
unity" (p. xix). The whole and its parts are ontologically adjacent.
Maturana and Varela (1972) explain that composite unities must work to 
maintain the organizations that give them their respective identities. They 
direct the network of components that comprise them to the continual 
reproduction (the perpetual realization) of those organizations. They generate 
themselves. They are (to use what is perhaps Maturana and Varela's most 
famous neologism) autopoietic. And for Maturana and Varela, autopoiesis is 
both the necessary and sufficient condition of life itself. Maturana clarifies this 
assertion by suggesting that "it is the circularity of its organization that makes 
a living system a unit of interactions, and it is this circularity that it must 
maintain in order to remain a living system and to retain its identity through 
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different interactions" (p. 9). Against evolutionist and reproductivist accounts of
life, Maturana and Varela adopt a position similar to that of Wiener several 
decades prior: "life" simply names any entity capable of maintaining 
organization.
The Chilean biologists prefered a single term to designate such entities: 
"machines." Machines are not technologies, "concrete hardware systems, 
defined by the nature of their components and by the purpose that they fulfill in
their operations as man-made artifacts" (Maturana & Varela, 1972, p. 77). 
Machines are systems of relations that form unities in space, systems defined 
by the precise organization of their components, which do not, by virtue of their
being this or that type of component, determine in advance the functioning of 
the machine. Nor does a machine's organization dictate the properties of the 
components it organizes: "The organization of a machine [...] does not specify 
the properties of the components which realize the machine as a concrete 
system, it only specifies the relations which these must generate to constitute 
the machine or system as a unity" (p. 77). The "essence" of a machine is 
precisely the relations it establishes. For Maturana and Varela, machines are 
systems of relations that perform their functions by mobilizing structural 
materials with no necessary connection to those functions; "the organization of 
the machine is independent of the properties of its components which can be 
any," for "a given machine can be realized in many different manners by many 
different kinds of components" (p. 77). This theory of living systems is 
unabashedly a "mechanicism" (p. 76); machines are their own motors 
(Maturana and Varela take a "nonanimistic view" [p. 76] of machines, rejecting 
105 
any appeal to some transcendental animating force). Autopoietic machines are 
therefore those machines that organize the work of maintaining their 
organizations. They do this and nothing else.
Any machine not directed at the maintenance of its own organization is not
an autopoietic machine; it is an allopoietic one. Allopoietic machines, Maturana 
and Varela (1972) suggest, are machines that "have as the product of their 
functioning something different from themselves" (p. 80). Take a car, they 
suggest, which is certainly a "concatenation of processes" (p. 79), yet not one 
specifically aimed at the maintenance of the car's organization. Maturana and 
Varela stress that autopoietic machines involve processes logically independent 
from the specific materials they organize, and they subordinate all activities "to 
the maintenance of their own organization" (p. 80). For this reason, Maturana 
and Varela characterize autopoietic systems as "homeostatic systems," a 
designation that is "a necessary consequence of the autopoietic organization" 
(p. 80). The cybernetic emphasis on physical entropy clearly undergirds this 
conception of autopoiesis.
Maturana and Varela (1972) call autopoietic systems "autonomous" (p. 80).
But their definition of autonomy does not involve some kind of 
disembeddedness from a system. Autopoietic machines are autonomous to the 
extent that they are capable of folding their machinic activities back on 
themselves and achieving some operational closure. This closure is necessary 
only in the organizational register; a system's relative degrees of closure define 
its structural capacities to cope with its environment in ways that help it 
maintain its organizational homeostasis. Autonomy is, then, "the self-asserting 
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capacity of living systems to maintain their identity through the active 
compensation of deformations" (p. 73). For Maturana and Varela, openness and 
closure are not easy opposites; they depend on one another when a system is 
organizationally closed but structurally open. A machine needs its relations to 
remain what it is.
Moreover, autopoietic machines express some individuality; "that is, by 
keeping with their organization as an invariant through its continuous 
production they actively maintain an identity which is independent of their 
interactions with an observer" (Maturana & Varela, 1972, p. 80). Allopoietic 
machines, conversely, depend on an observer, who determines those machines' 
operations because their products are "different from themselves" (p. 81). 
Autopoietic machines are sealed monads; they realize their unities through no 
organizational processes but their own; "their operations specify their own 
boundaries in the proceses of self-production" (p. 81). They are perfect. As 
Hayles (1999) elaborates, autopoietic machines "always operate in accord with 
their structures, whatever they may be" (p. 139). Any deficiency, any lack, any 
malfunction is the product of an observer who apprehends an autopoietic 
machine and, through some process of distinction, parses its boundaries, 
linearizes its circular auto-genesis, and generates for it some kind of "ideal" to 
which it never corresponds.
Similarly, autopoietic machines act only to reproduce their own 
organizations; they are otherwise "purposeless" (Maturana & Varela, 1972, p. 
86). This is to say that a machine's organization only stipulates and governs 
relations, not intentions. "Thus," Maturana and Varela write, "the notions of 
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purpose and function have no explanatory value in the phenomenological 
domain which they pretend to illuminate, because they do not refer to 
processes indeed operating in the generation of its phenomena" (p. 86, 
emphasis in original). Maturana and Varela thus seem to agree with the notion 
of purpose Rosenblueth, Wiener, and Bigelow beget when they render it a 
matter of observer positionality: "purpose or aims [...] are not features of the 
organization of any machine (allo- or autopoietic); these notions belong to the 
domain of our discourse about our action" (p. 85).
To be sure, theirs is a realism that posits a domain distinct from human 
observation, perception, and intention. But it is a realism with a constructivist 
rather than a representationalist epistemology. Maturana and Varela do not 
suggest that observers somehow "misidentify" or "misconstrue" the operation of
a machine when they apprehend it. An observer makes a distinction in a 
system, parsing it from a background and establishing a particular descriptive 
domain in which their distinctions operate. As it was for von Foerster and 
Bateson, observation is for Maturana and Varela (1972) not something that 
proceeds from outside a system, but rather an operation immanent to a system 
that is responsible for constituting and positioning the unities in it. Observation 
is a generative act characterized as a capacity to recursively take as its object 
the very collection of elements it has constituted as a unity and attempt to 
disembed this unity from a field. In Maturana and Varela's terms, machines are 
always structurally coupled to one another and to the milieu in which they have 
been connected through the constitutive cut of distinction; they reciprocally act
on one another not through transmission but by triggering material 
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(re)arrangements. For this reason, Maturana and Varela cheekily suggest that 
autopoietic machines "have no inputs or outputs" (p. 81). That is, these 
machines do not simply "accept" stimuli from other systems or their 
environments; instead, unity and stimulus are always interacting in a manner 
coextensive with the capacities their particular organizations afford. 
Autopoietic machines can therefore "be perturbed by independent events and 
undergo internal structural changes which compensate these perturbations" (p.
81), just as the human nervous system, Maturana explains earlier in 
Autopoiesis and Cognition, reconfigures sense data in line with a body's degree 
of openness to that data, from which it constructs a phenomenal field. 
Perturbations too powerful may, however, threaten to dis-organize the machine 
and dissolve the relations that make it what it is. But any noticeable relation 
between such a trigger and its response belongs entirely to the domain of the 
observer: "any relation between these changes and the course of perturbations 
to which they may point to [sic], pertains to the domain in which the machine is 
observed, but not to its organization" (p. 81). Causality is an observer-
dependent phenomenon.
Ultimately, one particular perturbation became too intense for the 
structural coupling that was Maturana and Varela. In later work that departs 
from the characterization of autopoiesis he developed with his colleague, Varela
would attempt to redefine the scope of a concept he felt had been 
simultaneously stretched too thin and delimited unnecessarily (see Hayles, 
1999). In Varela's view, autopoiesis pertained to biological life alone (particular 
cellular activity); the social systems to which others applied the term, he said, 
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did not really demonstrate the autopoietic characteristics for which he and 
Maturana had argued (see Protevi, 2009). What's more, he grew uncomfortable 
with autopoiesis' unyielding circularity, its emphasis on homeostatic closure and
the tendency to so rigidly distinguish machines from their environments. As 
Hayles (1999) observes, Maturana and Varela's vocabulary belies a desire to 
preserve an individualitic notion of agency; for her, "closure and recursivity [...] 
play the foundational role in autopoietic theory that self-possession played in 
classic liberal theory" (p. 146). Hayles expresses uncertainty over autopoiesis' 
status as an observer-dependent feature of systems themselves:
If the theory says that the observer creates the [autopoietic] system by 
drawing distinctions, it risks undercutting the ontological primacy of 
organizational closure. If it says that autopoietic processes are an 
essential feature of reality, it risks undercutting its epistemological 
radicalism. (p. 145)
Autopoiesis and Cognition begins by seeming to assert the former; it 
concludes by appearing to argue the latter. In short, Maturana and Varela were 
in the end incapable of completely harmonizing and radicalizing their 
ontological realism and epistemological constructivism. Moreover, as Wolfe 
(1995) notes, Maturana and Varela's work, particularly the ethics they attempt 
to draw from it, seems haunted by a speciesism that reasserts the primacy of 
the human despite a theory of machines that would appear to de-privilege it. 
However, another critic of autopoiesis, an outspoken opponent of both French 
structuralism and Lacanian psychoanalysis, would nevertheless elaborate his 
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own theory of machinic systems, one that completely re-ontologizes the 
cybernetic question of agency and offers a thoroughly nonhumanistic account of
the machinic production of reality. His name was Félix Guattari.
Machinic Desire and Ecological Subjectivity
The epistemological ambiguity Hayles identifies in the work of Maturana 
and Varela, where machines seem to be (simultaneously) the product of 
observational distinctions and autonomous from the realm of cognition, is 
evidence of the aporias a cybernetics of observing systems raised for those who
engaged with it. Second-order cybernetics struggled to reconcile the 
relationship between observing systems and machines, in part because its 
practicioners never sufficiently resolved their own ontological and 
epistemological dilemmas. But while these scientists tussled over the degree to 
which observing systems constituted the systems they apprehended, radical 
psychoanalyst Félix Guattari simply inverted the productive relationship 
between these two entities. For him, machines are not the products of 
observing entities; observing entities are always and already the products of a 
process that both subtends and supersedes them. This insight would fuel 
Guattari's vigorous attack on the predominant theoretical paradigms of his day: 
psychoanalysis and structuralism.
Guattari (1995) called this process "machinic heterogenesis" (p. 33), a 
concept that emerged from an inversion of Maturana and Varela and 
significantly retooled the concept of autopoiesis. While he appreciates the 
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biologists' productive distinction between machines and mere technical 
mechanisms, Guattari sought something more dynamic than a notion of self-
contained and self-sufficient autopoietic monads. He notes that
it is as biologists that Humberto Maturana and Fracisco Varela proposed 
the concept of the autopoietic machine to define living systems. I think 
their notion of autopoiesis—as the auto-reproductive capacity of a 
structure or ecosystem—could be usefully enlarged to include social 
machines, economic machines and even the incorporeal machines of 
language, theory and aesthetic creation. (Guattari, 1995, p. 93)
Here Guattari takes aim at Varela's assertions about autopoiesis' limited 
applicability to biological systems. Moreover, he takes issue with the idea that 
"organization" could name something enduring, something that transcends any 
concrete and material instantiation (p. 39). Indeed, what Maturana and Varela 
called "organization" was for him the epitome of structuralist abstraction—an 
ideal/ized system of relations, the Saussurian langue that misunderstands "the 
essential dimension of machinic autopoiesis": novelty, generativity, 
"disequilibrium" (p. 37). He railed against theories "occupied by inputs and 
outputs whose purpose is to make the structure function according to a 
principle of eternal return," something "haunted by a desire for eternity" (p. 
37). And he dismissed Varela's attempts to limit autopoiesis to biological 
processes, insisting instead that "autopoiesis, which uniquely describes 
autonomous entities—unitary, individuated and closed to input/output 
relationships—lacks characteristics essential to living organisms, like the fact 
that they are born, die and survive through genetic phylums" (p. 39).
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Guattari imagined a more vibrant and dynamic future for the concept of 
autopoiesis, which "deserves to be rethought in terms of evolutionary, collective
entities, which maintain diverse types of relations of alterity, rather than being 
implacably closed in on themselves" (pp. 39-40). A machine, Guattari suggests, 
always contains an "autopoietic node" that "gives it value" (p. 37), and that 
value is precisely (and somewhat paradoxically) its continual "breakdown, 
catastrophe—the menace of death" (p. 37). A machine does not merely reiterate
the already-signified; it opens onto the not-yet-organized. Guattari sought a 
conception of machines capable of "[taking] us beyond Varela's characterization
of autopoiesis as unitary individuation, with neither input nor output" and 
"towards a more collective machinism without delimited unity, whose autonomy 
accommodates diverse mediums [sic] of alterity" (p. 42). Machines cut across 
the biological, the social, the natural, the energetic, and the technical—"diverse
mediums of alterity" indeed—to compose (from seemingly disparate materials 
with no necessary connection) the very dynamic organizations capable of 
reproducing themselves and, consequently, the power relations they enable: 
machinic heterogenesis.
In the end, while Guattari appreciated Maturana's and Varela's attempts to
conceive self-organizing systems that were observer-independent, he found 
their rendering of autopoiesis too inflexible. Yet Guattari did not deny 
redundancy's productive potential. In fact, he seemed to appreciate Maturana's 
and Varela's attempt to theorize redundancy qua redundancy, a redundancy 
without a subject. But unlike his cyberneticist forebearers he did not 
unquivically embrace redundancy as an attractive social and political force; 
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instead, he fiercely interrogated the normativity of homeostasis. Redundancy 
was for Guattari the force by which flows of (human and nonhuman) desire get 
arrested, pooled, and channeled in ways beneficial to entities capable of 
implementing those redundancies. Redundancy is an effect of power relations. 
Guattari (1984) recognizes the unsettling penchant for redundancy that French 
semiology borrows from American information theory when he writes:
Information theory has tried to save the bacon of the semiologies of 
signification by defining significative redundancies as being in inverse 
proportion to the quantity of information—but this is no more than a 
rearguard semiological skirmish. In fact, the transfer of information 
belongs to a diagrammatic process that has no direct relation with the 
significative redundancies of human 'understanding.' 'Before' the 
signifier, redundancy and information came together in a process of 
intrinsic diagrammatization. (p. 132)
Here Guattari adopts Shannon's definition of information as the antithesis 
of redundancy. But he also recognzies information as something other than an 
epistemological problem (i.e., of "understanding"). Outside the domain of 
semiology, "before" the signifier, informatic redundancy pertains to something 
else: the (re)arrangement (for Guattari, the "diagrammatization") of material 
elements in ways that inhibit entropic divergences, which, for Guattari, marked 
the possibility of flight from oppressive state and economic forces. Indeed, he 
was skeptical of "the dominant position that information theory occupied at the 
core of linguistics," which "led to the adoption of a definition of language as 
merely a means of transmitting messages, the remainder being simply noise 
and redundancy" (Guattari, 2011, p. 23). Redundancy and recursivity operate 
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on and with the already-signified, on and with those materials already 
overcoded with the significations powerful forces are able to impose on them as
they draw them into their particular regimes of meaning and sensibility.
Guattari described (with assistance, he acknowledged, from frequent 
collaborator Gilles Deleuze) a repetition seemingly more fundamental, one that 
pertains to the material and energetic fluxes whose arresting and pooling serve 
as the precondition of signification: a refrain. Refrains are a-signifying 
repetitions both responsible for both the production of subjectivity and its 
dissolution or dispersion.
According to Guattari (1995), refrains function in at least three ways (see 
also Elliot, 2012, pp. 88-92). First, they establish a basic "ontological 
consistency" (p. 28), a rhythm that marks the emergence of a positive unity out 
of the ongoing flux of the universe—a basic unit of organization that forms its 
own universe amidst chaos. Second, through additional repetitions that entity 
establishes a territory for itself. Guattari calls these "intensive" repetitions. 
They draw together the elements that constitute the unity, that inscribe 
boundaries demarcating the unity from its environment. Repetition of these 
boundaries mark periphery and center, subject and object, home and not-home 
(Elliot, 2012). Finally, Guattari (1995) stresses a third function of the refrain: its
ability to escape the pull of other refrains, to slip away from other territories 
and take flight into heretofore unknown registers. Beyond this, says Guattari, 
refrains assume limitless potential to instantiate new rhythms whose novelty 
extends to infinity: "The fourth term stands for the nth term: it is the opening 
onto multiplicity" (p. 31).
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Machines (specifically those Guattari called "existential machines") work 
to implement refrains. They do this from a place immanent to those refrains. 
They fold desire onto itself in a kind of doubling-back, which serves as a ground
for the production of fragile unities out of chaotic flux (Guattari, 1995, p. 28). 
As refrains are a-signifying, this is an operation analytically distinct from (but in
some cases directly linked to) signifying practices. "The 'mechanism' of this 
turning around of being," Guattari writes "consists in the fact that some of the 
machine's discursive segments do not only play a functional or signifying role, 
but assume the existentialising function of pure intensive repetition that I have 
called the refrain function" (p. 53). Refrains in fact operate between or within 
the discursive and the "sensory" to
find substance in rhythmic and plastic forms, in prosodic segments, in 
facial traits, in the emblems of recognition, in leitmotifs, signatures, 
proper names or their invocational equivalents. (Guattari, 1996a, p. 162)
Yet Guattari's machines do not always serve to arrest, pool, and block, for 
the refrains they harness or modulate do not simply form universes and 
territorialize them. Refains always insinuate themselves in one another. They 
rework one another, amplify or diminish the force of one another's formative 
repetitions. Refrains encounter other refrains in meetings that might reinforce, 
distort, modify, or de-form. In true cybernetic, autopoietic fashion, they can 
unite and stabilize. But they can also demolish and dismantle. If cybernetics' 
resistance to change and its emphasis on stability renders it essentially 
conservative (see Hayles, 1999), then Guattari does not attempt to counter this 
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conservatism by advocating the propagation of entropy, but by granting 
repetition the power to obliterate. Guattari's refrains are forms of redundancy 
that can rework and dismantle other redundancies.
For the first-order cyberneticists, machines were a technical matter. For 
second-order cyberneticists, machines were an epistemological (and, in some 
cases, ontological) matter. For Guattari, machines were a decidedly political 
matter. Despite the fact that his machines were radically a-subjective, Guattari 
nevertheless mobilized the concept of machinic heterogenesis in an effort to 
solve the problem of the production of subjectivity in capitalist social 
formations, for he sought some insight into those processes that might generate
subjects capable of resisting oppressive forms of power dominant in the late 
20th century. In cybernetics, Guattari discovered a language and conceptual 
logic that permitted a productive break with prevailing theoretical approaches 
to the critical question of subjectivity under an emerging global capitalism 
(again, structuralism and psychoanalysis; see Watson, 2009). By enacting a 
cybernetic reading that retools first- and second-order notions of machinic 
activity, Guattari (1984) recast the problem of subjectivity as something that 
transcends purely structural explanations. Machines infiltrate structures and 
rework them. In one of his earliest essays on the matter, "Machine and 
Structure," Guattari says that while "in reality, a machine is inseparable from its
structural articulations," machines and structures function in a kind of 
reciprocal presupposition, for "conversely [...] each contingent structure is 
dominated (and this is what I want to demonstrate) by a system of machines, or 
at the very least by one logic machine" (p. 111). Guattari criticized structuralist 
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thinking for fetishizing abstract systems of sign-relations with little or no 
regard for the pragmatic fields of activity in which those systems operate 
(Guattari, 2011). Such thinking, Guattari thought, involved conceiving machines
in terms always already organized through power relations granting those 
terms efficacy or legitimacy. Guattari deployed a machinic vocabulary to 
describe a process anterior to structural activity, logically prior to semiological 
operations, one outcome of which could be the production of subjectivities or 
subject positions from which seemingly autonomous actors appear to act and 
speak. As he writes
Standard agents of production are mobilized before the transformation of
each individual into a speaker-listener capable of adopting a linguistic 
behavior compatible with the modes of competence that assign us to a 
particular position in the society of production. (Guattari, 2011, p. 38)
Or, put even more succinctly:
The sign will always have to refer to the semiologies of the power 
machines, and their particular syntagmatic and paradigmatic 
coordinates, if it is to produce any effect at all upon reality. (Guattari, 
1984, p. 136)
One effect of structuralism's hegemony (in linguistics and beyond) was a 
rather naive and unproductive understanding of agency, Guattari thought. 
Structuralism's penchant for binary thinking too often reinforced a retrograde 
agent/structure dualism that constrained attempts to conceive new avenues for 
political action. Guattari (1984) explains how (in a structualist imaginary) "the 
agent of action, whose definition here does not extend beyond this principle of 
reciprocal determination, is included in the structure," which "encloses the 
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subject, and will not let go as long as it is in a position to recuperate it within 
another structural determination" (p. 112). In short, for Guattari, structuralism 
cannot offer explanations of subject-formation that do not already operate 
within symbolic economies sanctioned by the forces of power in control of those
economies. Thinking cybernetically and conceiving this process machinically 
allowed Guattari to glimpse a structure's underside, something not already of 
the subject even if it might (in some cases) be responsible for the subject. For 
Guattari, a machine "remains essentially remote" (p. 112) from acting subjects, 
so machinic thinking interrupts an easy isomorphism between subject and 
agent because it demonstrates that (in the expansive fields of action in which 
agency might occur) "the subject is always somewhere else" (p. 112). The locus 
of agency is not the signifying subject but the machines that can produce this 
subject.
Guattari's resistance to explanations of subject formation predicated on 
the instantiation of signifying semiologies that loop through an infinite play of 
signifiers in self-contained systems informs his desire to see autopoiesis become
less rigidly self-referrential. And later in his career, Guattari (2008) would 
propose that thinking machinically about the production of subjectivity means 
thinking ecologically (and here he specifically recalls Bateson) about the ways 
social, mental, and environmental processes become organized, distributed, and
designated. Guattari returns the cybernetic problem of nonhumanistic, 
collective agency to a complex and crosscut field of forces in which existential 
and desiring machines alike work to implement or reinflect refrains that temper
forms of living. Quite simply, agency is a function of the refrain, an ability to 
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insinuate repetitions that modify existing relations (and an ability that is itself 
the product of the relations that various refrains have either instantiated or 
prised apart). But by positioning himself against structuralist modes of thought,
he unwittingly adopted the structuralist problematic—the status of the subject 
and the production of subjectivity—and in this way remained somewhat 
constrained by it. In his work with Gilles Deleuze, however, Guattari's theory of 
machines would finally free itself of subjectivist pretensions.
Toward a Machinic Ontology
Consistent with the cyberneticists who preceded them, Deleuze and 
Guattari (1977) define a machine by its behaviors, by what it does. "It 
represents nothing, but it produces. It means nothing, but it works" (p. 109). 
Yet their machine is not an exceptional type of entity, a privileged class of actor.
A machine is anything that organizes. More specifically, machines are what 
synthesize reality itself, not by reconciling (and therefore negating) the already-
formed into some higher order, but by cleaving portions of an abundance that 
always in some way exceeds them (through a parsing operation by now so 
familiar in the cybernetic tradition). Deleuze and Guattari write that "a machine
may be defined as a system of interruptions or breaks" in material and 
energetic flows (p. 36, emphasis in original). But "these breaks should in no way
be considered as a separation from reality," they write. "Rather, they operate 
along lines that vary according to whatever aspect of them we are considering" 
(p. 36). Machines give shape to chaos from a place inside that chaos; they 
attempt to instantiate repeatabilities from unpredictabilities.
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In geometric fashion, Deleuze and Guattari (1987) call that place of 
chaotic flows the plane of consistency, a plane with no dimensions or 
dimensionality on which exist the sheer plentitude of unformed matters and 
functions, heterogeneous singularities or haecceities not (yet) composed into 
distinguishable associations, intensities and capacities not (yet) actualized. On 
this plane, the first (and most fundamental) of Deleuze and Guattari's machines 
begins to work. It is an abstract machine. The abstract machine is "in itself 
neither physical or corporeal, any more than it is semiotic" (p. 141); it is rather 
like a diagram that realizes itself in its own productive acts. A diagram is not a 
representational device about any given collection of elements, but "a 
cartography that is coextensive with a whole social field" (Deleuze, 1988, p. 34);
it is immanent to the intensities and flows on which it acts. Such acts are a type
of synthesis that Deleuze and Guattari (1977; see also Grossberg, 2010, 2014) 
call connective: they interrupt the otherwise smooth flow of singularities by 
punctuating it, slicing it, cutting it in a way that forges specific relationalities 
and introduces a boundary condition. Cutting a flow does not negate it. "Far 
from being the opposite of continuity, the break or interruption conditions this 
continuity: it presupposes or defines what it cuts into as an ideal continuity" (p. 
36). Diagrams cut-connect to link singularities with no necessary association; 
they make and unmake connections between those entities and in so doing 
bestow some dimensionality to an otherwise chaotic, entropic flux.
Deleuze and Guattari (1987) liken the abstract machine to a lobster whose 
pincers dip into a flow of haeceities and extract (by collecting) assemblages, 
pivotal units of analysis in Deleuzean/Guattarian social and cultural criticism. 
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Simply put, an assemblage is any group of haecceities a machine has 
synthesized: a "constellation of singularities and traits deducted from the flow—
selected, organized, stratified—in such a way as to converge (consistency) 
artificially and naturally" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 406). In Deleuze and 
Guattari's native French the term for "assemblage," agencement, names not so 
much a noun as a verb, a dynamic process of arrangement by which elements 
with no necessary relation are nevertheless articulated and channeled in a 
particular direction as an unstable unity (see Anderson et al, 2012; Slack, 2011;
Slack & Wise, 2005). Assemblages are the products of diagrammatic 
actualizations; they put diagrammatic actualizations to work. "The abstract 
machine is like the diagram of the assemblage," say Deleuze and Guattari 
(1987), while "the assemblage negotiates variables at this or that level of 
variation [...] and determines which variables will enter into constant relations" 
(p. 100).
The assemblage is a critical unit of analysis in Deleuzean/Guattarian 
theory. More specifically, then, Deleuze and Guattari claim that abstract 
machines extract (and connect into another unstable unity) two assemblages: 
one Deleuze and Guattari designate content; the other, expression. "Expression"
names the assemblage of those singularities that act, that intervene in contents.
"Content" names the assemblage of those singularities acted upon, the bodies, 
actions, passions, and qualities made available to and for activity. Both are 
active, but each in its own way; as Deleuze (1988) explains, "contents" are 
those materials made "determinable," while "expression" are those rendered 
"determining." This is to say that this crucial distinction defines which of those 
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materials an assemblage has gathered together are acted upon and which are 
acting. Content and expression are not related as signifier and signified 
(expression does not represent content), nor are they related as base and 
superstructure (content does not unilaterally determine expression). An 
abstract machine places two collectivities of bodies with no necessary relation 
in a state of reciprocal presupposition. Given the particular way an abstract 
machine has brought a constellation of machinic and enunciative elements into 
contact (two assemblages connected into one collectivity of reciprically 
presupposing units), "expression" names those elements that intervene in those 
designated as content: expression "does not speak 'of' things; it speaks on the 
same level as states of things and states of content" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, 
p. 87, emphasis in original). Semiotic/expressive elements do not represent 
contents but "anticipate them or move them back, slow them down or speed 
them up, separate or combine them, delimit them in a different way" (p. 86).
By creating a contingent relation of reciprocal presupposition between 
content and expression, the abstract machine draws a line between the smooth 
and undifferentiated plane of consistency and the plane of organization (both of 
which, Deleuze and Guattari claim, actually exist on the same plane), 
actualizing particular haecceities by lending them a distinct dimensionality. The
diagram "plays a piloting role" (p. 142) in relation to these concrete 
assemblages, which embody the content and expression that diagram 
generates. Content and expression (two assemblage-collectivities themselves) 
are like dimensions of the assemblage-collectivity produced by their being 
placed in reciprocal presupposition with and to one another. For this reason, 
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Deleuze and Guattari frequently liken an assemblage's content to its particular 
machinic assemblage and an assemblage's expression to its particular 
collective assemblage of enunciation; in this way, the two pairs of terms work in
tandem. Once again, for Deleuze and Guattari every assemblage is a 
composition of two collectivities; every assemblage is, paradoxically, an 
assemblage of assemblages: a machinic assemblage is a pragmatic system "of 
bodies, of actions and passions, an intermingling of bodies reacting and to one 
another," and a collective assemblage of enunciation is a semiotic system "of 
acts and statements, of incorporeal transformations attributed to bodies" (p. 88;
see also Wise, 2005).
Nothing about an assemblage is guaranteed, however, for in every moment
and at every turn forces (both internal and external) seek to dis-assemble it. 
Assemblages achieve their character through links with other assemblages 
(links that define the capacities of the elements connected in and through 
them). Indeed, assemblages are precisely the links they establish, reinforce, or 
dismantle. They embody the machinic operations that produce them.
But the lobster's twin pincers bear doubly-articulated claws. Each 
assemblage—both expression and content—is doubled yet again, this time into 
substance and form. "Substance" refers to those materials made to be part of a 
content-assemblage or an expression-assemblage. "Form" refers to the ways 
these materials get ordered in each of these assemblages. The form of content 
is the order determinable materials receive when an abstract machine 
articulates content with expression; the form of expression is the order 
determining materials receive from the same encounter. Substances are the 
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product of what Deleuze and Guattari (see also Grossberg, 2010, 2014) call 
territorializing machines, which perform conjunctive syntheses that draw 
together various materials found in both content and expression collectivities 
("include this and this and this," etc.). Forms are the product of coding 
machines, which perform disjunctive syntheses that inscribe differences in and 
among the materials gathered into a territory ("an element in this territory can 
be either this, or this, or this," etc.). Just as expression and content reciprocally 
presuppose one another, so too do substance and form (both of which exist on 
the plane of organization, which itself reciprocally presupposes the plane of 
consistency): "The tetravalence of the assemblage" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, 
p. 89). Machines work to bring various states of coherence to an otherwise 
chaotic world. They (de/re)assemble it.
While they do not use the term, Deleuze's and Guattari offer a 
nonhumanistic theory of agency rooted in the notion of agencement. Their work
embraces multiple cybernetic tendencies: a refusal to privilege human actors as
the sole motors of social and cultural change; an emphasis on external 
relations, couplings, and their effects as a means of defining or characterizing 
actors; a de-linearized causality; etc. Deleuze and Guattari extrapolate these 
tendencies to their logical posthumanist conclusions, radicalizing them on the 
road to an ontology that makes agency a matter of arrangement. Theirs is a 
philosophy of radical immanance in which no entity stands outside or above the 
field in which it is embedded, and this immanentism ensures that arrangement 
more than the activity of an actor capable of standing apart from the field of 
forces that constitute it. Deleuze and Guattari's account displaces individual 
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actors to underscore the complexity of arrangement itself as an ongoing 
process that determines entities' capacities to affect the particular 
organizations that define the ways they might affect a social formation. Through
the specification of content and expression, Deleuze and Guattari are able to 
provide analytics useful for precisely determining the dynamics of any system of
relations. In short, Deleuze and Guattari's machinic account of the production 
of reality describes the continual production of social formations from flows 
that are always either more or less random, more or less contingent, more or 
less predictable: the organization of repetitions, redundancies, and refrains in 
an entropic universe—a cybernetic problematic, to be sure.
Agency Without Reductionism
Rosenblueth and Wiener (1950) conclude their defense of cybernetic 
agency by stressing once again the approach's emphasis on complexity and 
reciprocity. Analysis of any behavior, they write, is "quite incomplete if the 
object is considered in isolation, for it is only a part of a larger system" (p. 326);
any actor is always already in "a tight coupling with the environment" (p. 326). 
Assessing actor's relations with other actors in a field of forces affords insight 
into the ways complex systems might coordinate to structure that field in line 
with aims that cannot always be said to emerge from "within" a single entity. 
For Rosenblueth and Wiener, "the question of whether machines are or can be 
like men or the higher animals does not guide our choice" (p. 326) of traditional
humanistic terminology like "purpose" and "teleology"; indeed, "this question is 
on the main irrelevant" for what the duo calls "scientific objectives" (p. 326). 
Granting to machines those properties previously exclusive to humans is not a 
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benefit of thinking agency nonhumanistically. This serves only to disembed yet 
another class of actors—machines (like servo mechanisms)—from their 
respective environments, a move at odd with cybernetic impulses. Instead, 
reconceiving the nature, function, and capacities of machines acts as a way of 
underscoring the difficulties that arise in analyses predicated on a priori 
divisions between actors and the circuits of reciprocal action that bind and 
regulate them.
In their multi-part exchange with Taylor, then, the cyberneticists articulate
and refine a rather specific understanding of agency as a capacity of certain 
human, animal, and machinic actors: agential behavior is that which is goal-
oriented (or, in cybernetic terms, "teleological"). It is goal-oriented insofar as it 
is directed or oriented toward a goal, the anticipated achievement of which 
spurs or motivates such behavior. But it is also goal-oriented in a second sense: 
agential behavior gains its orientation from a goal. This is to say that it is 
influenced by those feedback relations that modulate activities and concretely 
influence the way an entity does in fact pursue its goal. By foregrounding the 
primacy of feedback, cyberneticists stress that goal-oriented behavior is 
oriented at a goal at the same time it is oriented by a goal. Taylor seemed to 
neglect this. Thus, for the cyberneticists, agential behavior is always necessary 
relational; it is always unfolding in a field of overlapping activities and forces 
that govern ("steer") it. Conceiving agency as a linear, unidirectional process 
involving easily identifiable subjects and objects is therefore difficult and 
ultimately untenable from a cybernetic perspective.
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What's more, one can never apprehend agential behavior by isolating an 
actor and locating agency "in" that actor. As Wiener and his colleagues made 
clear in their conversation with Taylor, cyberneticists effectively eschewed any 
notion of some internal "locus" of agency; they measured "intent" by assessing 
external behaviors ("You intended to shoot a gun"), not by appealing to an 
actor's internal state ("Did you intend to shoot a robber, or did you intend to 
shoot your mirror?"). They made agency a relational, field-oriented matter, one 
cut loose from its traditional location in interiority.
Cyberneticists' rhetorical work (such as that on display in this exchange 
with Taylor) demonstrates the meticulousness with which many scientists and 
engineers tackled the definitional work of forging their fledgling discipline. And
the preceding account of agency—with its fine-grained distinctions between 
intention and will, behavior and teleology—reveals the degree to which these 
thinkers appropriated and refashioned the discursive resources at their disposal
while pursuing a unifying theory of goal-oriented behavior. But their letters to 
Taylor also disclose the difficulty of speaking about the (notoriously slippery) 
issue of agency with even a modicum of clarity, a difficulty born of philosophical
inheritances against which Wiener and his co-authors so ardently struggled.
As cyberneticists refused to elevate the workings of human actors over the
complex systems in which they were embedded, they distributed agency across 
those systems and blurred customary a priori distinctions between agents and 
objects. They challenged Enlightenment-era definitions of agency that persisted
in their own euro-modern social, historical, and political conjuctures. Indeed, as
Wiener and his co-authors suggested, cybernetics was as much philosophical as
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it was technical. That is, despite their stated "scientific" motivations for 
constructing a more inclusive theory of agency, Wiener, Rosenblueth, and 
Bigelow could not avoid doing the philosophical work of articulating the 
ontological and epistemological grounds for cybernetics.
Their work throws into stark relief the complexities that Enlightenment 
understandings of agency as a human actor's ability to achieve intended aims 
unhindered by other forces (be they other agents or social/material structures) 
elide. More specifically, when deployed in various contexts or discourses, the 
concept of agency might suture together any of the following concepts and their
attendant issues:
• Autonomy: the degree to which an entity is able to act without 
determination or compulsion from extra-agential entities or structures;
• Intention: an agent's purpose or motivation in undertaking the actions it 
does;
• Will: an entity's sense of volition when undertaking these actions;
• Desire: the degree of an entity's affective investment in undertaking 
practices or achieving effects
• Effect(s): the results of an agent's actions and the consequences for both 
the acting agent and other entities (both agential and non-agential)
• Locus: the site of agency
• Teleology: the goal-directedness of an entity's agential actions
The Enlightenment-era conception of agency that persists under euro-
modernity (and therefore in many liberal and neoliberal social and political 
configurations) makes agency a matter of a self-possessed (will, intention) 
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individual human's (locus) ability to effect change in and to other entities 
(effects) largely unencumbered by outside forces (autonomy) that might derail 
the pusuit of its goals (teleology). Cyberneticists sought to unseat the human as
primary or sole agent in a complex system of entities (locus), each of which 
affects and is affected by the others in reciprocal, nonlinear fashion (effects). 
Rosenblueth, Wiener, and Bigelow (1943) stress that cybernetic behavior—"any 
change of an entity with respect to its surroundings" (p. 18)—is purposeful only 
insofar as it "may be interpreted as directed to the attainment of a goal—i.e., to 
a final condition in which the behaving object reaches a definite correlation in 
time or space with respect to another object or event" (p. 18). Behavior and 
purpose are both relational; assessing change requires knowing something 
about the milieu in which that entity is embdedded, and assessing purpose 
(intention) is a matter of examining that entity's behavior with respect to some 
situation vis-a-vis another entity. This was, recall, the source of Taylor's 
frustration with the cybernetic characterization of agency: he thought it made 
purpose (intention) too vague, and he argued for its reinstatement as something
germane only to the singular, goal-directed actor (locus). The cyberneticists 
argued for a notion of agency as a series of external relations; Taylor fought to 
keep it a matter of internal properties. In so doing, he ignored an issue 
absolutely crucial to the cybernetic imaginary: feedback, which reconfigures 
relationships between autonomy, effect, and teleology.
Cybernetic ontology is therefore an ontology of the black box, one that, as 
Pickering (2010) suggests, resists Enlightenment modes of thought. Critiques of
Enlightenment thinking tend to function as critiques of the humanism that 
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bifurcates the world into two domains: that of dynamic human culture and that 
of static nonhuman nature. Pickering emphasizes cybernetics' refusal to mimic 
this gesture, to expunge nonhuman actors from the privileged domain of human
activity. Cybernetics, he says, does not so much bring the two distinct types of 
entities "together" again; it skirts altogether the foundational articulations that 
instantiate the "two-worlds model" in the first place. For this reason, 
cybernetics posed a strategic position from which to develop critiques of this 
ontological separation (as in the famous example of Haraway's [1985] cyborg, 
that cybernetic organism with its pleasurable boundary transgressions and 
perverse couplings). Its tendency to avoid traditional ontological binarism also 
made cybernetics a source of trepidation for staunch liberal humanists—even 
Wiener (see Hayles, 1999). Cybernetics, Pickering (2010) says, celebrated the 
black box as not merely a puzzle to ponder but a "partner in [...] a dance of 
agency" (p. 20; see also Pickering, 1995) that involves humans and nonhumans 
alike.
By eschewing the ontological rift between humans and nonhumans, 
cybernetics simultaneously tends to deprivilege the role consciousness plays in 
the production of social formations. The euro-modern separation of mind from 
body (in Descartes) and subject from object (in Kant) encourages scientific 
inquiry concerning ways in which subjects with only partial and inadequate 
access to an otherwise real world might nevertheless re-present that world to a 
mind that hovers just outside it. But unlike euro-modern sciences concerned 
with accurately mapping the world, cybernetics does not "seek to pin the world 
down in timeless representations; rather, it "directly thematizes the 
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unpredictable liveliness of the world" (Pickering, 2002, p. 430). For Pickering 
(2010), cybernetics is an ontological project asking not just about the way the 
world might be known, but also with the way the world might be constructed 
(see also Escobar, 2007). For critical social and cultural theory, it recuperates 
the real in a manner that runs counter to euro-modern impulses that construe 
criticism as a predominantly epistemological enterprise aimed at interrogating 
the way an always already mediated world shapes the consciousness of actors 
and groups with differentially distributed abilities to know and speak about it 
(Grossberg, 1996a, 1998).
Cybernetics also tends to dismantle euro-modernist spatial logics that 
disembed actors from the field of determinations that produce them and 
juxtapose those actors against a more or less monolithic set of structural forces 
working to either enable or constrain their ability for authentic, genuine action. 
In such scenarios, both agent and structure acquire particular positive or 
negative valences: as Bennett (2010) explains, "structure can only act 
negatively, as a constraint on human agency, or passively, as an enabling 
background context for it" (p. 29). Agents, often presumed to be human, on the 
other hand act as positive animating forces that enliven structural 
arrangements by engaging, appropriating, challenging, resisting, or subverting 
them. Agency resides in individual agents, who possess it to greater or lesser 
degrees as a consequence of their designation as agents, a designation that 
precedes the machinic acts that produce those designations. Cybernetic 
thinking, on the other hand, tends to engage with the complexity of the fields 
that constitute actors.
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Engaging with this complexity is necessary for understanding the work of 
power today. This is especially clear from the writing of Raymond Williams 
(1977), one social theorist who conceives agency in a manner similar to the 
cyberneticists. Williams notes that accounts of social formations predicated on 
simple dualisms between agent and structure tend to encourage forms of 
reductionist thinking that (while perhaps convenient) are often unproductive 
and place critics in "an extremely awkward and disabling position" (p. 93). By 
positing structural determination as mere "setting of limits" (p. 87) on 
otherwise dynamic (too often human) agential activity, researchers tend to 
presuppose two elements: a transcendent structure whose internal logic 
"controls or decides the outcome of an action or process, beyond or irrespective
of the wills or desires of its agents" (p. 84) and an autonomous agent capable of
existing more or less outside the determining effects of that structure. The 
result, Williams writes, is "an alienated, objectivist 'society,' working 
'unconsciously,'" and a "comprehension of individuals as 'pre-social' or even 
anti-social" (p. 87). Both moves internalize agency, doing precisely what 
Rosenblueth, Wiener, and Bigelow resist—making it a property of either agent 
or structure.
But Williams (1977) offers a different reading of "determination" and, 
therefore, of agency: "a complex and interrelated process of limits and 
pressures," one located in "the whole social process itself and nowhere else" (p.
87). He warns against accepting any "abstraction of determinism, based on the 
isolation of autonomous categories, which are seen as controlling or which can 
be used for prediction" (pp. 87-88). "Determination," he notes, can through 
133 
everyday use accrue individualistic overtones—just like those closely-associated
(and equally slippery) concepts Rosenblueth, Wiener, and Bigelow sought to 
redefine: "to determine or to be determined," Williams writes, "is an act of will 
or purpose" (p. 87, emphasis added). Nonetheless Williams does for 
"determination" what the early cyberneticists hoped to do for their chosen 
terms (and what Taylor struggled to do in his critiques of cybernetics): divorce 
it from individualism and make it a matter of "complex relations" (p. 87). He 
stresses a particular social formation's irreducibility to either agential practices
or structural conditions, and resolves the tension between agent and structure 
not with some neat dialectic that fuses (and homogenizes) yet ultimately retains
the terms, but with a radical reworking of the notion of determination itself. 
Determination, for Williams, is a positive, productive process; his is a theory of 
multilinear, crosscutting effectivities whose nature or valance cannot be 
thought in advance of their actual deployment and operation. Faced with a 
model of social formations already organized into components called "agents" 
and "structures," Williams performs a move in line with many contemporary 
critiques of euro-modern ontology: he jettisons the binary, offering a notion of 
agency capable of resisting the forms of reductionism he elaborates. In this 
way, he gestures toward a theory of agency—of the capacity to affect the 
determination of a social formation—that needn't necessarily begin or end with 
a single actor, a theory that attends to "historically lived situations and the 
authentic complexities of practice" (p. 88).
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By underscoring the importance of complexity for critical social and 
cultural theory, Williams offers an avenue for thinking cultural practices outside
the narrow scope of isolated, individual intention, for admitting that "the author
of an action, the speaker of a discourse, may not be the actual agency which is, 
through such actions and discourses, struggling to bend history in specific 
ways, to specific interests and goals" (Grossberg, 1992, p. 113). Resisting 
individualistic theories of agency might be seen as part and parcel of a search 
for what Stuart Hall (1980) calls "a non-reductive determinacy," a problem the 
solution of which depends on the ability "to supersede the endless oscillations 
between idealism and reductionism" (p. 72). If the question of agency is in part 
the question of ways in which social formations get arranged such that they 
organize relations of power and define spaces of possibility, then potential 
answers to this question need not necessarily begin or end with singular actors 
(let alone singular humans, though for Williams these proceses certainly can—
and likely do—involve them). For while critique may in fact function to improve 
the conditions of those individuals who are both products and relays of power 
relations (humans and nonhumans alike) it must begin to do so by recognizing 
the complexity of the fields in which they operate.
In its own ways, cybernetics grappled with this complexity in much the 
same way Williams did. Williams offers a reading of agency that locates agency 
not "in" the singular actor (locus) but rather in the field of forces that articulate 
to produce particular social formations. He downplays subjective interiorities 
(will) and structural imaginaries to arrive at a reading of effectivity as nonlinear
(effect), whereby an single actor's actions are always already overdetermined 
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by the multilinear forces that immanently organize and channel them. And yet 
he maintained a humanistic teleology, hoping his analysis of culture might 
produce different ways of (human) life. Cyberneticist he was not.
In the decades that followed Taylor's heated exchange with the 
cyberneticists, post-cybernetic thinkers grappled with the notions of complexity
their work begat. Each posited an answer to the question of the relationship 
between agents and machines. In the hands of Deleuze and Guattari, however, 
this project reached a kind of apotheosis when it (re)enters the realm of 
ontology. And in recent decades, Deleuze and Guattari's machinic ontology has 
precipitated development of numerous nonhumanistic theories of agency—each 
of which could provide conceptual resources for analyzing contemporary 
informatic politics. The next chapter concerns these theories and their 
affordances.
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CHAPTER 4: MAPPING INFORMATION (THEORY)
Plotting a Course
While he tended toward optimism in his sweeping prognostications, 
Wiener was not at all sanguine about the consequences of a proliferation of 
purpose-driven servomechanisms. In an unpublished 1949 essay for the New 
York Times, he reflected on the advent of a "new age of machines" (Wiener, 
1949a, p. 1). Of this new age, electronic computers were a paradigm exemplar. 
Indeed, for Wiener these machines were harbingers of this new era, which 
promised both unparalled prosperity and heretofore unfathomable 
consequences. "These new machines have a great capacity for upsetting the 
present basis of industry," Wiener writes, "and of reducing the economic value 
of the routine factory employee to a point at which he is not worth hiring at any 
price" (p. 7). Wiener says new technologies portend a future of "unmitigated 
cruelty" and require an approach "both humane and intelligent" (p. 7), as 
purposeful, calculating machines threaten to outstrip our mastery, our agency: 
"We can be humble and live a good life with the aid of the machines, or we can 
be arrogant and die" (p. 8). Evidently, Wiener's new science of control opened 
avenues of thought, research, and practice that were not altogether beneficial 
to humankind.
137
Wiener's trepidation over the oncoming age of intelligent machines belies 
cyberneticists' resistance to the more radical implications of their work, which 
blurred traditional distinctions between the human and the nonhuman. Today, 
cybernetics' attention to non-humanistic agency resonates with a particular 
body of contemporary critical cultural theory that questions the nature, 
function, and role of "the human." Concern with the role nonhuman elements 
play in the organization of social life animates this recent work. The kinship is 
striking (if occasionally tacit), for concern with the cybernetic problematic 
persists in many recent theoretical accounts of nonhuman actors and their 
activities in social formations. Emerging as it does in the wake of Deleuze's and 
Guattari's machinic ontology, such projects attempt to orient critical attention 
to questions regarding the ways in which a multiplicity of elemets participate in
producing and organizing these formations (see Escobar, 2007, for an 
overview). Moreover, this work typically seeks to account for the activities of 
actors shunted aside (and out of critical view) by a (largely euro-modern) 
penchant for binary thinking that neatly cleaves reality into discrete realms: the
human (or the symbolic, the subjective, the cultural, the interpretive) and the 
nonhuman (or the material, the objective, the natural, the inert). Efforts to 
police the boundary between these domains are acts of what Latour (1993) calls
purification, the effective exorcism of plants, animals, and inorganic nature 
from the province of human reason and politics. As the previous chapter 
explained, cybernetics' effective rebuke of this enduring, categorical difference 
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between humans and machines represents an alternative to purifying 
tendencies (even if cyberneticists themselves often refused to confront this 
implication of their work).
This chapter examines in more detail the problematic that a cybernetic 
comportment toward the world disclosed. It treats this problematic—agency—
by locating it as part of a problem-space, a particular confluence of historical 
tendencies or forces that interlock to organize thought and action (Grossberg, 
2010). Doing so affords some insight into the discursive and material conditions
through which media and cultural critics might theorize information and 
information technologies. More specifically, then, this chapter unpacks various 
attempts to theorize nonhumanistic agency today. It argues that the 
Deleuzean/Guattarian project actually helps situate and specify each of these 
attempts; in this way, it presents a particular framework for addressing the 
problem of information today.
As previous chapters have argued, cybernetics concerns itself with the 
organization of complex collections of heterogeneous elements into repetitions 
or redundancies for the purpose of orchestrating or modulating specific actions 
in the present and future (for the making-more-probable of certain effectivities)
—a problem-space of agency. This chapter begins, therefore, with an 
examination of certain themes that characterize this space: "control" and 
"governance." It then examines two approaches to this problem-space: the 
genealogy of Michel Foucault and the radical conjuncturalism of Lawrence 
Grossberg, each of which embodies a Deleuzean/Guattarian orientation toward 
power relations (an orientation useful for addressing the concrete ways 
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informatic discourses, practices, and technologies structure political 
possibilities today. But these approaches only gesture toward ways one might 
heed the cybernetic imperative to conceptualize agency beyond "the human." 
To explore this imperative more deeply, this chapter then turns to three 
contemporary theoretical attempts to account for the role of nonhumans in the 
organization of social formations: actor-network theory, vital materialism, and 
agential realism. Using the Deleuzean/Guattarian machinic ontology as a meta-
model, it charts these positions and elaborates their affordances for conceiving 
informatic politics today. Ultimately, this chapter concludes with its own 
recursive maneuver when it argues that these contemporary accounts actually 
help clarify earlier attempts to conceive the pressing problem of organizing a 
contingent universe—namely, accounts from Shannon and Wiener. Revisiting 
the work of these figures in this way helps elucidate the respective aims and 
scopes of their projects and situates them more firmly in the problem-space this
chapter reconstructs.
Problem-Spaces of Control
When selecting the name of his pioneering science, Wiener was keenly 
aware of "cybernetics'" etymological inheritances. "In choosing this term," he 
writes, "we wish to recognize that the first significant paper on feedback 
mechanisms is an article on governors [...] We also wish to refer to the fact that 
the steering engines of a ship are indeed one of the earliest and best-developed 
forms of feedback mechanisms" (Wiener, 1961, pp. 11-12). Cybernetics is the 
science of government, the science of steering goal-seeking humans, animals, 
and machines in particular directions toward specific ends. It achieves its aims 
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not through proceedures aimed directly at these entities themselves 
(procedures meant to directly restrain or inhibit individual movements) but 
through the organization of a field of possible alternatives, through the making-
more-probable of some alternatives over others. Wiener called it the science of 
control.
Control, says Deleuze (1992), channeling the cyberneticists, does not 
operate through repression or enclosure, but through putting in motion an 
entire field of entities whose movements and coordinates might become objects 
of and for intervention. Control appears "ultrarapid" and "free-floating," 
proceeding with heretofore unrealized speed and precision while diffusing 
throughout the social frabic. Like Wiener, Deleuze treats the computing 
machine as evidence of a new historical moment—not because they somehow 
cause certain historical circumstances, he clarifies, "but because they express 
those social forms capable of generating them and using them" (p. 6). Here 
Deleuze refers to technical machines, the concrete, material devices germane 
to particular social formations. But the tendencies he and Guattari observed in 
the late 20th century certainly shaped their ontological imaginary about 
machines in general, an imaginary which, as the previous chapter 
demonstrated, emerges coextensively with developments in computerized 
technologies. What Wiener calls the "new machine age" is for Deleuze an 
emerging ensemble of relations between materials, qualities, signs, discourses, 
and practices with the ability to reorient lived realities: a diagram.
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Recall that for Deleuze and Guattari machines synthesize reality out of the 
virtual by way of various redundancies, loopings and poolings that arrest desire
and channel it in specific, calculated (if not entirely guaranteed) directions. 
These redundancies take several forms, perform various functions. Yet for 
Deleuze and Guattari, they are fundamental to the production not only of actual
conditions of existence (the concrete and specific social organizations that 
establish possibilities for living and thriving) but also of potentials for 
disrupting those organizations. Their indebtedness to the cyberneticists and 
information theorists that preceded them is clear.
And yet Deleuze and Guattari (1987) did not speak too favorably of 
information theory, which they claimed "takes its point of departure from a 
homogeneous set of ready-made signifying messages that are functioning 
already as elements in biunivocal relationships, or the elements of which are 
biunivocally organized between messages" (p. 179, emphasis in original). 
Presumably adopting a Shannonian description of communication situations 
(though really reciting one more indebted to Weaver, as Guattari tended to do), 
the authors criticize the notion of that set of possible messages upon which an 
act of selection operates. As Chapter 2 explained, Weaver often described 
Shannon's "communication" as some transfer between two discrete minds, 
whereby one acts (with conscious intent) to mitigate misunderstandings by 
selecting for transmission appropriate symbols from a set of possible symbols. 
But Deleuze and Guattari underscore a troubling fact: the presence of a set 
implies some prior act of organization, some moment of selection and 
circumscription logically prior to the one Shannon describes. This act 
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establishes the set of messages (out of which the event of selection occurs) as a 
set of possible messages in the first place. Mutual knowledge of this set is 
therefore integral for establishing and maintaining communication between two
parties (as Weaver would have it), both of which must always already share a 
message-space (thus, information theory's inherent "biunivocality," according to
Deleuze and Guattari). "The picking of a combination depends on a certain 
number of subjective binary choices that increase proportionally to the number 
of elements" (p. 179) write Deleuze and Guattari, obviously describing the logic 
of Shannon's bits. In this way, they say, the concept of information is itself 
predicated on particular regimes of significance that establish quite specific 
parameters for the communication situations it was designed to track and 
measure, a regime that "carries out the prior gridding that makes it possible for
the signifying elements to become discernible, and for the subjective choices to 
be implemented" (p. 180). In short, Deleuze and Guattari wonder how to begin 
thinking redundancy and the activation of potentials outside or apart from pre-
established fields (the same problem, remember, that motivated MacKay's own 
empiricist concept of descriptive information). Redundancy must also be 
something other than the repetition of the already-established; it must be a 
force that itself instantiates, inscribes, works on, or dissassembles distinctions.
Earlier in A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari experiment with this
notion of a primordial redundancy, bringing it to bear on the field of linguistics 
through an analysis of the "order-word" (a concept meant to place speech and 
action more firmly on the same plane and in reciprocal presupposition). They 
call the relation of speech and action "a relation of redundancy" (p. 79, 
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emphasis in original); the order-word, the "relation of every word or every 
statement to implicit presuppositions" (p. 79) embedded in wider, pragmatic 
systems, is not itself informatic but rather intimately related to the 
informational:
The most general schema of information science posits in principle an 
ideal state of maximum information and makes redundancy merely a 
limitative condition serving to decrease this theoretical maximum in 
order to prevent it from being drowned out by noise. We are saying that 
redundancy of the order-word is instead primary [...]. (p. 79)
Emphasizing information's utter contingency (its articulation in and 
through broader systems of action and value) Deleuze and Guattari (1987) also 
underscore the role redundancy tends to play in popular accounts of 
mathematical information theories: mere limit-condition, a force that can do 
nothing but reify and oppress. American information theory makes redundancy 
a matter of negation, a force that arrests or stymies otherwise dynamic, 
energetic fluxes. In their view, such informational thinking already speaks the 
language of the powerful, one that aims to synthesize subjectivities anemable to
their programs and logics. What's needed, they argue, is some notion of 
redundancy that exists outside the logics of identity that underpin Weaverian 
readings of Shannon's "communication" (where the success of a transmission is 
predicated on the successful duplication of content).
Their unchecked adoption of a Weaverian communication model yokes 
Deleuze and Guattari's critiques to a received view of information as the 
content of communication, the stuff that acts in a representational register to 
ensure symmetry between entities in a biunivocal relationship. It is this figure 
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they then choose to attack. For example, Deleuze and Guattari (1987) insist that
language "is not the communication of information but something quite 
different: the transmission of order-words" (p. 79). Information theories, they 
claim, both traffic in and perpetuate regimes of signifiance, a certain type of 
circular, semiologically redundant sign-activity that tends toward the continual 
production of subjectivities clustered about a master signifier (p. 131-133). 
Construed as the stuff transferred between intentional subjects operating with 
and through a shared set of conventions, information is (in their view) already 
overcoded with social, technical, and economic order-words, for some 
apparatus of power has already operated to make it intelligible as that stuff. In 
other words, information-as-content has already been articulated through 
actions that place it in the service of dominant systems of meaning and, of 
course, power. Their concern is rather language that "is neither informational 
nor communicational" (p. 75). Language is precisely that system of order-words
that can subvert insidious biunivocality, the force that subtends both 
information and communication because it is more abstract than both.
So for Deleuze and Guattari (1987), "it becomes apparent that information 
and communication, and even signifiance and subjectification, are subordinate 
to redundancy" (p. 79). As American information theorists like Shannon and 
Weaver had posited it, "information" addresses the problem of selecting and 
coding the already-organized, of orchestrating bodies and signs a more abstract
system of language had already made salient and significant. This is precisely 
why Deleuze and Guattari viewed information theory as an instrument of power
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bound up in a constellation of discourses and technical machines that 
reinforced it, and it is why both information theory and cybernetics became 
hallmarks of that emerging diagram of power Deleuze would later call "control."
For Deleuze and Guattari, mapping those diagrams that organize relations 
between bodies, statements, acts, signs, and practices permits concrete 
investigation of the relations of power these diagrams orchestrate and 
facilitate. Deleuze (1988) especially described the ways in which diagrams work
to effect relations of power, that is, to make feasible (or infeasible) the exercise 
of certain capacities, to establish contact "between unformed matter [...] and 
unformalized functions" (p. 77) and assemble them into the institutional forms 
that govern everyday life. To map reality is to rediscover the circuits through 
which some influence over future and potential actions flows. It is to inhabit the
cybernetic problem-space and apprehend the way a field of potential actions 
might be restructured, augmented, or diminished. It is to attend to the power of
governance.
The Governance of Power, the Power of Governance
Speaking at the Collège de France decades after the publication of 
Cybernetics, Michel Foucault (2004) traced what he called "a bit of an inventory
of this problem of government" (p. 88). The 16th century, Foucault claimed, saw
increased circulation of materials addressing the problem of governing. 
Governing stood as a new technique of rule specifically opposed to those of 
sovereignty, the form of power most of these political polemics identified with 
Machiavelli's Prince. Whereas the Prince "exists in a relationship of singularity 
and externality, of transcendence" to that which he rules, government involves 
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the immanence of rule, the diffusion of new techniques and technologies for the
coordination and maintendance of the state from some place internal to the 
state. As Foucault puts it:
Whereas the end of sovereignty is internal to itself and gets its 
instruments from itself in the form of law, the end of government is 
internal to the things it directs; it is to be sought in perfection, 
maximization, or intensification of the processes it directs, and the 
instruments of government will become diverse tactics rather than laws. 
(p. 99)
From the 16th to the 18th centuries, then, the problem(-space) of 
government took shape. Government intervenes in an economy of things, in a 
field of relationships it attempts to control and manage. Government "arranges 
things" (Foucault, 2004, p. 98); it apprehends relationships between forces and 
factors and attempts to reconfigure them. Foucault explains, for example, how 
government takes hold of "men [sic] in their relationships with things like 
customs, habits, ways of acting and thinking [...] things like accidents, 
misfortunes, famine, epidemics, and death" (p. 96). Logics and practices of 
government invest in populations to coordinate specific flows of bodies in 
dispersed and loosely-defined fields. Perhaps without knowing it, Foucault had 
shown that Wiener's "new machine age" was anything but. Indeed, the 
techniques and technologies of concern to Wiener expressed centuries-old 
concerns.
In its earliest American formations, cybernetics was an intellectual project 
that coupled computerization with the logics and practices of government. 
Quite simply, it functioned as a collection of discourses and techniques of 
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power. Indeed, for Foucault (1978, 1983) power implies the modulation of 
potentials: the conduct of conduct, or governance. As Foucault conceived it, 
power is the capacity to determine capacities, to act on and modify actions, to 
intervene and configure the "disparate field of possibilities brought to bear 
upon permanent structures" (Foucault, 1983, p. 219). Power is not a possession,
nor does it involve consent. Power is not a simple matter of individual actions. 
Rather, it "brings into play relations between individuals" and works on "an 
ensemble of actions which induce others and follow from one another" (p. 217). 
This is to say that power is not synonymous with Enlightenment agency (as an 
agent's relative ability to free itself from contraints and act more or less 
uninhibited by other agents). Power instead involves the production and 
distribution of "free" entities themselves.
Against Enlightenment notions of power and agency, Foucault (1978) 
describes power relations as "both intentional and nonsubjective" (p. 94). This 
is to say that they involve subjects but do not emanate from subjects: "they are 
imbued, through and through, with calculation" as "there is no power that is 
exercised without a series of aims and objectives," but "this does not mean that 
[power relations] result from the choice or decision of an individual subject" (p. 
95). Foucault dismantles a euro-modern binary that tends to juxtapose agency 
and power, as if the ostensible "possession" of the latter permits an actor to 
immediately and transparently augment or diminish the former in itself or 
another. For Foucault, power and agency are immanent to one another; that is, 
power is immanent to the very processes of organization itself, processes that 
bear directly on the differential distribution of capacities to influence the fields 
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of forces that define not only what agents can do (for, as Foucault notes, agents 
still act quite intentionally) but also what they are (how they are made visible 
and legible as agents in the first place, how systems of relations articulate them
as agents to begin with). Power and agency are inextricably bound; neither can 
somehow "precede" the other.
In theorizing power this way, Foucault (1983) occupies the same problem-
space the cyberneticists do. His aim is to assess "the way in which the conduct 
of individuals or groups might be directed": "governance" (p. 221). Like Wiener,
Foucault prefers the term because it allows him to speak of those processes by 
which fields of action get organized. Both are concerned with conduct, a "way 
of behaving within a more or less open field of possibilities" (pp. 220-221) that 
is (at the same time) the regulation of others; this is feedback by another name.
What's more, both Foucault and the cyberneticists are at pains to foreground 
reciprocity and a notion of "freedom" that runs counter to received 
Enlightenment views. Recall from Chapter 2 Ashby's insistence that 
cybernetics' only concern was feedback relations, those in which agents 
reciprocally influence one another's potentials for effective action. Foucault 
(1983) might say that cybernetics concerns itself only with freedom: not those 
agents who have somehow managed to extricate themselves from power 
relations (for this is impossible) or those situtions "where determining factors 
saturate the whole" (p. 221), but rather those possibilities for being-otherwise, 
possibilities that are themselves arrayed across fields organized to permit or 
delimit them. As MacKay's theory of information stressed, power is a matter of 
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acting on what one can do, what an actor could do or thinks it should do given a
field of possibilities. Power works to modulate the field of possibilities; it is not 
simply an ability to act.
Foucault (1983) is even more specific in his description of power relations 
when he discusses their relationship to what he calls "relationships of 
communication" (p. 217), or those relations between already-subjectivated 
speakers and listeners, which have themselves been produced as relays of 
power. Communication relationships involve the exchange of messages, 
statements, and meanings that harness, propel, thwart, redirect, or amplify the 
power relations that generate them. Power relationships and relationships of 
communication are themselves always in relationship with another type of 
relation: relations detemining "objective capacities" (p. 217-218), or the 
concrete, specific characteristics and abilities actors demonstrate as a result of 
their articulation to regimes of power and regimes of communication. These are
not three separate domains—"on one hand the field of things, of perfected 
technique, work, and the tranformation of the real; on the other that of signs, 
communication, reciprocity, and the production of meaning; finally that of the 
domination of the means of constraint, of inequality and the action of men upon 
other men [sic]" (p. 218)—but three interlocking technologies that exists to a 
greater or lesser extent in any social formation, where they "overlap one 
another, support one another reciprocally, and use each other mututally as 
means to an end" (p. 218). They exist always in a "block of capacity-
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communication-power." Abstraction-expression-content: three machinic systems
participate in "modifying the field of information between partners" and 
"produce effects of power" (p. 218).
As did Deleuze and Guattari, Foucault harbors an uncritical understanding 
of both "communication" and "information" that makes any easy conflation of 
his writing on power with the American cybernetic imaginary somewhat more 
complicated. Foucault (1983) clearly adopts a Weaverian reading of the 
relationship between communication and information when he describes
relationships of communication which transmit information by means of a
language, a system of signs, or any other symbolic medium. No doubt 
communicating is always a certain way of acting upon another person or 
persons. But the production and circulation of elements of meaning can 
have as their objective or as their consequence certain results in the 
realm of power; the latter are not simply an aspect of the former" (p. 
217)
For Foucault (like Deleuze and Guattari), information is the content of 
communication, the meaningful "stuff" of transmission. Power, he says, 
functions more fundamentally than systems of "information": it works to 
organize the conditions for informational transactions to occur and become 
intelligible as such. But cyberneticists like Wiener (as Chapter 2 explained) 
rejected this view of information. For them, the concept of information aligns 
much more closely with Foucault's relations of power, for their understanding of
communication was entirely divorced from the kind of semantic "meaning" 
Foucault seems to think fits part and parcel with it.
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Deleuze, Guattari, and Foucault elaborated the mechanisms that undergird
received notions of language, address, meaning-making, and subjectivation, for 
they sought some alternative to the inadequate structural-semiological models 
their contemporaries used to address these issues. For their liking, 
"information" and "communication" were too tightly bound to these models; 
they named processes and practices that occurred after abstract systems of 
language and regimes of power had taken effect. But their critiques of 
information and communication occlude the fact that they were indeed chasing 
the same problematic as the information theoriests, particularly the 
cyberneticists. Indeed, cybernetic communication involves precisely the act of 
modulating conduct, of acting on the present or future actions and capacities of
another. It is an operation on the field of potentials that might unfold around an 
actor. Wiener (1954) famously used "communication" and "control" 
synonymously: "When I control the actions of another person, I communicate a 
message to him (p. 16). Foucault (1983) thinks "relationships of communication 
imply finalized activities (even if only the correct putting into operation of 
elements of meaning)" (p. 218). Deleuze and Guattari (1987) insist that 
language is "the transmission of the word as order-word, not the 
communication of a sign as information" (p. 77). But for the information 
theorists, information is not sign-as-content-stuff, nor is it that which traffics in 
the realm of finalizations. "A message," Wiener (1949b) writes, "need not be the
result of a conscious human effort for the transmission of ideas" (p. 2). Indeed, 
as the notion of cybernetic feedback maintains, information is precisely that 
which belongs to the not-yet-but-will-be, the unfinalized, the open, the field.
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From Epoch to Conjuncture
Foucault's is an epochal understanding of the problem Deleuze and 
Guattari defined. But while Wiener, too, advances a kind of epochal 
understanding of the cybernetic project (as product of some "new machine 
age"), Foucault offers a means of reading the cybernetic project genealogically 
(Foucault, 2010). His is an endeavor aimed not at uncovering cybernetics' 
supposed origins but rather its conditions and points of emergence, the 
statements and acts that operate in the present to secure the trajectory and 
efficacy of specific relations of power. In this way it represences one attempt to 
clarify the Deleuzean/Guattarian effort to map the power relations that produce 
the real. Lawrence Grossberg's radical conjuncturalism is another.
Radical conjuncturalism is a response to the influence of euro-modernism 
in critical social and cultural theory, one that, as Wiley (2005) argues (though 
he calls Grossberg's practice "spatial materialism"), intervenes philosophically 
to prevent theory and criticism from unwittingly reinforcing the very logics and 
tendencies they frequently set out to critique. Such tendencies include: an 
ontological dualism between the phenomenal and the noumenal that fosters an 
epistemological preoccupation with representation; a persistent textualism; a 
pervasive temporalism that promotes linear and causal thinking on issues of 
identity and change; the conflation of identity and subjectivity with agency in a 
politics of difference that perpetually defers positive critique; and an emphasis 
on "the local" as a concrete site of resistance against seemingly more abstract, 
oppressive power relations. Radical conjuncturalism thus equips critical social 
and cultural theory (particularly the project of cultural studies) to effectively 
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assess and subsequently intervene in the power relations shaping everyday life
—to "construct itself as a response to the demands of its context" (Grossberg, 
1998, p. 3). Remaining sensitive to these demands requires for Grossberg a 
critique of analytic concepts theorists (too often uncritically) import from euro-
modern thought. Agency is one of these concepts.
Grossberg begins by rejecting the Kantian distinction between reality and 
representation that in so much contemporary theory has rendered agency a 
matter of a speaking position (of a subject's ability to re-present reality in some 
strategic or beneficial way). Euro-modernity construes subjects as agents who, 
despite an inability to access the real itself, can perhaps strategically re-signify 
it. In euro-modern epistemic formations, then, "individuals, defined primarily by
social identities, are taken as the locus of both sovereignty and agency" 
(Grossberg, 2010, p. 78). For Grossberg (1992), euro-modern critique is thus a 
preoccupation with actors' relative abilities to "construct a correspondence 
between two parallel, nonintersecting planes—language and reality" (p. 48). 
Rather than proffer another theory of the way in which reality and its 
representations may (or may not) coincide, radical conjuncturalism represents 
an effort to problematize and ultimately recuperate the real itself as an object 
of concern in critical theory. Grossberg argues that under euro-modernism 
"reality" becomes nothing more than the backdrop for more dynamic 
representational (i.e., signifying) activities—"a transcendental whole existing 
outside theory and practices" (Grossberg, 1992, p. 48). Following Deleuze and 
Guattari, he suggests a model of reality as becoming ("a multiplicity of planes of
effects and the ways they intersect, traverse and disrupt each other," p. 48), as 
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an ongoing production of positive differences that actualize particular 
virtualities. The task of critical theory, therefore, is to understand the ways in 
which various realities are constituted such that they afford certain modes of 
action, investment, and existence.
Radical conjuncturalism is a rebuke of anthropocentrism. Grossberg 
distinguishes the operations of individual agents from those of agencies, or 
what he calls (following Gramsci), "tendential forces" (Grossberg, 1992, p. 123).
This distinction is not simply Grossberg's way of restaging the agent/structure 
dichotomy, for in radical conjuncturalism agencies "do not exist independently 
of or in some opposition to individuals, actors, identities, and subjects" (p. 123).
Agents, "the sites of practices and struggles to control the direction and 
destiny" (p. 124) of a particular social formation, are inseparable from and 
positioned in relation to agential forces, which "map out the long-term 
directions and investments which have already been so deeply inscribed upon 
the shape of history that they seem to play themselves out in a constantly 
indeterminate future" (p. 123). More simply put, both agencies and agents are 
active, albeit in distinct but related ways. Agencies embody the ongoing 
struggles that define a given field of possibilities, and agents operate, "whether 
knowingly or unknowingly, on behalf of particular agencies" (p. 122)—though 
perhaps even in ways that reconfigure or redirect those agencies. For 
Grossberg, agential forces operate anterior to or in excess of subjectivity; they 
are processes that work to define possibilities for not only subjective experience
but also for generating particular alliances and attachments that traffic outside 
economies of signification. And so Grossberg's particular materialism is spatial 
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insofar as it concerns ways in which social formations both organize and afford 
various emplacements, orientations, alignments, and movements. For 
Grossberg (1993), "the question of agency is how access and investment are 
distributed within a particular structured mobility" (p. 16)—how certain 
agencies have arranged spaces in ways that permit or inhibit concrete 
connections shaping what agents can do.
Again following Deleuze and Guattari, Grossberg (1992, 1996b, 2010, 
2014) attributes responsibility for the production of reality to machines, a-
subjective processes that perform the work of organizing the real. Recall that 
for Deleuze and Guattari reality is actualized out of the virtual (the plane of 
consistency) through machinic processes. Deleuze and Guattari's "virtual" is 
immanent to the actual, as both are real. Deleuze and Guattari (1977, 1987) 
offer Grossberg a conceptual vocabulary useful for tracking the various 
operations (the machinic syntheses) that produce social formations. Like 
Deleuze and Guattari, Grossberg (2010) prefers the term "machine" in order "to
avoid humanistic and voluntaristic notions of agency" (p. 36) when discussing 
these operations. For Grossberg (again, following Deleuze and Guattari), three 
machines are fundamental to the production of social formations. First are 
abstract machines (what Grossberg prefers to call "stratifying machines") that 
operate on the plane of consistency to actualize virtualities and arrange them 
on the plane of organization as content and expression. Grossberg (2010) 
describes the relationship between expression and content as one between "a 
nonsubjective agency and a nonpassive materiality" (p. 37):
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This is not simply a reinscription of the distinction between the subject 
and object, but rather a production of a relation between particular 
possibilities of acting or agency and particular possibilities of being acted
upon (...). (p. 190, emphasis added)
Next, Grossberg attributes to territorializing machines the work of linking 
"events into relations of proximity and distance, defining distances and 
proximities, mobilities and stabilities" (p. 38). The result (ala Deleuze and 
Guattari) is the organization of substance of both content and expression. 
Producing the form of a given collectivity (content and expression both) is the 
task of coding machines, which for Grossberg "inscribe grids of differentiation" 
(p. 38) across these collectivities. This degree of specificity permits radical 
conjuncturalism to offer fine-grained accounts of the ways various machinic 
processes instantiate various operations of power. Given a particular element in
a social formation, radical conjuncturalism is able to ask how that element 
functions as part of an assemblage—that is, how it has been connected to other 
elements in a field of forces and what it does as part of that field. Does this 
entity function as an abstract machine, producing stratifications of the real and 
aligning visibilities and articulabilities? Or does it operate within a field already 
diagrammed, establishing territories or coding elements that have been 
brought together? But as Grossberg (1992) writes: "pointing out [...] that the 
pieces 'fit' together [...] is not the same as defining the mode of that 
articulation, the nature of that fit" (p. 56).
With the aim of specifying "the nature of the fit" between elements in a 
given social formation, radical conjuncturalism offers another resource: 
articulation. Broadly speaking, "articulation" names a connection produced 
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between elements with no necessary relationship (Hall, 1985)—a connection 
that defines the capacities of the elements articulated—as well as the process of
making and unmaking these connections. According to Hall (1986):
Articulation is thus the form of the connection that can make a unity of 
two different elements, under certain conditions. It is a linkage that is not
necessary, determined, absolute and essential for all time. You have to 
ask, under what circumstances can a connection be forged or made? So 
the 'unity' of a discourse is really the articulation of different, distinct 
elements which can be re-articulated in different ways because they have
no necessary 'belongingness' (p. 53, emphasis in original)
In this way, radical conjuncturalism offers its own response to the easy 
linearity of euro-modern causality. Slack (1996) suggests that "articulation can 
be understood as a way of characterizing a social formation without falling into 
the twin traps of reductionism and essentialism" (p. 113); indeed, it provides a 
resource for thinking agency outside personological, euro-modern models that 
would render agency a simple matter of human conduct or presuppose some 
simple homology between a structure's characteristics and its concrete effects. 
The notion of articulation emphasizes the fact that no set of determinations is 
ever guaranteed; rather, it stresses the nature and form of linkages between 
heterogeneous elements that define the elements' specific capacities as they 
have been organized in a given social formation. Agency, then, involves making 
and unmaking the connections that define an entity's capacities. Put another 
way, agency refers to an entity's ability to perform (dis)articulatory work—to 
align various resources in useful and advantageous ways, or, as Grossberg 
(1992) writes, "to reposition practices within a shifting field of forces, to 
redefine the possibilities of life by redefining the field of relations" (p. 54).
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This is the fundamental unit of analysis for the spatial materialist: 
practices. A practice is a "mode by which effects are produced and reality 
transformed" (Grossberg, 1992, p. 51). Like cybernetic black-boxes, behaviors 
and effects mark practices: they are what they do in the complex fields of which
they are a part. Grossberg echoes a now-familiar cybernetic theme when he 
asserts that the internal properties of a practice guarantee nothing about how it
operates: "Its origin, whether biographical (in the intentions of the actor) or 
social (in the economic relations of its existence) is, to a large extent, 
irrelevant" (p. 51). For Grossberg, "practice" reflects a sense of action, the 
dynamism and unpredictability inherent in a field of articulated forces, so that
what is important [...] is what practices are available, how they are 
deployed or taken up and how they transform the world. It is not merely 
a question of what, in any instance, people do in fact do, but of the 
possibilities available to them: of the means available for transforming 
reality, as well as those actually taken up. (p. 51)
Practices are not exclusive to humans, but are composed of entire regimes 
of bodies, actions, knowledges, techniques, affects, and signs coordinated in 
ways that produce effects. But as Grossberg suggests, these effects are also of 
a field; the effect of a cause is always its influence on an arrangement of force-
relations (a "context," for Grossberg). Effects affect the distributions of 
elements that define possibilities. Indeed, as Grossberg indicates, agency is this
very capacity to induce transformation, to alter the various articulations that 
determine the concrete specificity (and therefore the function) of an entity.
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The foregoing explanation of Grossberg's machinism now permits a more 
nuanced discussion of radical conjuncturalism's particular understanding of 
agency. Wiley (2005) notes that in radical conjuncturalism "agency" is a 
complicated affair, if only because it operates in several distinct but interrelated
modes. Grossberg (2014) has also acknowledged agency's multi-dimensionality, 
suggesting that the term applies differently with regard to the specific 
functionality of a machinic ensemble. Practices that stratify the real through a 
connective synthesis are agential enactments different from those that perform 
the organizational work of coding or territorializing the distributions such 
stratifications constitute, or what Grossberg calls the work of creating "rhythms
and repetitions, places and spaces" (p. 24). These agential practices are 
different still from the work of organizing differential access to these locations 
("inserting people into maps and empowering them with access to virtual 
capacities"), and those practices involved in actualizing "capacities available at 
particular sites" (p. 24).
The machinic nature of agency (as the practice of articulating or dis-
articulating other practices) necessitates speaking of agency in a variety of 
registers. In this way, Grossberg can describe agency as "the product of 
diagrams of mobility and placement which define or map the possibilities of 
where and how specific vectors of influence can stop and be placed" (1996a, p. 
102), "how access and investment are distributed within a particular structured
mobility" (1993, p. 16), "particular sites of activity and power" (1996a, p. 99), 
"the articulations of subject positions into specific places (sites of investment) 
and spaces (fields of activity)" (1993, p. 15), and "the empowerment enabled at 
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particular sites and along particular vectors" (1993, p. 15)—all without 
contradiction, for "agency" is germane to machinic practices at various sites 
and scales, and acquires different effectivity when glimpsed from the 
perspective of either agents or agencies. Ultimately, for Grossberg (1992), 
"there can be no universal theory of agency" because "agency can only be 
described in its contextual enactments" (p. 123). Agency exists only "in the 
differential and competing relations among historical forces at play" (p. 123)—
forces radical conjuncturalism seeks to track.
Radical conjuncturalism pries apart one-dimensional renderings of both 
agency and assemblage in order to specify the complex dynamics of any 
confederation. It draws attention to the bi-planar nature of assemblages (which 
are always already both machinic and enunciative) and offers tools for 
assessing the effectivity of various machinic operations. By incorporating the 
Deleuzeo-Guattarian language of "coding" and "territorializing" machines, 
radical conjuncturalism is able to provide nuanced and precise accounts of the 
ways actors function in and against their respective fields.
Grossberg expresses concern for the ways in which particular actors seem 
to operate autonomously (to achieve effects without, against, or in spite of the 
interrelations that in fact make their actions possible). This is a concern, in 
other words, for what Grossberg (2010) calls "embedded disembeddedness," a 
state in which an actor seems to gain some autonomy from its context, even 
while "the form of its embeddedness defines it as disembedded" (p. 92). 
Grossberg deploys the term in an analysis of the way various domains (the 
economic, the political, the cultural, etc.) seems to act relatively autonomously 
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from one another in a given social totality; nevertheless, it serves as a useful 
heuristic for discussing articulations among agents and agencies. One might 
conceive the latter, Grossberg's (1992) "tendential forces" (p. 123), as akin to 
abstract machines, those diagrams that organize fields of visibilities and 
articulabilities. Agents (for Grossberg, the locus of "practices and struggles to 
control the direction and destiny" of a social formation [p. 124]) are the 
assemblages that occupy more squarely various positions on a plane of 
organization. Agencies and agents are of course in a constant state of 
reciprocal presupposition, but the manners in which they are reciprocally 
influential become critical objects of inquiry. Examining a given assemblage or 
practice's machinic function is simply not sufficient to provide adequate insight 
into the nature of a given artifact, project, or formation; only mapping the 
crosscutting articulations between machines can yield such insight. If a 
particular actor might seem to act autonomously (that is, disembedded from a 
field of forces), then the question of its effectivity is not simply "What can this 
machine do?" but "How is this machine capable of producing this effect?" As 
Grossberg (2010) puts it:
How is something relationally produced as autonomous, without thereby 
giving up its relationality? How can something be produced as self-
producing? How can something be regulated in ways that continuously 
producing it as self-regulating? (p. 92)
Using language that is more than vaguely cybernetic, Grossberg here 
stresses that effective action is always embedded in (and indebted to) a field. 
An actor's agency—its ability to influence the conditions that articulate to 
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govern or regulate its relative capacities—is always already a matter of the "fit" 
constituted between locations in a diagram, resources those diagrams make 
available, and the practices that mobilize them (a "fit" that indeed defines the 
entities fitted together). Machinic activities (machinic practices) are never as 
straightforward or transparent as their attendent narratives tend to make them 
seem. Radical conjuncturalism firmly foregrounds this principle, offering a 
useful corrective for the more naive or celebratory accounts of agency that tend
to populate descriptions of informatic systems leaning heavily on forms of social
or technological determinism.
In addition to articulation, radical conjuncturalism's antidote to 
determinism includes the notion of conjuncture; indeed, this is Grossberg's 
preferred conceptual lens for comprehending social formations' complexities. 
Drawn from Marxist political analysis, "conjuncture" names a certain 
articulation of forces co-constituting a field (or terrain) that affords various 
opportunities for political action. As Grossberg (2010) insists, however, "a 
conjuncture is not defined a priori by location, territory, or diagram," but is 
rather "characterized by an articulation, accumulation, and condensation of 
contradictions, a fusion of different currents or circumstances" (p. 40). Thinking
conjuncturally about relations of power helps critical social and cultural theory 
avoid strict determinisms that would locate the "causes" of certain 
circumstances in some singular actor. Instead, Grossberg's conjuncturalism 
underscores the complex and crosscut nature of a given social formation, the 
"origins" of which cannot be reduced to something like the nation-state 
(Grossberg, 2010, p. 42). Instead, conjunctural thinking expresses radical 
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conjuncturalism's particular approach to issues emerging from a cybernetic 
problem-space: the construction and maintenance of stable unities out of a 
heterogeneous multiplicity, out of some more-or-less predictable flux. For 
Grossberg (following Antonio Gramsci and Stuart Hall), conjunctures are 
temporary and provisional settlements in a complex field of forces, contingent 
balances always requiring maintenance. "A conjuncture," writes Grossberg 
(2010), "must always be seen as the result of a complex and fragile set of 
articulations, which requires various labors to maintain its ever-changing shape
and density" (p. 42). More than purely historical or epochal, Grossberg's 
conjuncturalism is another attempt to mobilize Deleuze and Guattari's critical 
project of mapping social relations.
Because radical conjuncturalism embraces as many theories of agency as 
are necessary for describing machinic functions of agents and agencies at any 
level of abstraction, it offers an analytic useful for disentangling and mapping 
the formations in which information and information technologies tend to traffic
(and which they articulate). Yet without a thoroughgoing schematization of 
agency's multiple modalities, radical conjuncturalism cannot offer researchers 
more than a methodological imperative (indeed, its commitment to radical 
contextualism demands this). The theory appears less a readymade set of 
descriptions awaiting application to a wide range of issues and more a spirit of 
investigation that might guide analysis of information technologies and other 
entities whose practices constitute contexts. In contemporary critical social and
cultural theory, additional theoretical projects have attempted to accomplish 
this.
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From Model to Meta-Model
Both Foucault's and Grossberg's projects represent the concretization or 
crystallization of Deleuze and Guattari's ontology in epochal and conjunctural 
modes, respectively, but neither offers a specific theory of agency appropriate 
to the task of mapping the relations between human and nonhuman actors in 
and across various social formations (the former does not so much address 
"agency" as he does "power/knowledge" and the latter is more concerned with 
the way agency in general might be conceived as a function of various 
machines).
Recently, however, contemporary critical social and cultural theory has 
witnessed the propogation of many such theories, each of which represents a 
post-Deleuzen/Guattarian attempt at theorizing the agency of the nonhuman. 
These approaches tend to reflect early cybernetic proclivities: a rejection of a 
priori ontological distinctions between human and nonhuman actors; a focus on 
complexity; an emphasis on actors' behaviors and capacities as indicators of 
their nature and function; and a refusal to disembed single actors from the 
fields of actions and forces that constitute those actors. And while these 
contemporary accounts might at first blush appear divergent and contradictory, 
one might argue that their differences are indeed a result of their tendency to 
stress various elements of the Deleuzean/Guattarian schema (itself an 
outgrowth of cybernetic thinking, as the previous chapter explained). For this 
reason, then, the conceptual cartography Deleuze and Guattari proffer as part 
of their machinic ontology can become something of a meta-model for 
contemporary critical social and cultural theory that takes seriously the role of 
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nonhuman actors in the articulation of social formations (for more on the 
specific function of meta-modeling, particularly in the work of Guattari, see 
Watson, 2009). A brief examination of three such theories—Bruno Latour's 
actor-network theory, Jane Bennett's vital materialism, and Karen Barad's 
agential realism—demonstrates how this is the case. This chapter then 
consludes by assessing the particular figures of agency each position 
articulates.
Actor-Network Theory
Bruno Latour founds his critique of euro-modernity (and his concomitant 
rebuke of the metaphysical rift between humans and nonhumans) on the 
principle of irreduction. "Nothing," he writes, "is, by itself, either reducible or 
irreducible to anything else" (Latour, 1998a, p. 158). This seemingly paradoxical
statement expresses Latour's insistence that no social actor (or actant, to use 
Latour's preferred term) can be automatically explained by another. For him, no
actant is necessarily determined by another actant; however, any actant can be 
made to associate with another actant through appropriate efforts. And, in light
of this radical contingency, such efforts define worlds.
Neither human nor nonhuman, an actant is a singular unit of action, 
simply that which accomplishes something in relation to and with other actants.
For Latour, an actant is inseparable from these relations, which completely 
determine the actant in its concrete and unrepeatable specificity. An actant is 
what it does to, with, against, atop, and in coordination with other actants. 
Apart from these relations, it cannot exist. As Harman (2009) writes, actants 
are "always completely deployed in their relations with the world, and the more
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they are cut off from these relations, the less real they become" (p. 19). Latour 
has another name for actants (one by now familiar to anyone interested in 
cybernetics), these bundles of action-relation that are inseparable from the 
work they perform. He calls them black boxes.
Like a cyberneticist, Latour (1987; 1991; 2005) emphasizes an actant's 
actions. An actant is what it does, what it performs or accomplishes. It 
possesses no enduring interiority or stable set of properties that might define in
advance how it operates or how it relates to other actants. Harman (2009) 
sounds like Ashby when he writes that with Latour's actants, "the internal 
properties of a black box do not count as long as we are concerned only with its
input and output" (p. 33). In fact, Latour's black box is precisely that which 
purports to possess some immutable character as a result of the particular 
relations it manages to build and sustain. For this is a critical feature of life as 
an actant: the ability to form a network of relations. Actants engage one 
another in what Latour (1988b) calls "trials of strength," engagements in which 
actants attempt to recruit and enroll one another in their (immanent) projects 
and programs, growing stronger (more real) as they do. Actant-collectivities 
feature "spokespersons," or "some people defining who they are, what they 
should be, what they have been" (Latour, 2005, p. 31). All actants jockey to 
prolong their existence, to exert their durability in the world through their trials
of strength, the success or failure of which depends on an actant's ability to 
effectively mask (to black box) the ongoing work of sustaining the fragile 
relations that make it possible. "If you still believe groupings exist 'by 
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themselves,' writes Latour (2005), "for instance the 'individual,' just try to 
remember how much labor had to be done before each of you could 'take your 
life into your own hands'" (p. 32).
Latour (1987) calls every black-box actant "a machination, a strategem, a 
kind of cunning" (p. 129) that organizes and mobilizes actors with no necessary 
connection to one another. This process requires constant negotiation. And it is 
controversial (Latour, 2005). Some actants are more easily enrolled into 
networks than others. Some break away at inopportune times. Still others 
attempt to redefine the aim, direction, and scope of the network. In short, 
Latour's actants always mediate one another through complex processes of 
translation, the work of forging associations that link actants in particular 
contingent relationships. Mediation involves forming and managing these 
relationships, arranging fields of action (or "bending space"), establishing 
dependencies between and among actants, and enforcing particular forms or 
grammars of action across these heterogeneous groupings (Callon & Latour, 
1981).
If actions define actants, then these actions are not the straightforward, 
transparent, or linear actions of euro-modern causality. For Latour (2005), 
"action is not done under the full control of consciousness; action should rather 
be felt as a node, a knot, and a conglomerate of many surprising sets of 
agencies that have to be slowly disentangled" (p. 44). In other words, action is 
dislocated from its more traditional locus in the singular, intentional subject and
instead "borrowed, distributed, suggested, influenced, dominated, betrayed, 
translated" (p. 46) between and among actants striving to exert some influence 
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in a network. "Action" names something pertinent to a state of affairs, not a 
property of a body; an actor is "the moving target of a vast array of entities 
swarming around it" (p. 46). As Sayes (2014) puts it, Latour's actor-network 
theory insists that "an uncertainty concerning just what it is that is acting must 
be implemented at the same time as one introduces uncertainty concerning just
what action is" (p. 141). As it was for early cyberneticists like Wiener, action is 
for Latour multi-directional and reciprocal.
Latour's (2005) attempt to refashion action outside the epistemological 
confines of euro-modernity is a contribution to what he calls "about the most 
difficult problem there is in philosophy" (p. 51): agency. If actants are defined 
precisely by their relations, and these relations are the mechanisms by which 
multidirectional actions are disbursed across networks, then "agency" cannot 
resemble some kind of free will (action uninhibited by the influence of others), 
even if an actant attempts to make it seem so as a way of justifying its own 
capacity to differentially influence a particular set of relationships (i.e., when an
actant masks the relations that define it in order to assert that its power is the 
result of some force outside those relations). Indeed, for Latour agency is 
always controversial because it involves an actant's ability to downplay its 
reliance on a complicated and contingent set of relations (to naturalize or 
presuppose these as something stable and reliable). But actants do not possess 
agency, as if an actant could acquire more or less agency by virtue of its status 
as this or that type of actant. Agency is rather wholly relational, something 
distributed across an entire network of associations between actants with 
disproportionate abilities to influence those associations. This is "agency" for 
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Latour: the ability to make a difference in and to the set of relations that 
organize the multilinear directionality and effectivity of actions. Matters of 
agency are therefore irreducible to explanations predicated on a single source 
or target (e.g., a human and its intentional actions). Understanding the 
specificity of particular social formations—how certain collectivities of actants 
have come together, in what ways, and with what effects—means locating the 
traces of the complex and variegated actions actants perform to maintain their 
ties, stake their positions, and discredit or disassemble others.
Vital Materialism
Jane Bennett's vital materialism is a project both ontological and ethico-
political. In its ontological mode, vital materialism seeks ways of investigating 
and expressing thing-power, "the curious ability of inanimate things to animate,
to act, to produce effects dramatic and subtle" (Bennett, 2010, p. 6), while 
acknowledging that nonhuman "things" always exceed human capacity to 
represent them (let alone completely comprehend them). Like actor-network 
theory, vital materialism refuses the euro-modern hierarchy between human 
and nonhuman animals, plants, and minerals, and instead "draws attention to 
an efficacy of objects in excess of the human meanings, designs, or purposes 
they express or serve" (p. 20). For Bennett, nonhuman things are not inert 
materials to be overcome, oppressive structures to be subverted, available 
resources to be consumed, or stable backgrounds of contextual variables to be 
controlled; they are lively and forceful actors participating in the construction 
and organization of material realities.
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As an ethico-political project, vital materialism aims "to encourage more 
intelligent and sustainable engagements with vibrant matter and lively things" 
(p. viii). Bennett seeks a way of accounting for the way these "lively things" 
participate in the distribution, modulation, and regulation of power relations 
that enable or constrain forms of life (modes of being or flourishing). 
Expressing frustration with a humanist bias running through contemporary 
politics, Bennett suggests that attention to the thing-power of nonhuman 
actants might radically reframe contemporary notions of action, power, 
responsibility, and agency (see also Bennett, 2004). "A lot happens to the 
concept of agency once nonhuman things are figured less as social 
constructions and more as actors and once humans themselves are assessed not
as autonoms but as vital materialities" (p. 21). Thing-power enlivens our 
understanding of the nonhuman and tempers our bias for the human.
But thing-power is not somehow exclusive to nonhuman actants; Bennett 
(2010) does not simply invert the euro-modern balance of agential privilege. 
Thing-power pertains instead to a broader manifold that subtends and gives 
shape to both humans and nonhumans. "Human power is itself a kind of thing-
power" (p. 10, emphasis added), and Bennett's vital materialism explores the 
possibility of this singular force animating the ongoing relations between bodies
that figure from a self-same process of unfolding materiality. It
affirms a figure of matter as an active principle, and a universe of this 
lively materiality that is always in various states of congealment and 
diffusion, materialities that are active and creative without needing to be 
experienced or conceived as partaking in divinity or purposiveness. (p. 
93)
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Thing-power is without recourse to a transcendent animating term; the 
power of things is indeed their own, immanent liveliness. Indeed, Bennett 
theorizes and embraces a force immanent to matter itself—the force of matter, 
in its infinite variability. Here Bennett (2010) clearly owes a debt to another 
philosopher of thing-power: Spinoza (1996), who, in his Ethics, elaborated 
precisely that singular force-material from which all beings—human and 
nonhuman like—figure. Spinoza called it either "God" or "Nature," as either 
would suffice to name the single, infinite, and eternal substance conceived only 
in and through itself. For Spinoza, every body is a modification, a mode, of this 
substance's infinite attributes, and every body is itself composite, a collectivity 
of other bodies composed from the same, singular, eternal stuff. Bodies are 
bodies of bodies, which are themselves bodies of even more bodies. Yet while 
any body is in fact a collectivity of others, it cannot be reduced to its constituent
parts; it cannot be explained as the mere result of some specific combination of 
elements that are purportedly more fundamental. Composite bodies are 
therefore collective singularities. And all bodies both affect and are affected by 
other bodies in ways that modify their abilities. In doing so, they augment or 
diminish something central to Bennett's theory of thing-power: their ability to 
persist in being and maximize the power of the very singular body-collectives 
they are.
Spinoza explains that bodies enter into relations with other bodies that are
in some cases detrimental to their ability to remain coherently associated. 
Forceful enough, such encounters can destroy a body-collective by diffusing the 
bodies that compose it. But bodies can also relate to other bodies in ways that 
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enhance their coherence. Such encounters can augment their ability to remain 
productively associated. Spinoza argues that bodies do not enter into relations 
in accordance with some pre-established criteria (for such criteria would 
therefore somehow transcend God or Nature, an impossibility for Spinoza). 
Instead, Spinoza (1996) says, bodies enter into relations with other bodies 
simply because these relations might enable them to endure. This enduring, 
this striving to persist as a concrete mode of God's infinite being, is for Spinoza 
the essence of a(ny) thing: "Each thing," he writes, "as far as it can by its own 
power, strives to persevere in its being. [...] The striving by which each thing 
strives to persevere in its being is nothing but the actual essence of the thing" 
(p. 75). Spinoza called this striving the conatus: a desire, immanent to all things
(because it is the essence of all things), to persist and become (in Spinoza's 
terms) more perfect. For Bennett, conatus names the thing-power of the thing, 
the force of its ability to actively and continuously exist.
Emphasizing a particular collectivity's conatus is Bennett's way of 
accounting for a kind of nonhuman or asubjective will that might account for an
aggregate body's durability and persistence despite its heterogeneous makeup. 
Leveraging the Spinozan conatus, then, Bennett (2010) can begin to outline 
vital materialism's implications for traditional notions of agency, vitality, life, 
and politics. "If we do not know just how it is that human agency operates," she 
asks, "how can we be so sure that the processes through which nonhumans 
make their mark are qualitatively different?" (p. 34). Arguing once more for the 
universality of thing-power, Bennett suggests a rethinking of agency as 
collective, "distributed across an ontologically heterogeneous field" (p. 23) of 
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bodies. Vital materialism's agency is a "confederate agency of many striving 
macro- and microactants" (p. 23) affecting other actants and being affected by 
them in turn. In line with Deleuze and Guattari, Bennett calls these 
confederations assemblages, "ad hoc groupings of diverse elements, of vibrant 
materials of all sorts [...] living, throbbing, confederations that are able to 
function despite the persistent presence of energies that confound them from 
within" (pp. 23-24). Assemblages are collective and conative bodies, and for 
Bennett each "owes its agentic capacity to the vitality of the materialities that 
constitute it" (p. 34). Thinking body-collectives as assemblages allows Bennett 
to stress that they are defined neither by some essential or invariant set of 
properties, nor by those of their component parts. Rather, assemblages acquire 
their particular character as a consequence of their connection with other 
assemblages: the connections an assemblage does or does not make with other 
bodies are precisely that which give an assemblage its identity, which enable its
persistence. Like a cybernetic black box, an assemblage is what it can do, or 
how it draws together, stakes out, organizes, mobilizes, and distributes the 
capacities of the elements it assembles. The hallmark of an assemblage is what 
it makes possible; agencement is the ongoing modification of a potential for 
action.
Describing the agency of an assemblage, Bennett therefore suggests 
rethinking three terms typically associated with the concept of agency: efficacy,
trajectory, and causality. An assemblage's efficacy refers to its "creativity," its 
"capacity to make something new appear or occur" and to "make a difference 
that calls for response" (pp. 31-32), something like the Latourian notion of 
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agency. Additionally, while an assemblage does not adhere to a preordained 
telos, it does mark some trajectory, "a directionality or movement away from 
somewhere even if the toward-which it moves is obscure or even absent" (p. 
32). Here Bennett's Spinozan influence again distances her from the cybernetic 
definition of teleology: the purpose or goal of an agent's striving is an increase 
in its perfection. Finally, an assemblage effects multilinear determinations 
characterized by its particular causality, which emerges from within it and 
cannot be predicted or completely controlled by it. Assemblages have uneven 
topographies; unlike actor-network theory, which seems to presuppose a 
particular spatial imaginary (the network), vital materialism insists that an 
assemblage's particular configuration differentially distributes capabilities to 
influence that assemblage. Bennett's discussion of an assemblage's agency 
augments the Latourian notion that agency is simply distributed by focusing on 
the effects, consequences and directionalities of those distributions. As Wise 
(1997) indicates, Latour's agential vocabulary "is far too passive and (shall we 
say) disinterested to adequately describe the actual process" (p. 34). Bennett, 
on the other hand, draws attention to the particular character and 
consequences of a given arrangement in search of a thing-power that both 
subtends and supersedes the human. In her vital materialism, cybernetic 
behavior, purpose, and will operate in new registers.
Agential Realism
Karen Barad's (2007) agential realism finds inspiration in the "philosophy-
physics" of Niehls Bohr, whose work in quantum physics (specifically his notion 
that atoms were not as stable, discrete, bounded, or determinate as once 
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thought) "not only revolutionzied physics but shook the very foundation of 
Western epistemology" (p. 97) by challenging both Cartesianism and 
Newtonianism. Bohr offers Barad an alternative to the "representationalist 
triadic structure of words, knowers, and things" (p. 97) so prevalent in various 
social constructionisms that subordinate "matter" to ostensibly more dynamic 
forces (like "language" or "culture"; see also Barad, 2003). Instead, Barad is 
"interested in understanding the epistemological and ontological issues that 
quantum physics forces us to confront, such as the conditions of possibility for 
objectivity, the nature of measurement, the nature of nature and meaning 
making, and the relationship between discursive practices and the material 
world" (p. 24). Barad's interest, in other words, is mattering. She adumbrates a 
radically realist ontology's consequences for the way one might conceive 
agency.
Agential realism's fundamental unit is neither the actant nor the 
assemblage but the phenomenon. Barad notes that Bohr (unlike his Newtonian 
contemporaries) refused the Kantianism that distinguishes between objects of 
observation and agencies of observation that come to bear on them. For both 
Bohr and Barad, phenomena are not re-presentations of the world for a subject 
somehow able to stand apart from it, but the very entanglement of observer and
observed in a primordial relationality that precedes them both: "ontologically 
primitive relations [...] without preexisting relata" (p. 139). For agential realism,
then, "the primary ontological units are not 'things' but phenomena, dynamic 
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topological reconfigurings / entanglements / relationalities / (re)articulations of 
the world" (p. 141) itself, not mediations of that world that something existing 
outside the world manages to produce.
Phenomena, then, arise not from the interaction of distantiated knower 
and known, but through what Barad calls intra-actions that in fact produce 
these two entities. "Intra-action" names for Barad "the mutual constitution of 
objects and agencies of observation within phenomena" (p. 197, emphasis in 
original); it is the event-process that determines the boundaries and properties 
of phenomena, that enacts a cut constitutive of subject and object. The power to
effect intra-active cuts resides with apparatuses, which Barad describes as "the 
material conditions of possibility and impossibility of mattering" (p. 148, 
emphasis in original). They are "boundary drawing practices" (p. 206, emphasis 
in original) that "enact what matters and what is excluded from mattering" (p. 
148). For Barad, "mattering" means both "becoming significant," demanding 
attention and/or response, as well as "materializing." And critically for Barad, 
apparatuses are not subjects; they are the processes through which subjects 
and objects are produced and sorted in the first place. She writes:
Apparatuses are not merely about us. And they are not merely 
assemblages that include nonhumans as well as humans. Rather, 
apparatuses are specific material reconfigurings of the world that do not 
merely emerge in time but iteratively reconfigure spacetimematter as 
part of the ongoing dynamism of becoming. (p. 142)
Via Foucault, Barad argues that apparatuses facilitate power-relations not 
by representing the world in particular ways, but through the differential 
applications of force that constitute particular intra-active matterings. For 
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instance, Barad suggests that fetal imaging apparatuses do not merely 
represent the fetus, but rather constitute the phenomenon of the fetus, which 
cannot exist outside regimes of material and discursive intra-actions (e.g., 
among what Latour might call a network of medical discourses, piezoelectric 
crystals, cathode rays or LCD screens, juridical imperatives, etc.). In this way, 
prenatal imaging technologies produce the fetus-as-phenomenon and ascribe 
certain subjective qualities to it (see also Casper, 1994; Stormer, 2010). 
Apparatuses effect intra-actions not by "detect[ing] difference that are already 
in place; rather they contribute to the production and reconfiguration of 
difference" (p. 232) between humans and nonhumans, between culture and 
nature. Barad hopes her agential realism might espouse some sensitivity to 
(and accountability for) the ways certain material and discursive practices 
enact those cuts that open or foreclose opportunities for "mattering" as intra-
actions differentially constitute phenomena that figure from the self-same stuff 
of the world through a singular, dynamic process of ongoing (re)configuration. 
"This dynamism," Barad writes, "is agency" (p. 141, emphasis in original).
Agency for Barad is neither a possession nor an attribute but "an 
enactment" (p. 214). Agency cannot be the property of either a human or a 
nonhuman (as agential intra-actions are what produces them both). It is the 
performativity of all that is: "The universe is agential intra-activity in its 
becoming" (p. 141). Agential realism conceives agency as an "ongoing flow [...] 
through which part of the world makes itself differentially intelligible to another
part of the world" (p. 140); for Barad "the ongoing ebb and flow of agency" (p. 
140) discloses something about the way that multiple modes of being might be 
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produced and enacted—but not because agency is counterposed with structure 
(as the ability to generate difference despite oppression). Barad's agential 
realism "does not take sides in the traditional debates between determinism 
and free will but rather poses an altogether different way of thinking about 
temporality, spatiality, and possibility" (p. 177), for agency is that through which
"causal structures are stabilized and destabilized" (p. 140)—not the way agents 
might overcome the limits of space and time (see Brophy, 2010, on intra-activity
and cyberutopia) but "the making of spacetime itself" (p. 140). Space, time, and
matter are not the external limits to iterative becoming (the "structures" for an 
otherwise free play of movement), but are in fact produced by those becomings.
Likewise, causality is neither an issue of strict determinism or free will, but the 
enactment of exclusions produced intra-actively, exclusions that condition 
possibilities for action. In an emphatic summary statement, Barad argues:
Agency is 'doing' or 'being' in its intra-activity. It is the enactment of 
iterative changes to particular practices—iterative reconfigurings of 
topological manifolds of spacetimematter relations—through the 
dynamics of intra-activity. Agency is about changing possibilities of 
change entailed in reconfiguring material-discursive apparatuses of 
bodily production, including the boundary articulations and exclusions 
that are marked by those practices in the enactment of a causal structure
(p. 178, emphasis in original)
Elsewhere, Barad calls matter congealed agency (p. 151; see also Colls, 
2007), but not because agency is a force ontologically separate from matter. In 
line with Bennett (2010), Barad insists that "there is a vitality to the liveliness 
of intra-activity, not in the sense of a new form of vitalism, but rather in terms 
of a new sense of aliveness" (p. 177). She celebrates "the world's effervescence,
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its exuberant creativeness," which "can never be contained or suspended" 
because "agency never ends; it can never 'run out'" (p. 177). But unlike 
Bennett, Barad does not locate agency in or of the assemblage; again, her 
apparatuses "are not merely assemblages" (p. 142) because assemblages 
already consist of bodies and relations produced and sorted according to 
agential intra-actions ontologically anterior to them. Similarly, Barad is at odds 
with Latour's actor-network theory because in agential realism agency is 
neither "restricted to the possibilities for human action" nor "is it simply the 
case that agency should be granted to nonhumans as well as humans, or that 
agency can be distributed over nonhuman and human forms" (p. 178). For 
Barad, "what is at issue [...] are the possibilities for the iterative reconfiguring 
of the materiality of the human, nonhuman, cyborgian, and other such forms" 
(p. 178). Agency is instead about the production of realities through the making
of cuts—and "cuts are agentially enacted not by willful individuals, but by the 
larger material arrangement of which 'we' are a 'part'" (p. 178). For Barad, "the
world is an open process of mattering through which mattering itself acquires 
meaning and form through the realization of differential agential possibilities" 
(p. 141). While she appreciates Butler's understanding of mattering as 
materialization, Barad pushes the concept further to to describe "matter as an 
active 'agent' in its ongoing materialization" (p. 151) outside a locus in (human) 
bodily practices. For Barad, matter's materialization is always already 
influenced by specific apparatuses, which "are the material conditions of 
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possibility and impossibility of mattering" (p. 148, emphasis in original). Agency
is a matter of mattering, the ongoing production of arrangements that 
determine what matters and what doesn't.
Charting Ontologies (Three Agential Territories)
Actor-network theory, vital materialism, and agential realism each offer 
critical social and cultural theory an account of agency dislocated from a locus 
in the individual actor (human or otherwise). Each of these accounts (as well as 
each's respective theory of agency) draws on resources particular to certain 
"regions" or "moments" in the Deleuzeo-Guattarian ontological meta-model. 
Charting these theories via this meta-model clarifies the aim and scope of their 
respective projects. Doing so is particularly important insofar as each 
represents a viable resource for analyzing the effectivity of information and 
information technologies today.
Actor-Network Theory
Actor-network theory offers a compelling and sophisticated theoretical 
vocabulary for discussing (in great detail) the regimes and enrollments 
individual black-box actants might initiate, sustain, or subvert as they shape 
particular social formations, and its dedication to tracking (again, in great 
detail) the effects of human and nonhuman actions does impose a welcome 
degree of rigor on such discussions.
However, actor-network theory situates its analyses firmly in the realm of 
the actual (that is, on the plane of organization) and therefore struggles to 
account for actants that might well lie outside a particular networked set of 
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relations—for only that which is networked can play a role in organizing the 
social. In his later work (see, e.g., Latour, 2005), Latour invents the concept of 
"plasma" to account for "what is in between the meshes of [...] circuitry" (p. 
242, emphasis in original). Plasma is "that which is not formatted, not yet 
measured [...] not yet covered, surveyed, mobilized, or subjectified" (p. 244); it 
is a "reserve [...] for every formatted, localized, continuous, accountable action 
to be carried out in" (p. 245). Latour thus distinguishes between two 
qualitatively different types of material: the active actual (formatted and 
networked) and the passive potential (the reserve in which steeps more 
interesting and dynamic activity). Latour conceives a binary relationality: for 
him, an actant is seemingly either connected and actualized via trials of 
strength or disconnected and relegated to the reserve. With regard to the 
Deleauzean meta-model, one might say Latourian analysis prefers the plane of 
organization. More specifically, acts of inclusive connection are relatively 
unproblematic for Latour (because enrollment into networks is always 
occurring in the Latourian imaginary), so territorializing operations concern 
him less than the coding functions of actants capable of speaking on behalf of 
(and therefore characterizing) the collections of actions that constitute an actor.
Actor-network theory is primarily a theory of coding machines.
Latour offers little explanation of the way in which the "unformatted" gets 
"formatted" into specific actor-networks (the way potentials get actualized). In 
this way, actor-network theory's preoccupation with the actual blinds it to the 
diagrammatic (stratifying) activities that produce and organize collectivities or 
populations (like "human" and "nonhuman") in a social formation. Moreover, by 
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distributing agency so widely across a social field, Latour risks 
deproblematizing it. Slack and Wise (2005) argue, for example, that actor-
network theory "tends to treat agency as if it were somehow universally 
available" (p. 123). The authors suggest that "the approach does not foreground
variations in the availability of agency or the role of power in the construction 
and stabilization of networks" (p. 123). Latour tends to conflate action and 
enrollment with agency itself when he eliminates euro-modernity's 
nature/culture divide; agency is for him a matter of stabilization on the plane of 
organization, and he glimpses it in any location actors refuse to remain at rest—
that is to say, everywhere.
Vital Materialism
Vital materialism demonstrates a now-familiar penchant for charting the 
fields of possibility a particular social formation may afford, and Bennett (2010) 
expresses a desire to "rewrite the default grammar of agency," for it is "a 
grammar that assigns activity to people and passivity to things" (p. 119). Of 
chief concern for vital materialists, then, are the ways in which concrete 
organizations of actors espouse, affirm, enforce, or disrupt arrangements that 
secure certain asymmetries of ability to influence those very organizations.
By attributing agency to assemblages, Bennett situates analysis squarely 
on the plane of organization (and is in this way akin to Latour). Bennett's 
actants (that is, her assemblages) are confederations of already-stratified 
materials, although because she leans on Deleuze and Guattari's process 
ontology (not to mention a strikingly Wienerian cosmological imaginary), she is 
able to claim that "all bodies are [...] but temporary congealments of a 
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materiality that is a process of becoming, is hustle and flow punctuated by 
sedimentation and substance" (p. 49). This is, after all, how Bennett's 
materialism is a vital one; matter itself contorts in conjunction with the bodily 
activities that shape it. Nevertheless, Bennett attends principally to "conative" 
actors' capacities for efficacy, trajectory, and causality—properties discernable 
only on the plane of the already-organized. By specifying these dimensions of 
agential activity, Bennett seems to seek some explanation of potential actions 
actors may perform, the multiple functions they may enact. In this way, then, 
vital materialism stands to offer more specific accounts of agential activities in 
particular social formations. While actor-network theory attends primarily to 
the particular coding functions actants might enact (i.e., their relative abilities 
to characterize the function or effects of certain connections), vital materialism 
is concerned foremost with the territorializing operations of assemblages; 
Bennett's conative assemblages gather "tone" and "energy" (p. 35) through 
precisely what they draw together.
But while she borrows much from Deleuze and Guattari, Bennett curiously 
neglects the philosophers' distinction between the machinic assemblage and 
the collective assemblage of enunciation, the twin, irreducible, and reciprocally 
presupposing dimensions of any assemblage. Recall that for Deleuze and 
Guattari analysis of an assemblage and its effectivities involves deciphering 
precisely which of those bodies gathered into the assemblage have been 
consigned the ability to act and which have been attributed the capacity to be 
acted upon. The machinic assemblage (that pragmatic system) and the 
collective assemblage of enunciation (that semiotic system) respectively name 
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collections of bodies with differentially-distributed capacities for influence. 
Bennett's expressed desire to discover the source of such differential 
distributions makes her decision to omit this useful analytic distinction even 
more perplexing. Critical studies of information and information technologies 
might benefit from this distinction, however, as "information" might operate 
differently as part of different contexts, ensembles, and discursive regimes. As 
previous chapters have demonstrated, for example, some actors tend to 
construe information as an object, some-thing on which otherwise more "active"
subjects operate. Other accounts of information (such as those articulated in 
postwar mathematical, engineering, and cybernetic literatures) explicitly reject 
the notion that information can function as object-ive content. Instead, they 
urge consideration of information's expressive function. A theory of 
nonhumanistic agency sufficient for making sense of contemporary informatic 
politics must account for this critical distinction.
Agential Realism
Agential realism characterizes agency as the ongoing production of 
iterative "cuts" that determine topological manifolds, and is therefore (unlike 
actor-network theory) attentive to the manner in which the potential becomes 
actual. Barad's apparatuses are indeed something like abstract machines, 
entities that intra-actively stratify the unformed matters and functions into 
specific populations with concrete possibilities for relating to one another (i.e., 
into phenomena, which name some relationship between what has been 
designated "subject" and what has been designated "object"). This is to say that 
for agential realists agency is primarily the province of entities whose 
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boundary-producing activities draw diagrams that distribute possibilities for 
action(s) and perception(s)—that is to say, for mattering. As Barad (2007) puts 
it:
[...] Phenomena are the ontological inseparability/entanglement of intra-
acting "agencies". That is, phenomena are ontological primitive relations
—relations wihout preexisting relata. [...] It is through specific agential 
intra-actions that the boundaries and properties of the components of 
phenomena become determinate and that particular concepts (that is, 
particular material articulations of the world) become meaningful. (p. 
139, emphasis in original)
Agency is for Barad (2007) a capacity of the universe itself, an "ongoing 
flow [...] through which part of the world makes itself differentially intelligible 
to another part of the world and through which causal structures are stabilized 
and destabilized" (p. 140). She is even more explicit when she plainly states 
that "the universe is agential intra-activity in its becoming" (p. 141). Barad 
imagines an infinitely agential universe in which boundary-drawing 
apparatuses' activities intra-actively cut and re-cut (configure and re-configure, 
fold and re-fold) the undifferentiated in order to produce the conditions of 
possibility any arrangement of differentiated actors affords. An apparatus acts 
always and only in that moment when the potential becomes actual, when a 
plane of organization materializes on or against a plane of consistency. If for 
Latour nothing seems to act diagrammatically, for Barad everything does.
Agential realism therefore has difficulty grappling with actors that don't 
seem to engage in boundary-drawing activities—machines, in other words, that 
do not diagram but might code, territorialize, or perform an additional 
organization function. If actor-network theory threatens to deproblematize 
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agency by accounting for agency as just another effect of differentially 
distributed actors (actors with disproportionate influence the origin of which 
remains a mystery), then agential realism proposes to do the same by making 
agency an ontological a priori, by making a very specific notion of agency (as 
boundary-drawing) a universal tendency. But as Chapter 2 has shown (and as 
the conclusion to this chapter will further demonstrate), competing definitions 
of information exist precisely because they apprehend the agential problematic 
in different ways, in different contexts or from different vantage points. While 
provocative, agential realism's one-dimensional understanding of agency cannot
account for the complexity or diversity of machinic activities in which 
informatic technologies might participate.
Relationality, or Power's Cardinal Directions
Certainly the foregoing analysis of contemporary non-humanistic theories 
of agency does not exhaust the available repertoire of such projects ongoing 
today, but this sample is representative of the way in which such theories tend 
to occupy various positions in a Deleuzean/Guattarian ontological meta-model. 
It also exposes the extent to which each perspective is capable of addressing 
not only those relations that constitute and organize agency in a given social 
formations but also those relations of power immanent to the fields in which 
these agential activities occur. Deleuze and Guattari distinguish between 
multiple machinic activities in order to adequately map these power relations, 
but not every style or mode of relational thinking adopts their analytic with the 
same degree(s) of specificity. Moreover, many such theories tend to equate 
action with agency and therefore risk deproblematizing the very thing Deleuze 
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and Guattari mean to underscore with their emphasis on critical mapping: the 
very ways in which some actions are more efficacious than others, in which 
some actions articulate to effects others do not—or, to paraphrase Bateson, the 
ways in which differences can make different differences. Attention to these 
articulations is attention to power relations.
An Orientation Toward Power
The turn to non-humanistic agency, says Mark Andrejevic (2013), is not 
only a popular trend in the rarefied fields of critical social and cultural theory; it
also tracks particular tendencies in contemporary popular politics. For 
Andrejevic, the (re)turn to complexity coincides with the rise of a "post-
comprehension" paradigm in popular cultural and political discourses, a 
paradigm which, in light of increasing amounts of "data" (or what Andrejevic 
calls "information"), tends to downplay the efficacy of cohesive narratives and 
elevates (even celebrates) correlative logics over causal ones in explanations of 
social forces and formations. Here, Andrejevic writes, "post-comprehension 
refers to a reconfigured concept of agency in which questions of desire, 
motivation, and intension, are bracketed" (p. 141). Post-comprehension 
discourses tend to foreground a "rapidly expanding scope of relevant variables
—a scope that soon becomes 'too big to know'" and consequently favor a 
particular epistemological device: "patterns that cannot be modeled and, in this
respect, are inexplicable—patterns that simply emerge from the database and 
can be neither anticipated nor explained once they emerge" (p. 142). The result,
says Andrejevic, is a kind of "post-human pluralism" in which "knowledge [...] 
has operational efficacy but no descriptive, explanatory, or even causal 
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purchase" (p. 142). Moreover, it's a pluralism that tends to rest neatly alongside
neoliberal logics championing the chaotic-but-generative capacities of markets. 
For Andrejevic, accounts of nonhumanistic agency that equate critique with the 
production of relational descriptions might stymie their own political potentials.
Pressing not merely for descriptions of relational complexity but rather 
analysis of the concrete ways in which those complex relations actually 
organize fields of (actual and potential) activity, Grossberg (1992) stresses 
attending to the ways in which particular articulations of practices function. 
Generating politically useful insights about the organization of social life is not 
simply a matter of "bringing the pieces together and noting that they are 
connected" (p. 56). The point, recall, is to describe "the mode of that 
articulation, the nature of that fit" (p. 56, emphasis added). Put another way, 
the spatial materialist would insist that "arguing that a particular articulation is
taken up is [not] the same as describing the way it is taken up" (p. 56, emphasis
added). Relationally-oriented approaches to cultural theory and criticism often 
stop short of such descriptions, relying instead in the endless proliferation of 
contextual descriptions meant to constitute the analysis' political purchase. But 
as Grossberg asks: "Without understanding the form of power of a particular 
line or connection, how can one imagine the possibility of its being broken?" (p. 
56).
And in her compelling critique of relational ontologies, Sue Ruddick (2012)
cautions new materialists not to become enamored with their own theoretical 
detours. The risk of a tendency to uncritically celebrate relational complexity, 
she writes, is that "we might quickly become lost, enthralled perhaps by 
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seemingly endless points of connection and disjunction, complex webs of 
interconnection" (pp. 208-209). Relational thinking, Ruddick argues, is by itself 
no guarantor of politically useful knowledge; more than an ongoing series of 
"connections and disjunctions," relationality is foremost a way of accounting for
asymmetries of influence among those relations. In other words, any analysis of 
relations must always already involve investigating relations of power. "It is not 
simply the relationship between things that is called into question," Ruddick 
says. "[I]t is the ways in which this relationship engages the 'things' themselves
—what is brough into play in each multiplicity" (p. 208). In their haste to grant 
nonhuman actors access to agential relations, in their frequent conflation of 
action and agency, and in their myopic view of the Deleuzean/Guattarian meta-
model, too many contemporary nonhumanistic theories of agency tend to 
presuppose (or even dismiss) the question of power, the question of whether 
and how some forms of relation (and some modalities of action) achieve 
differential effectivity in a given social formation.
These critiques share a common thread: dissatisfaction with contemporary
accounts of nonhumanistic agency that tend to equate action or effect with 
agency itself and therefore ignore the differential relations of power that 
distribute capacities for access, influence, and investment in various social 
formations. This is to say: they recall the importance of attending to power 
relations.
Latour (2005) is not silent on the issue of power, which he treats as 
something like a connection of asymmetrical influence. Resisting the tendency 
to theorize transcendent and monolithic structures of power, Latour (2005) 
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instead claims that "power, like society, is the final result of a process and not a 
reservoir, a stock, or a capital that will automatically provide an explanation" (p.
64). But construing power as chiefly the result of some series of actions risks 
ignoring the very activities that organize differential abilities to make a 
difference. In other words, because for actor-network theory agency is simply 
some ability to make a difference in a network of actants, the theory has 
difficulty accounting for the type or kind of difference an actor might make—
and whether or not these differences make a difference to agential activities in 
multiple registers (though according to Harman, 2014, Latour has recently 
attempted to rectify this). Unfortunately, Latour's tendency to downplay the role
power plays in the organization and maintenance of relations between actants 
has inspired some social and cultural theorists sensitive to the operations of 
nonhuman actors to dismiss the term "power" as "too anthropocentric" and 
therefore of marginal relevance to the question of non-humanistic agency in 
general (Bryant, 2013, p. 13).
Like Latour, Barad's (2007) agential realism tends to grant agency a kind 
of ontological primacy or transcendental status when it posits agency as the 
universe's infinite becoming, "doing/being in its intra-activity" (p. 235). At 
times, Barad describes power as coterminus with this becoming. Describing 
Butlerian and Foucaultian approaches to this issue, for example, Barad writes 
that "power is not an external force that acts on a subject; there is only a 
reiterated acting that is power in its stabilizing and sedimenting effects" (p. 
235). Power is
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[...] transmitted through the repeated application of pressure on the 
body. The body reacts to the forces, manifest as shifting material 
alignments and changes in potential, and becomes not simply the 
receiver but also the transmitter or local source of the signal or sign that 
operates through it. (p. 189)
Power is, in other words, an ability to modulate or arrest the infinite 
becoming of the universe and produce specific actualizations (the ability to 
make intra-active cuts that stabilize spacetimes and organize what can and 
can't matter). To Barad, however, the analytical or political purchase of this 
seems somewhat mundane, as she is rather more ready to ontologize, stating 
simply that agential realism's primary contribution to theorizing power is that 
the study of power
is not limited to the social. That is, the forces at work in the 
materialization of bodies are not only social, and the materialized bodies 
are not all human. [...] Crucial to an agential realist conception of power 
is a reworking of causality as intra-activity. Indeed, what is at issue is the 
very nature of causal relations: causal relations to not pre-exist but 
rather are intra-actively produced" (p. 235, emphasis in original)
Barad explains neither how the agential realist insight that power relations
involve extra-human bodies is exclusive to agential realism nor how this claim 
contradicts or confirms other nonhumanistic theories of agency already 
occupying the same problem-space.
Bennett's vital materialism is theoretically well-positioned to track ways in 
which more-than-human assemblages invest particular actors with differing 
degrees of ability to affect the organization of a social formation. But recall that
her peculiar appropriation of Deleuze and Guattari fails to take into account the
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pair's distinction between machinic assemblages and collective assemblages of 
enunciation, a distinction designed in fact to generate the kind of analytic 
insights Bennett seeks. Recall, too, that for Deleuze and Guattari the machinic 
assemblage (a given assemblage's contents) are very active indeed; they are 
simply not agential in the sense that an assemblage's expressive elements are. 
Again, "expressions or expresseds are inserted into or intervene in contents, not
to represent them but to anticipate them or move them back, slow them down 
or speed them up, separate or combine them, delimit them in a different way" 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 86). Abstract machines grant bodies designated 
as "expressive" the ability to influence machinic contents in ways they 
themselves are not entirely influenced—a relation of power.
For Bennett (2010), however, power is chiefly "thing-power" (p. 2), "that 
which refuses to dissolve completely into the milieu of human knowledge" (p. 
3), the power to "exceed their status as objects and to manifest traces of 
independence or aliveness" (p. xvi). Put more simply, thing-power is the power 
to "make things happen, to produce effects" (p. 5). But Bennett has little to say 
about the kind of effect a thing might have. For Deleuze and Guattari, an 
assemblage's contents have effects (they perform actions, they affect other 
bodies), but they are not agential (they have not been granted the capacity for 
their actions and effects to affect the fields in which they are embedded).
Two Mathematicians, Two Maps
Wiener and Shannon are in their own ways advancing accounts of the 
agency of the nonhuman, so one might therefore subject their theories to 
similar treatment in a way that reveals something critical about their 
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differences—and about the nature of the problem-space they occupy. What 
remains of this chapter will do just that. It offers one final map(ping) to return 
this discussion to the question of information. Utilizing Deleuze and Guattari's 
ontological, machinic vocabulary, one might account for the seemingly radical 
disjunction of Wiener's and Shannon's respective theories of information by 
putting the mathematicians in conversation with the post-cybernetic, machinic 
philosophers whose nonhumanistic and a-subjective ontology resonates with 
them. Placing these theories on Deleuze and Guattari's ontological map helps 
clarify their aims (even as it explains their divergences).
Wiener's Abstract Machine
Reflecting in his autobiography on the role cybernetics played in his life 
and career, Wiener (1956) cannot help but offer another doleful description of 
the harsh universe desperately in need of cybernetic science:
We are swimming upstream against a great torrent of disorganization, 
which tends to reduce everything to the heat-death of equlibrium and 
sameness described in the second law of thermodynamics. What 
Maxwell, Boltzmann, and Gibbs meant by this heat death in physics has a
counterpart in the ethics of Kierkegaard, who pointed out that we iive in 
a chaotic moral universe. (p. 324)
As previous chapters have explained, Wiener viewed cybernetics as the 
universal science capable of tracking and perfecting ways life that might stave 
off the effects of this relentless, entropic cosmos. It was a necessary affair, even
if it could never function as a final one: "We are not fighting for a definitive 
victory in the indefinite future," he writes. "It is the greatest possible victory to 
be, to continue to be, and to have been. No defeat can deprive us of the success
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of having existed for some moment of time in a universe that seems indifferent 
to us" (p. 325). For Wiener, cybernetics assisted in "our main obligation": "to 
establish arbitrary enclaves of order and system" (p. 324). The formal 
articulation of information as the principle means by which life generates and 
maintains these enclaves was for Wiener a matter of survival on the grandest 
scale imaginable.
Wiener's information functions like an abstract machine. It is that cutting-
across that occurs on chaotic planes of consistency and arranges particles in 
productive and useful ways. As the inverse of entropy, "information" names the 
force that gathers together "life" and shields it from the entropic tides that 
threaten to sweep it away. And as no mere "thing," information is instead that 
process of taking-form (i.e., "in-formation") against the ever-present threat of 
death by diffusion. Affirming this reading of Wiener's information as an abstract
machine (and invoking Bateson in the process) Faucher (2014) stresses that in 
the Wienerian sense information "not only makes the difference but is 
difference—or, rather, information is differential selection within the milieu in 
which the thing is constituted as resonance between content and expression, 
always in a composition of assemblages" (p. 186, emphasis in original). 
Studying information furnishes the measure of a milieu's relative degree of 
organization, its openness or resistance to change.
Wiener described the dissolution of life as a movement from heterogeneity 
to homogeneity; his early work in Brownian motion shaped this imaginary 
(Wiener, 1938; see McMillan, 1989, for further explanation). Wiener seemed to 
fear little else more than he feared a world without difference or definition, the 
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complete diffusion of the complexly ordered into a vast, undifferentiated 
expanse. Deleuze and Guattari explained the production of the actual from the 
virtual by completing the circuit: they depict the redundant looping, pooling, or 
gridding an abstract machine effects on heterogeneous haecceities to bring 
them into some contingent but effective alignment. Wiener fears the ultimate 
collapse of the heterogeneous into the homogeneous; Deleuze and Guattari are 
wary of the homogenization of the heterogeneous. But these thinkers all pivot 
around a common concern: the (de-/re-)construction of arrangements from a 
redundant force immanent to them. For Wiener, agency is a capacity to resist 
entropy by installing productive patternings. A quest for variety and potential, 
an aversion to complete closure and the eradication of difference, animate 
Wiener and Deleuze and Guattari alike. As Wiener (1961) reminds his readers: 
"The transmission of information is impossible save as a transmission of 
alternatives" (p. 10). Wiener (1956) regarded the maintenance of heterogeneity 
as "an insolance against the gods and the iron necessity that they impose" (p. 
325). To theorize information is to theorize the process by which the conditions 
for life itself become fundamentally organized even while (even in spite of the 
fact that) everything will inevitably be otherwise. "Here lies the tragedy, but 
here lies the glory too" (p. 325).
Shannon's Expressive Ensemble
In 1956, the same year Wiener published his autobiographical 
recapitulation of information's cosmic importance, Claude Shannon penned his 
own assessment of information theory's scope and purchase for the second half 
of the twentieth century. Published on a single page in IEEE Transactions—
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Information Theory, the piece was but four paragraphs long. In it, Shannon 
(1993c) observes that "the subject of information theory has certainly been 
sold, if not oversold" through its articulation "with such fashionable fields as 
computing machines, cybernetics, and automation" as well as "biology, 
psychology, linguistics, fundamental physics, economics, the theory of 
organization, and many others" (p. 462). Information theory's "heady draught of
popularity" did not please Shannon, who fervently reminds readers that "while 
we feel that information theory is indeed a valuable tool in providing 
fundamental insights into the nature of communication problems and will 
continue to grow in importance, it is certainly no panacea for the 
communication engineer or, a fortiori, for anyone else." Shannon implores those
ostensibly working on or with "information" to remember that "the basic results
of the subject are aimed in a very specific direction, a direction that is not 
necessary relevant to such fields as psychology, economics, and other social 
sciences." The title of Shannon's polemic neatly encapsulates his assessment of 
the field: "The Bandwagon."
Shannon (1993c) resisted the broad application of his work to non-
engineering endeavors (something he sternly reminds zealous readers is "not a 
trivial matter of translating words to a new domain" [p. 462]), because he felt 
his mathematical theory of information described not a universal principle but a
particular expressive ensemble, what in Deleuzean/Guattarian parlance one 
might call a collective assemblage of enunciation. For Shannon, information 
was not responsible for bringing entire worlds into existence (as it seemed to do
for Wiener); it existed on the plane of the already-actualized as a particular 
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measure of redundancy between relatively dis/organized unities. Recall that 
Shannon's informatic imaginary begins at precisely the opposite point Wiener's 
does: not with a chaotic field of homogeneity eventually ordered by informatic 
accumulation (the circulation of message-forms), but with a perfectly 
predictable arrangement of elements the certain repeatability of which 
information threatened (even though perfect predictability in practice proves 
impossible). Indeed, Shannon's theorization of information as synonymous with 
uncertainty positioned information not as an ordering force but as a force of 
destabilization, something to be mitigated through the engineering of 
communication technologies. Information is (in Shannon's cryptographic sense) 
chaotic; it increases proportionally to the degree of uncertainty (or "surprise") 
inhering in in a given milieu or arrangement, a definition which implies some 
prior act of stratification that produces entities thus arranged (entities like an 
"information source" and a "receiver").
Shannon was clear: information is useful and important insofar as it can 
help engineer communicative situations with conditions optimal for the 
reproduction of certain configurations (the replicability of certain message-
events). The mathetical theory of communication is one attempt to link 
particular substances (symbols, equations) to particular forms (logarithmic 
mathematics, Boolean logic)—and then to bring this expressive ensemble to 
bear on other materials (electrical switches, telephony systems) such that these
contents begin to arrange and align with expressive imperatives. As a theory of 
information (a set of resources that form a collective assemblage of 
enunciation) it offers a method for generating clear, effective connections 
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between events unfolding across milieus; it measures (that is, cuts into) systems
of entropic uncertainty by assessing the degree of "surprise" (in bits) those 
milieus afford. "Information" becomes a way of assessing the arrangement of 
myriad ensembles (machinic assemblages of bodies, statements, acts, signs, 
and other materials); the term names a way of apprehending a field 
probabilistically—so that the arrangement of these contents might be 
sufficiently repeated. Shannon's theory of information belongs to a collective 
assemblage of enunciation.
Conclusion: A Cartographic Theory of Communication
One year after the explosive release of his essay "A Mathematical Theory 
of Communication," Claude Shannon published "Communication in the 
Presence of Noise," a brief but powerful paper that pushed information theory 
in an intriguing direction. Appearing in the Proceedings of the Institute of 
Radio Engineers (now the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, or 
IEEE), the paper offers a method of "representing any communication system 
geometrically" (Shannon, 1949, p. 10). The work benefits communication 
engineering in an important way, Shannon claims:
The advantage of this geometrical representation of the signals is that we
can use the vocabulary and the results of geometry in the communication
problem. Essentially, we have replaced a complex entity (say, a television 
signal) in a simple environment (the signal requires only a plane for its 
representations as f(t)) by a simple entity (a point) in a complex 
environment [...] (p. 12)
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So Shannon re-imagined his classic communication model geometrically 
(as a series of points, vectors, and planes) to demonstrate the utility of a 
thoroughly spatialized approach to signal transmission. Recall that for Shannon 
messages are neither meaning-bearing units nor packets that move through 
channels but rather events of selection that modify particular arrangements 
(generating or ameliorating information). In "Communication in the Presence of
Noise," Shannon is able to capitalize on the conceptual purchase of this earlier 
maneuver by explaining messages as concrete spatialities. Underscoring this 
move, Shannon here refers to messages as points among larger "message 
spaces" and to transmitting and receiving entities as spatialization processes:
The input of the transmitter is a message; that is, one point in the 
message space. Its output is a signal—one point in the signal space. 
Whatever form of encoding or modulation is performed, the transmitter 
must establish some correspondence between the points in the two 
spaces. (p. 14)
In short: for Shannon, communication becomes not the transmission of 
ethereal signals through an otherwise inert (if potentially resistive) channel, but
the reproduction of spatial arrangements at multiple locations.
Shannon is even more direct when he reminds readers that
The geometrical name for such a correspondence is a mapping. The 
transmitter maps the message space onto the signal space. In the same 
way, the receiver maps the signal space back onto the message space. (p.
14)
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Of course, the process is never guaranteed or seamless; perturbations (the
noises to which the title of Shannon's essay refers) occur in the form of spatial 
distortions, "small region[s] of uncertainty about each point in the space" (p. 
11), "a warping of the space, so that each point is moved" (p. 13). Clearly, for 
Shannon "mapping" is not the act of re-presenting a spatial arrangement to an 
observing entity—one in which, as Pickles (2004) explains, "information is 
conveyed" by an entity seeking to "devise better approximations between raw 
data and the map image" (p. 33). This is in fact a common description of 
Shannon's communication process predicated on the misunderstanding that his 
"information" serves a representative function. It is related instead (as previous 
chapters have demonstrated) to the ongoing process of arrangement through 
which message spaces are assembled, secured, contested, and (re)shaped. If 
communication is a process of mapping, then it involves the effective replication
of arrangements, forging those connections (drawing those lines) that establish 
the contours of the possible (see Pickles, 2004) and ensure the upkeep of the 
systems designed to police those contours.
The mapping problem occupied Wiener too. In fact, he insisted that his 
infamous Yellow Peril was devoted entirely to it. The Extrapolation, 
Interpolation, and Smoothing of Stationary Time Series is, Wiener (1949b) says,
an attempt to unite the theory and practice of two fields of work which 
are of vital importance in the present emergency, and which have a 
complete natural methodological unity, but which have up to the present 
drawn their inspiration from two entirely distinct traditions, and which 
are widely different in their vocabulary and the training of their 
personnel. (p. 1)
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The "two fields" in question were statistical mechanics and communication
engineering, the articulation of which (as Chapter 2 explained) fueled the 
cybernetic imaginary. The Yellow Peril was declassified in 1949 (the same year 
Shannon released his application of geometrical principles to communication 
engineering), and its publication revealed one of Wiener's most sustained 
ruminations on the fruitful combination of mathematics and engineering for the 
purpose of prediction and control.
In the opening pages of Extrapolation, Interpolation, Wiener explains that 
"natural methodological unity" between "time series in statistics" and 
"communication engineering" (p. 1). He felt the two had heretofore been 
artificially (and unproductively) separated in a way that "has often blinded the 
communications and the power engineers to the essential unity of their 
problems" (p. 3). Wiener explains that
methods involving probability theory and correlation are part of the 
traditional stock in trade of the statistician, but, on the other hand the 
use of the complex plane is quite foreign to his training. The complex 
plane of function has a long history in communication technique, but 
statistical methods do not, and, as things stand at present, a man may be 
a practiced communications engineer without even being aware of their 
existence. (pp. 8-9)
Wiener's articulation is clear: he is writing to fuse these methods "into a 
common technique which, in the opinion of the author, is more effective than 
either existing technique alone" (p. 9): more effective, that is, at drawing more 
accurate inferences about future behavior from past performances—the 
cybernetic fixation. Central to this endeavor was the specification of the 
message as the fundamental unit of analysis for cybernetics (though Wiener 
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does not use this term explicitly, as his eponymous volume was still years away),
albeit a notion of "message" radically reworked. Indeed, communication 
engineering and statistical mechanics converge in the concept of the message, 
for the former is "the study of messages and their transmission" while the latter
enables their elaboration as "some sort of array of measurable quantities 
distributed in time" (p. 2). Unlike Shannon, his occasional student and 
interlocutor, Wiener mapped the message not in space but as a function of time:
This time series is then subjected to transmission by an apparatus which 
carries it through a succession of stages, at each of which the time series
appears by transformation as a new time series. These operations, 
although carried out by electrical or mechanical or other such means, are
in no way essentially different from the operations computationally 
carried out by the time-series statistician with slide rule and computing 
machine (p. 2)
Recall that Wiener's communication model lacks the moments of encoding 
and decoding present in Shannon's, so Wiener here speaks more directly about 
the transmission of messages. Nevertheless, Wiener describes a transmission 
process that is anything but simple or transparent; it is rather a "succession of 
stages" through which a message is transformed (meticulously reproduced from
moment to moment). As they would be in his Cybernetics, messages are for 
Wiener propagated forms of organization, not the stuff of human meaning or 
cognition. "A message need not be the result of a conscious human effort for the
transmission of ideas," he writes (p. 2), for records of current and voltage kept 
on instruments at an electrical substation "are as truly messages as a telephone
conversation" (p. 2). Messages are foremost patterns, and
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in that moment in which circuits of large power are used to transmit a 
pattern or to control the time behavior of a machine, power engineering 
differs from communication engineering only in the energy levels 
involved and in the particular apparatus used suitable for such energy 
levels, but is not in fact a separate branch of engineering from 
communications. (p. 3)
Wiener's concern here is the accuracy with which one might predict the 
successful propagation of such a pattern, the probability with which a pattern 
that has occurred in the past may appear again in the future, for then one might
predict and control its future activities; this explains Wiener's related 
preoccupation with extrapolation (as evidenced by the Yellow Peril's formal 
title).
If Shannon plots the convergence or divergence of configurations in space,
then Wiener charts the same phenomenon in time. But remembering Wiener's 
particular conceptionalization of messages indicates the cyberneticist's 
conformity with Shannon on this point. Communication is principally about the 
replication or distortion of organizational configurations. In their attempts to 
conceive the problem of information spatially, the mathematicians connected 
conceptual resources in generative ways. Wiener, for one, surely thought he'd 
hit on something critical: "The proper field of communication engineering is far 
wider than that generally assigned to it," he declares (p. 2).
Previous chapters have shown how cyberneticists endeavored to make this
statement true, how they worked to broaden the purview of emerging 
communication sciences until they could speak with authority about matters on 
a cosmological scale. Along the way, they advanced a radically new notion of 
machinic activity, drawing a series of equivalences between human, animal, and
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machine behavior that set the stage for several post-cybernetic thinkers. They 
also gestured toward an understanding of agency unmoored from its 
Enlightenment articulations, offering instead a manner of conceiving agency as 
something distributed across a field of patterned forces. As the previous 
chapter argued, Deleuze and Guattari's radically immanent machinic ontology 
represents a sustained and influential engagement with these insights, one that 
has inspired numerous contemporary accounts of the ways nonhuman actors 
shape everyday life.
Shannon's concerns were limited: he studied the reproduction and 
modulation of electrical signals with technical machines. Wiener's aspirations 
were grander, and yet both scientists' methods for solving their respective 
problems—and the conceptual resources each marshaled to enact them—
continued to resonate with those inhabiting the problem-space the study of 
information disclosed. Deleuze and Guattari in particular relocated 
communication engineering's idiosyncratic conceptualization of the machine to 
an explicitly ontological register, an effort with wide-ranging influence in 
contemporary social and cultural theory.
And Deleuze and Guattari also turned to mapping as a practice critical to 
their own geometrically-inclined work. For them (as the previous chapter 
explains), machines operate in part by mapping spaces, by drawing the lines of 
connection and disconnection that constitute affiliations and breaks, proximities
and influences. But Deleuze and Guattari also advocated mapping as a critical 
project, a matter not of re-presenting the real in a new (ostensibly more 
liberatory) way, but of re-configuring it. For them, maps are "entirely oriented 
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toward an experimentation in contact with the real"; they foster "connections 
between fields" and are "detachable, reversible, susceptible to constant 
modification" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 12). This is what mapping entails 
for machines of all kinds—including, as Shannon and Wiener clearly thought, 
signal- or message-propagating machines.
Shannon and Wiener's deep investment in cartographic imaginaries 
underscores the need for critical mappings of the intellectual spaces they both 
mobilized, inhabited, and produced in their work on information. Charting the 
intellectual terrain such work generated is indeed crucial for understanding the
contours of the problem-space it both obfuscates and discloses—and this 
chapter has begun such work. But as Faucher (2013) reminds us, "no matter 
how complex the conceptual map by which we choose to represent information 
in motley contexts, the map is not the territory" (p. 189). The next (and final) 
chapter will survey this territory.
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CHAPTER 5: ON INFORMATION POLITICS
Grammars and Modalities (or, Some Redundancy)
All this returns us to the problem—or rather, the problem-space—of 
information. A problem-space (recall from Chapter 1) is a particular 
constellation of forces, a dynamic set of tensions that appear to interlock 
(however tenuously) around certain issues or efforts. As a problem suddenly 
pressing and relevant during and after the Second World War, "information" 
defines such a problem-space; it names not some singular or nominal entity, but
rather discloses (and, in part, organizes) a dispersed field of concerns. In so 
doing, it becomes increasingly central to numerous 21st-century activities and 
struggles. This chapters examines some of those struggles.
But first, a bit of redundancy: Chapter 1 outlined ways information figures 
in multiple "grammars"—various popular, discursive articulations that construct
different (often fractured, inconsistent, and contradictory) sets of tensions—
which determine both what information is and how information works. These 
were:
• The political-economic (information as a bounded and discrete object 
available for appropriation)
• The cultural (information as the amorphous "stuff" of meaningful 
expression, which by its very nature supersedes constraints)
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• The documentational (information as both thing and process of recording
and retrieval, something that participates in complicated relationships 
with "data," "knowledge," and truth)
• The metaphysical (information as a universal substrate underpinning 
material reality)
Other grammars will (likely already do) exist. But these are four of 
information's most powerful and pervasive popular configurations, which 
constitute the political terrain across which struggles over information occur. 
They articulate (often disparate) logics and materials into seemingly natural, 
enduring notions about information's role, function, and dynamics in 
contemporary social formations.
As Chapter 1 also explained, one such notion (which cuts across the first 
three grammars especially) is that information is a resource, something a social
actor might variously use, misuse, or use up. Under the influence of what 
Balnaves and Willson (2011) call the "resource doctrine of information" (p. 44), 
many popular narratives fail to question this status. What's more, Balnaves and 
Willson remind us that the resource doctrine regulates not only the ways in 
which one might conceive information itself, but also the ways one might 
imagine that which exists in relation to information. For example, the authors 
suggest that the doctrine "carries with it explicit assumptions about rationality"
(p. 43); it articulates a particular mode of subjectivity that thinks about, 
concerns itself with, or otherwise relates to information. One might say, then, 
that for Balnaves and Willson, informational problem-spaces organize and 
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authorize certain kinds of subjects that can or cannot—should or should not—
engage with informational resources in particular ways toward particular ends. 
They ask subjects to imagine themselves as certain kinds of agents.
Previous chapters have demonstrated that "agency" is at stake in 
discussions of information. This is to say, agency is a problematic that analyses 
of information (as a problem-space) disclose. Chapters 3 and 4 especially have 
shown that "agency" is no less complex or polysemic a concept than 
"information," despite its occupying a good deal of thought in contemporary 
critical social theory. And as Chapter 2 explained, agency has been decidedly 
germane to discussions of information since the advent of mathematical 
information theory and cybernetics. Indeed, American information theorists 
wrestled productively with the implications of their work for traditional, 
Enlightenment-influenced conceptualizations of agency—even though they did 
not use that term to describe the issue that concerned them. Predicated on the 
realization of the universe's unavoidable contingency, such work influenced 
decades of writing in fields like anthropology, biology, and continental 
philosophy. It catalyzed a new agential imaginary.
Information's status as a resource raises important questions: for whom or 
what is information a resource today? What does information's popular 
articulation as a resource tell us about the way we conceive agency today? And 
how do such conceptions influence our understanding of the ways we struggle 
over information within informational problem-spaces? Locating answers to 
such questions becomes increasingly critical when information emerges as 
something to which an increasing number of political problems and issues 
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become articulated. To a significant extent, however, rather stringent and 
delimiting conceptualizations of information constrain possible answers to these
questions; answers to these questions figure almost exclusively from a specific 
understanding of information's multiple dynamics—an understanding the 
resource doctrine instantiates.
This final chapter examines the popular politics of information, and does so
in order to expose the resource doctrine's grip on popular understandings of 
information. It argues that information's popular discursive grammars are 
distinct precisely because they articulate different modes (or "modalities") of 
information's expressivity—in short, its semiotics. To do this, the current 
chapter utilizes conceptual tools that emerging from one important engagement
with information theory: that of Félix Guattari.
Consider information's semiotic dynamics as the particular modalities of 
its expressivity. Recall (from Chapter 3) that for Deleuze and Guattari (1987) 
every assemblage consists of both content (a machinic assemblage) and 
expression (a collective assemblage of enunciation). At times, Deleuze and 
Guattari (1987) refer to assemblages' expressive dimension as a semiotic one, 
"a regime of signs" (p. 504). Particular to every regime of signs is the manner in
which those signs articulate to certain contents, the way bodies designated as 
expression take hold of and intervene in those designated as content. The 
relationship between those things we call "signs" and those things we call 
"referents" is particular to any given assemblage; the mode of their 
(inter)action is far from predetermined. Further, both content and expression 
embody another coupling—one of form and substance—making the relationship 
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between content and expression much more complex than most standard 
semiological accounts (of interaction between disembodied sign and embodied 
thing) can describe.
Deleuze and Guattari (1987) are clear: "content" and "expression" are not 
synonyms for "signified" and "signifier." Instead, these terms name collections 
of heterogeneous elements marshaled and put into relations with specific 
dynamics and consequences. Indeed, an ability to parse or differentiate the 
specific mechanics of a given relationship between content and expression—
between the "pragmatic" collection of bodies that is acted upon and the 
"semiotic" collection of bodies that acts—is one benefit of Deleuze and 
Guattari's assemblage-oriented analysis, and these mechanics do not 
immediately (or necessarily) align with the logics and effectivities of 
representational, signifying semiologies. A more nuanced approach to 
expression—a more nuanced semiotics—assists in elaborating the complexity of
a given social formation (or assemblage).
Guattari offers such a semiotics. Watson (2009) notes that Guattari's 
search for a theory of signs capable of addressing this complexity predates—
and in many ways prefigures—his eventual engagements with Deleuze. As 
previous chapters have explained, Guattari's frustration with the conceptual 
and political limitations of structuralist semiology motivated his search for "an 
inventory of raw materials and spare parts used not only by language, but also 
by many other types of messages, signals, modes of expression, or transmission 
[that] are essential to many processes and work in social, ecological, cellular, 
and atomic systems" (Watson, 2009, p. 46). In a series of early essays and 
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letters, Guattari sketched what he would eventually call a "mixed semiotics"—a 
semiotics more robust than that which Guattari found in structuralism, one that
identifies the multiple, distinct but interlocking modes of semiotization present 
in contemporary social formations. Not surprisingly, several commentators 
(including collaborator Deleuze) have noted the theoretical eclecticism with 
which Guattari approached this endeavor. Influences from biology, physics, 
mathematics, and (most importantly here) cybernetics and information theory 
are acutely evident in this early work, especially as Guattari's disillusionment 
with Lacanian psychoanalysis deepened (see Watson, 2009, pp. 45-54, for more 
detail). Guattari continually refined this work both as part of and subsequent to 
his writing with Deleuze. This chapter, too, will amend Guattari's earlier 
semiotic conceptualization in order to align them with the shape they took later 
in Guattari's career. While together Deleuze and Guattari offer an intricate and 
compelling ontology, Guattari's solo compositions demonstrate a persistent 
engagement with the particularities of expression; to some extent, they 
"operationalize" the Deleuzean-Guattarian ontology, and are for this reason 
most useful for the current analysis.
More specifically, this chapter adopts Guattari's mixed semiotics in order 
to parse and subsequently analyze the political terrain on which various 
struggles over "information" occur today. Guattari himself was concerned with 
such matters, and wrote frequently about "the rapidly evolving machinic realms
of scientific theory and information technology" (Watson, 2009, p. 45). Crucially,
Guattari insisted that digital, computational information technologies function 
not just to circulate well-formed symbols; they also intervene in the material 
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conditions under which those symbols become intelligible as such. In fact, they 
foreground this function. "Today's information and communication machines do 
not merely convey representational contents," he writes, "but also contribute to 
the fabrication of new assemblages of enunciation, individual and collective" 
(Guattari, 1996b, p. 96, emphasis in original). Thus, this chapter explores the 
conceptual and political purchase of a "mixed semiotic" approach to struggles 
over information. It aims to parse and clarify the multiple and overlapping 
functions "information" assumes in contemporary organizations of power. 
Understanding the politics of information today means means understanding 
those ways in which various discursive grammars of information draw upon and
refashion information's mixed semiotics. While it does not claim to offer 
universally applicable political solutions, this chapter proceeds in the hope that 
some exploration and explanation of the current conjuncture's contours might 
assist those struggling to navigate them.
After adumbrating Guattari's mixed semiotics as a schema for plotting 
these struggles, this chapter explores the problems and possibilities such a 
semiotics discloses for the politics of information in each of its expressive 
modalities. Struggles in each of these expressive registers adopt and harbor 
their own particular notions of agency, which get articulated in and to activities
organized around information. Moreover, then, parsing information's mixed 
semiotics assists in discerning the various modalities of agency that appear 
through struggles in which "information" seems to play a decisive role. Each of 
information's semiotic modes discloses a certain figure of agency (a certain 
agential imaginary or articulation of agency as a problem), each with its own 
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dynamics that frame (guide or even prefigure) discussions of information 
politics in particular ways. In other words, what agency "means" (that is, what 
the term articulates, what problems it encompasses) shifts in each of these 
modalities. This chapter concludes by examining those important shifts.
Semiotization Without Signification
In The Philosophy of Information, Luciano Floridi (2011) identifies what he
calls "the elementary problem" for any sustained, formal analysis of 
information: "What is information?" (p. 30, emphasis added). He writes:
Information is still an elusive concept. This is a scandal not by itself, but 
because so much theoretical work relies on a clear analysis and 
explanation of information and of its cognate concepts. (p. 30).
Perhaps just as scandalously, Floridi effectively skirts the question by 
turning its potential answers into matters of positionality; what information is is
a matter of its relationship to particular conditions of existence. In this sense, 
then, "information can be viewed from three perspectives" (p. 30). These are:
• information as reality
• information for reality
• information about reality
Floridi's "information as reality" is an attempt to describe information as 
something "environmental," "a pattern of physical signals, which are neither 
true nor false" (p. 30, emphasis in original). This is a view of information as an 
ostensibly "natural" entity, something isomorphic with material conditions and 
capable of configuring them. "Information for reality" is Floridi's term for 
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phenomena like "instructions," "orders," and "recipes" (p. 30, emphasis in 
original)—things that do not represent real conditions but actually (under 
certain conditions and with appropriate resources) trigger or maintain those 
conditions. Information in this case is not isomorphic with the material, but it 
does intervene in the material. Finally, Floridi's "information about reality" is 
information in its "semantic" mode (p. 30). Here information functions as 
something "alethically verifiable" (p. 30); it traffics in economies of 
verisimilitude to accurately or inaccurately re-present some object or state of 
affairs. Thus, for Floridi (2011), this type of information can be "veridical" (p. 
50); it performs a kind of truth function predicated on some correspondence 
between information and material conditions. And information, in this sense, 
must by its very nature always correspond to a referent with the greatest 
degree of fidelity. Floridi insists that "false [semantic] information is not a 
genuine type of information" (p. 50). "One speaks of false information not as 
one speaks of a false sentence, which is a sentence that happens to be false, but
in the same way as one qualifies someone as a false friend, i.e. not a friend at 
all" (p. 50). Such information is not isomorphic with the material and does not 
directly intervene in it. Instead, it stands apart from real conditions to re-
present those conditions in certain ways.
But Floridi's perspectives on information are not "perspectives" at all (for 
the term implies that information's effectivities are solely the result of some 
observing entity); rather, they are various modalities—of the ways information 
figures in both popular accounts of informatic activity, and of such activities' 
articulation into various socio-technical assemblages, especially those 
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assemblages characteristic of late capitalism. As Chapter 3 explained, radical 
psychoanalyst Félix Guattari adopted cybernetic, machinic thinking to address 
the production of subjectivity in precisely this period of capitalism's 
development. Part and parcel of his concern with these processes of production 
was a keen interest in the very mechanisms of capital's operations, the concrete
techniques and technologies through which forces of power shape the 
conditions in which subjects emerge today. In particular, Guattari scrutinized 
one type of technology: information technology (see Genosko, 2009). While he 
was perhaps more optimistic about the revolutionary potential of ever-shrinking
electronics (such as radios and personal computers) than were some of his 
contemporaries, Guattari maintained that these technologies operated in ways 
quite unlike their antecedents—and were for this reason ripe for fresh analysis 
and critique.
Adequately grasping the complexity of these expressive ensembles 
requires, Guattari suggests, expanding semiotic vocabularies in order to 
account for the functions of an assemblage that tend to fall outside the domain 
of the semiological (Guattari used the term "semiology" to name that semiotics 
concerned exclusively with the dynamics of meaning and representation). The 
result of such an expansion, inspired by the work of Louis Hjelmslev, was 
Guattari's "mixed semiotics" (see Genosko 1998, 2002), which theorized 
multiple modes of semiotization beyond the work of signifying semiologies. 
Indeed, Guattari viewed signification as only one mode of semiotization, and a 
limited one at that, circulating as it does already-formalized signifier-signified 
relationships through universal chains of equivalence and subjective 
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interpretation (i.e., the semiologist's "readings"). For him, structuralist 
semiology was a tyrannical science, one "not interested in social origins 
underlying the formalization of significations" (Guattari, 1984, p. 169) and 
concerned more with producing universalizable interpretations of symbols that 
served institutions with the power to perpetuate them. Guattari sought to limit 
semiology's scope in order to account for the multiplicity of sign functions 
present in any given assemblage and expand the conceptual vocabulary with 
which analysts and critics might address that assemblage's particular regime of
signs.
In his early work, Guattari schematized his Hjelmslevian mixed semiotics 
this way:
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Illustration 3: Guattari's mixed semiotics, as conceived
in 1973
Understanding Guattari's multiple modalities of sign activity is crucial for 
recognizing not only the force and scope of his intervention into semiotics in 
general but also the specific contribution he makes to the study of information 
and information technologies. Examples of each semiotic mode, specifically as 
each relates to the problem of information, follow these more general 
descriptions.
First (in order to specify the limits of his conceptual model), Guattari 
(1984) explains a-semiotic encodings, or activities that "do not involve a specific
semiotic stratum" (p. 90). With appropriate scare quotes and other qualifiers, 
Guattari refers to these encodings as "'natural' chains of encoding" (Guattari, 
1984, p. 90) or "so-called natural encoding which functions independently of the
constitution of semiotic substance" (Guattari, 1996c, p. 149). Here, Guattari is 
attempting to theorize a kind of organization or formalization that functions 
outside of or apart from the semiotic activities that instantiate planes of 
expression and content. To theorize a-semiotic activity, Guattari mobilizes 
Hjelmslev's distinction between matter and substance (that is, "matter" refers 
to the field of un-actualized material intensities, while the "substance" refers to 
what those intensities become when actualized through a semiotic encounter). 
Here, then, is Guattari's attempt to describe a system of encoding that is not 
"properly" semiotic. He believed matter could take form in ways that could not 
be semiotically explained. "Indeed," he writes
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the separation between non-semiotically formed matter and semiotically 
formed substance, insofar as it is established independently of the 
relations of expression and content, opens the way to the study of 
semiotics independent of signifying semiologies, that is to say, semiotics 
which, to be precise, would not be based on the bipolarity of signifier-
signified. (Guattari, 1996c, p. 148)
"A-semiotic encodings" is perhaps the most abstract and least thoroughly 
explained of Guattari's categories (see Genosko, 2002, and Watson, 2009, for 
two excellent explications). Clearly, as the preceding quotation shows, Guattari 
wished for this category to counter semiological tendencies, including the 
tendency to view the world as a textual system, a system of writing. "Do not 
succumb to the semiotic illusion of projecting an écriture onto the natural 
field," he says. "There is no genetic writing" (Guattari, 1996c, p. 149). Indeed, 
genetic activity was a sort of a-semiotic touchstone for Guattari, as it 
apparently addressed the process by which organic matter organizes outside a 
system of signs. Importantly, however, Guattari states that nothing prohibits 
actors from trying to represent the processes and products of a-semiotic 
encodings. "The biologist who makes a model of the RNA and DNA chains is 
transposing these structures into a system of signs, thus producing an entirely 
new basis of expression" (p. 90). In much the same way, one might describe 
American information theorists' notational activities; Shannon and Wiener, for 
example, used mathematical symbols to depict the "natural" processes of 
organization they envisioned.
Second, Guattari describes the operations of signifying semiologies. As the
above semiotic schema indicates, Guattari depicts signifying semiologies as 
severed from material flows, locked in circular and self-referential loopings 
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whereby signs refer to other signs ad infinitum as part of formal signifying 
chains. For Guattari, signifying semiologies tend to arrest and flatten the force 
of material fluxes, which are "doubly reduced: first to fit the signified contents, 
and then to fit the signifier, whose despotic ambition is to put everything that 
could represent it through a process of repetition that always brings it back to 
itself" (p. 92). This type of semiotic activity is, in other words, that which the 
structuralist semiologists prided themselves on elucidating. Guattari displays 
little sympathy with the structuralists, whom he accused (as previously 
indicated) of a kind of tyranny, for they "take control of the symbolic 
semiologies used by children, the mad and others to try and safeguard their 
economy of desire as best they can" (Guattari, 1984, p. 168). Structuralist 
psychoanalysis is, then, in the business of offering universal interpretations for 
the sign systems that structure the unconscious "like a language." Semiological 
signs relate to their referents via re-presentation; sign and thing never intersect
directly, as signs stand apart from the "real" conditions of their ongoing 
circulation. This is to say that semiological signs work by interposing 
themselves between material conditions and consciousness; they always 
presuppose an already-formed subject who interprets them. The result, for 
Guattari (1984), is the trap of Kantian mediation: "a subject cut off from all 
direct access to reality, imprisoned in a signifying ghetto" (p. 92).
Third, Guattari elaborates a class of semiotic activity he calls a-signifying 
semiotics, which involve signs that do not necessarily partake in signifying 
economies. Indeed, they operate anterior to and only potentially in support of 
signifying semiologies; they modulate material fluxes that set the conditions for 
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signification. For this reason, they are not truly "signs," but rather what 
Guattari variously calls "particle-signs," "point-signs," or "part-signs," for they 
shuttle between the symbolic and the material—part sign, part matter. A-
signifying particle-signs need not "pass through" consciousness or even 
subjectivity. As Genosko (2009) puts it, "part-signs engage machinic material 
processes beyond the problem of referentiality" (p. 99). Developing a theory of 
part-signs allows Guattari access to those machinic processes that are without 
recourse to signifying logics. It displaces the speaking subject from the center 
of analysis as the wellspring from which reality is ostensibly "socially 
constructed," and facilitates Guattari's contention that
Signs "work" things prior to representation. Signs and things combine 
with one another independently of the subjective "hold" that the agents 
of individuated enunciation claim to have over them. A collective 
assemblage of enunciation is, then, in a position to relieve speech of its 
role as the imaginary support of the cosmos. (Guattari, 1996c, p. 151)
In Guattari's terms, a-signifying particle-signs "can bring into play systems
of signs that, though they may incidentally have a symbolic or signifying effect, 
have no connection with that symbolism or signification as far as their specific 
functioning is concerned" (Guattari, 1984, p. 171). They prefigure signifying 
signs but do not rely on them or the significations they produce. Ultimately, for 
Guattari, part-signs function without recourse to some semantic content. They 
do not open themselves up for interpretations as much as they work well within 
various configurations; that is they effectuate the material conditions for 
potential significations according to certain established parameters 
(parameters established, for example, in other semiotic registers, like a-
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semiotic ones). Indeed, while semiological signs tend to loop and expand 
through seemingly infinite signifying semiosis, "an extremely precise and rigid 
syntax" (Guattari, 1984 p. 171) governs a-signifying part-signs. According to 
Guattari, part-signs
give up all the manifold values that can exist in symbolic systems of 
signifying systems: the sign becomes so refined that there are no longer 
thirty-six possible interpretations, but a single designation. (p. 171)
Unlike signs available for signifying semiosis (the becoming-conscious of 
the subject to the sign, the ongoing act of semiotic mediation that occurs in 
subject-sign encounter), particle-signs do not permit ongoing redefinition—they 
do not "slide" (Genosko, 2009, p. 97). Instead, according to Guattari (1995), 
part-signs' primary operation is triggering; enmeshed in complex relations of 
other bodies and signs arranged to facilitate their actions, these signs activate 
relationalities and police boundaries—they "give out stop and start orders" (p. 
49). They initiate or terminate material operations. Rather than run isomorphic 
with "real" conditions or stand apart from and re-present those conditions, 
particle-signs operate "flush" with them. As Genosko (2002) puts it, a-signifying 
part-signs demonstrate "no recourse to representative structures. (p. 170).
Understanding the particular dynamic of Guattari's a-signifying part-signs 
can be difficult because Guattari's own semiotic schematic seems to 
misconstrue their relationship to material fluxes. Guattari offers a pictorial 
figure of his mixed semiotics that sees matter always already bifurcated into 
expression and content in advance of any kind of semiotic activity. A truly 
immanent semiotics, such as the one Guattari hoped to realize, would entail, 
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however, positing the existence of matter as a category of true 
undifferentiation. The material cannot "contain" categories, for these are a form
of differentiation—and matter is (by Hjelmslev's definition) without 
differentiation. A more appropriate schematization of Guattari's mixed 
semiotics might look like this:
This revised figuration of Guattari's mixed semiotics more clearly depicts 
the role of a-signifying part-signs; it maintains their position on the planes of 
content and expression, but denies them the ability to immediately or 
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Illustration 4: Guattari's mixed semiotics revised
transparently actualize material flows (the province of a-semiotic encodings) 
while retaining their capacity to modulate the conditions of signifying 
structures.
Developing a mixed semiotics was Guattari's (1984) way of "re-defining the
problem of meaning and signification" so that "meaning" names something 
more than the effects of semiological activities, something "resulting from the 
conjunction of semiotic systems in confrontation" (p. 164)—something, as 
Langlois (2014) suggests, that has more to do with establishing the conditions 
of meaningfulness than conveying already-meaningful contents. A mixed 
semiotic approach to the question of "meaning" stresses the multiple and 
overlapping regimes of signs that work to produce the conditions in which 
meaningful activity may occur, in which some "things" might be designated 
meaningful and others not. In short, thinking beyond signification refocuses 
critical attention on those non-semantic processes by which the material 
conditions of everyday life get organized to support various "meaningful" 
orientations in and to the world.
Information—
These conceptual tools from Guattari underscore the fact that Floridi's 
"perspectives" on information are not merely positions subjects take in relation 
to information, but rather facets of information's mixed semiotics, particular 
modalities of sign activity through which information might operate. As such, 
this approach to information discloses something about the popular terrain on 
which struggles over information occur; it indicates certain critical points of 
tension at which "information" gets variously articulated, animated, and 
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deployed toward particular ends. This is uneven terrain, to be sure. However, 
what remains of this dissertation presents a brief (and, admittedly, occasionally 
speculative) reading of this terrain as refracted through the multiple modes of 
information's mixed semiotics.
—About Reality
The Kumusha Takes Wiki project "aims at activating communities across 
Africa to create and contribute freely-licensed information, texts, images and 
media about their communities (villages, townships, suburbs, inner cities, 
etc.)," which anyone can eventually incorporate into Wikipedia (Wikimedia, 
para. 1). The project is important, blogger Francois-Xavier Ada (2014) explains, 
because the "digital divide means some African communities are 
underrepresented on the web," and "without a well-developed online presence, 
misinformation about them can spread relatively unchallenged" (para. 1). 
Indeed, Ada says, "much existing information available about local African 
communities can only be accessed within the confines of specific languages and
dialects" (para. 5)—but "the Kumusha Takes Wiki Project wants to give those 
communities a voice" (para. 3) online. So the project encourages members of 
Sub-Saharan communities to work with designated "Wikipedians in Residence" 
(para. 7) to help produce "online content" (para. 6) better representative of 
their cultures. "The project will work to create information that benefits 
everyone," Ada says "not just those writing the articles" (para. 8). Kumusha 
Takes Wiki is part of the Africa Centre, which Ada explains is "involved in 
correcting the spread of incorrect information" about African communities. It 
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wants to "revitalize the information base" (para. 9) available to both those 
seeking knowledge about Sub-Saharan African communities and those creating 
it.
This is information in its signifying modality, whereby information 
functions according to the logic of semiological sign. Here, information stands 
for something or someone. It functions as a signifier of a world beyond or apart 
from it. It represents or misrepresents with greater or lesser fidelity. It is about 
reality.
This, of course, is the very semiotic modality early information theorists 
did not embrace, for their information was non-semantic (it did not traffic in 
economies of "meaning") and non-representational (see Chapter 2). And yet this
is the semiotic function many contemporary, commonsense definitions of 
information tend to presuppose and espouse. Consider, for instance, various 
programs and practices aimed at protecting "personal information" (or 
"personally identifiable information" in juridical contexts), information deemed 
valuable precisely because it discloses something about a target; in its 
signifying modality, information is useful insofar as it ostensibly reflects 
something about a referent. Such information reveals certain conditions that 
orient subjects in the world. It can expose (information is "accurate" when it 
thoroughly re-presents target conditions), and it can obfuscate (as 
"misinformation" about Sub-Saharan African communities circulates online to 
the detriment of the people that comprise them).
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Information functioning this way must first become an object, something 
disarticulated from the material conditions of its production, something one 
might circulate. As Guattari's semiotic schema indicates, signs that perform 
signifying functions operate at the nexus of fully-formed contents and 
expressions, articulating some identifiable form and substance; they form 
discrete units ready for appropriation by other mechanisms, which might 
subsequently enclose them. Capitalist and liberal democratic formations, for 
example, frequently—and seemingly with much success—articulate information 
about reality into something one might own, trade, protect, secure, and so 
forth. In this mode, information can become some kind of content for other 
assemblages.
Struggles over information in its signifying modality are therefore typically
struggles over and with competing representations of the world. Indeed, though
he never defines or specifies his use of the term "information" in his recent 
book Infoglut, Andrejevic (2013) assumes the primacy of this semiological 
modality in order to argue that "contemporary forms of information glut" 
(Andrejevic's term for the preponderance of irreconcilable accounts of the 
world in the data-saturated global West) spur "deadlocks of representation" (p. 
14) that continually undermine anyone's ability to speak truthfully or 
authoritatively on matters of intense public debate. Such debate becomes less 
focused on proposing sound arguments and counter-narratives and more on 
how "to use the expanded media space to engulf any dominant narrative in 
possible alternatives, to highlight the indeterminacy of the evidence by 
promulgating endless narratives of debunkery and counter-debunkery" (p. 9). 
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Struggles over information are struggles not only to represent real conditions 
but also to demonstrate the utter futility of any sustained narrative about those 
conditions.
Documentational and political economic grammars of information 
frequently foreground this signifying function when they facilitate claims about 
information's ability to re-present certain properties or conditions. These 
grammars depend on a figure of information as not only something that re-
presents reality but also does so with accuracy; they hinge on logics of fidelity 
and verisimilitude.
—For Reality
Pacing across the now-iconic, red-carpeted TED Talk stage, author Eli 
Pariser frets. "There is no standard Google anymore," he tells his audience. 
Quite simply, he says, two users submitting the same query will receive vastly 
different search results from the world's most-used search engine. Egalitarian 
rhetoric to the contrary, the World Wide Web has become a meshwork of "filter 
bubbles," says Pariser: "your own, personal, unique universe of information that
you live in online," (TED, 2011), a kind of "personal ecosystem of information 
that's been catered by these algorithms to who they think you are" ("The Filter 
Bubble"). And Pariser worries about the effect these "algorithmic gatekeepers" 
might have on users' abilities to access, connect to, and retrieve material that 
enhances their lives. For Pariser, it's one of the most pressing ethical issues of 
our time: What's made relevant? What's drawn closer? What's pushed aside? 
What connects (and doesn't connect) to what? Or, in Pariser's (2011) words, 
what "controls the flows"?
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Pariser's "information" is information in its a-signifying modality, or the 
modality in which information functions as a matter of orchestrating non-
representational forces. In this mode, "information" pertains to those operations
that attempt to actuate or facilitate the effects of certain arrangements; it 
regulates flows, modulates signals, distributes relationships. It decides what 
goes where (and in what proportions). It does not re-present a given state of 
affairs, but rather intervenes directly in it, helping to shape it: information for 
reality.
Recall that MacKay (1969) understood this modality rather well (see 
Chapter 2), as he distinguished between the "selective" (or syntactic) function 
of information (which Shannon's theory foregrounded) and the "descriptive" (or 
semantic) function that complemented it. MacKay maintained Shannon's 
insistence on a fundamentally non-semantic (or a-signifying) dimension of 
information processes. "By the theory of information," he writes, "we shall mean
broadly the theory of processes by which representations come into being, 
together with the theory of those abstract features which are common to a 
representation and that which it represents" (p. 80, emphasis added). 
According to MacKay, a-signifying forces "justify" (p. 80) representational 
activity; they undergird it, establishing its concrete conditions. Indeed, this is 
why MacKay ultimately settled on a pragmatic theory of "meaning" for 
information theory and not a semantic one: because he imagined messages as 
"keys" with the ability to perpetuate or attenuate effects across complex 
constellations of heterogeneous elements and modulate their potentials (what 
MacKay called their various states of "conditional readiness" for action), 
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MacKay framed the problem of "meaning" as always first and foremost one of 
organizing an "information space" (p. 92) by activating some elements of a 
situation and not others. "The meaning of a message," he wrote, "may be 
defined as its selective function on a specified ensemble" (p. 92). "Selective" 
information theories like Shannon's address precisely how the processes 
through which the conditions for meaningfulness—not the "transfer" of meaning
itself—become part of the communication process. These processes are 
primarily a-signifying.
Research regarding information's a-signifying modality has proliferated 
lately (see Langlois, 2011, 2012, 2014; Rieder, 2012; Terranova 2004b; Thomas,
2013), as theorists and critics have attempted to describe "how digital 
platforms reconfigure life in networked societies" (Thomas, 2013, p. 1), and 
specifically how emerging socio-technical ensembles ask us to attend to "the 
governance of the heterogeneous conditions within which specific meanings 
come to appear" (Langlois, 2011, p. 8). Such investigations foreground the non-
representational and non-semantic operations of contemporary media 
technologies (and, in particular, what one might call "information 
technologies"). But perhaps one of the most popular critical investigations of 
information's a-signifying modality is Galloway's (2004) elucidation of 
"protocol," that "distributed management system" for 21st century power 
relations (p. 8). For Galloway, "protocol" names the set of concrete conditions 
for the actuation of relations, a "proscription for structure" that determines the 
ways entities connect and relate (p. 30, emphasis in original). A protocol 
"regulates flow" (p. 74); it outlines the material contours of specific relations, 
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the concrete possibilities for action in specific configurations. It names what is 
connected (or isn't), what transpires (or doesn't), and how (or not). And with a 
slight nod to Shannon and Wiener (though using an economic vocabulary they 
would not), Galloway calls information "the key commodity in the organizational
logic of protocological control" (Galloway & Thacker, 2007, p. 57).
Struggles over information in its a-signifying modality typically concern 
efforts to establish, police, and rework the various (dis)connections that make 
certain activities (im)possible. Ruppert (2012, 2013) highlights such struggles, 
for example, in her research on management information system (MIS) 
practices as they relate to the administration of juvenile offenders and "at risk" 
populations in the UK. She explores the way certain information systems 
selectively arrange certain statistical parameters through ongoing acts of 
calculation and assessment in order to make particular bodies visible and 
actionable under particular conditions. For Ruppert, databasing techniques and
technologies are ways of managing the various contingent linkages and 
couplings that make certain bodies available for forms of intervention. Similarly,
Rieder's (2012) investigation of "evaluative metrics" (software like Google's 
PageRank) work to distribute indicators of "importance, quality, relevance, 
performance, and so on" (para. 1). Through an analysis that is both 
genealogical and textual (both diachronic and synchronic), Rieder demonstrates
the ways certain algorithmic variables shape and regulate complex collections 
of heterogeneous materials (like websites, in the case of PageRank), drawing 
some together, associating some with others, and distancing others from one 
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another. Such algorithms, he writes, "encode ways of putting things into 
relation that (can) fundamentally reconfigure how power is constituted" (para. 
48). For thinkers like Pariser, it is a form of power in desperate need of address.
This mode of information's expressivity is salient in documentational and 
cultural grammars of information. While normative discourses in this register 
tend to treat information as signifying or representational, counter-discourses 
often stress information's a-signifying modality. Arguments against certain 
"informatic" juridical-technical assemblages like DRM (digital rights/restrictions
management) technologies, for example, to criticize the technologies for the 
ways in which they organize conditions of possibility (the ways they organize a 
repertoire of actions available to a subject)—not for their "representational" 
functions (see, e.g., Stallman, 2014).
—As Reality
"Ever since the elucidation of the molecular basis of living systems, we 
have known that all elementary processes of life are governed by information," 
writes Bern-Olaf Küppers of the Friedrich Schiller University of Jena (2014, p. 
217). He is attempting to demonstrate information's cosmic fundamentality by 
insisting that it makes worlds hang together. "The processes of life would 
implode into a jumble of chaos if they were not perpetually stabilized by 
information and communication," he says (pp. 217-218). For Küppers, anything 
that organizes communicates, for communication is the very process of 
organization itself: "'Communication' means neither more nor less than the 
reciprocal harmonization and coordination of processes by means of chemical, 
acoustic, and optical signals" (p. 220). Communication is what patterns the 
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universe—gives is a basic, operational order. And anything that exhibits order 
might find its way under the aegis of "structural sciences," which endeavor to 
discern "the way in which reality is structured—expressed, investigated, and 
described in an abstract form [...] irrespective of whether these structures 
occur in a natural or an artificial, a living or a non-living, system" (p. 232-233). 
Küppers' "structural sciences" attend to the fact of order itself; they examine 
how the world gets in-formed and, as such, establishes the preconditions for all 
that is: information as reality.
This is information in its a-semiotic mode. It is, in other words, information
as a-semiotic encoding, an ongoing process of (in)formalization that organizes 
"matter" (conceived broadly as Hjelmslev does—as potentiality). Here 
information is not form but formalization (an encod-ing); it is organization qua 
organization, and it operates outside the planes of content and expression. 
Information is the simple and sheer fact of repeatability or unrepeatability, the 
basic movement of organization or disorganization. It is the particular taking-
form that occurs with greater or lesser probability.
Information as a-semiotic encoding is the object of inquiry early American 
information theorists described as part of their mathematical and engineering 
endeavors. It discloses some seemingly "fundamental" relationship between 
order and chaos (Wiener), predictability and unpredictability (Shannon). As 
Chapter 2 explained, these thinkers were responding to what they perceived to 
be a drastic reconfiguration of conjunctural dynamics, which rearticulated 
knowledge of the universe as a fundamentally probabilistic place. This shift 
prompted a flurry of activity aimed at comprehending and ultimately controlling
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this contingency, but such activity—and the conceptual resources it spawned, 
including the notion of "information"—would have been inconceivable, even 
unnecessary, at a time when Newtonianism reigned. Using Deleuzean-
Guattarian language, one might suggest that these thinkers crystallized a new 
diagram, a new organization of content and expression that stressed probability
and, by extension, contingency, as the inescapable way of the world. Scientists 
and engineers like Wiener and Shannon illuminated this diagram by developing 
materials to cope with, or subsist in it. Building theories of information, that 
measurable quantity to which other researchers could apply various 
mathematical and scientific instruments, was one of the ways they did so.
They were not alone. A probabilistic imaginary animates even the 
Deleuzean-Guattarian vocabulary this dissertation mobilizes to make sense of 
this shift itself. This fact complicates deployment of the term "diagram" in this 
context, because Deleuze and Guattari are themselves indebted to the 
conceptual resources that emerged from this conjuncture, and their "diagram" 
is one result of this debt. This is to say that their ability to imagine the world as 
a kind of fluctuation between more-or-less chaotic states—or the very idea of a 
"fundamental" tension between order and chaos as a world-making mechanism 
in the first place—is part and parcel of the imaginary they mobilize in their 
philosophizing; the concept of a "diagram" names the idea that the world's 
contingency is organized according to non-necessary distributions, and the idea
that the world is composed of non-necessary distributions is itself part of a 
contextually-specific diagram (more on this soon). As Chapters 3 and 4 
illustrate, a specific conceptual genealogy links the notion of a probabilistic 
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universe with 20th century developments in metaphysics. Deleuze and Guattari 
developed their immanentist ontology under the direction of (and with 
conceptual resources from) this very non-Newtonian line of thought. 
Contingency and immanentism do not imply one another (one might call 
Spinoza's metaphysics an immanentism without contingency, for example), but 
the particular combination these philosophers articulated resonates with the 
processes and problematics of their cybernetic forebearers.
Struggles over information in its a-semiotic modality tend to foreground 
this organizational (i.e., diagrammatic) mechanic: a dynamic between order and
disorder, a tension between coherence and incoherence. Indeed, this is the 
primary "pivot" for metaphysical grammars of information, which stress 
information's capacity to configure the undifferentiated (i.e., the entropic). 
Accounts like Küppers' are becoming increasingly more common, for, as award-
winning essayist and physicist Ken Wharton puts it, the force of their logic has 
become entrenched, "so strong that many physicists can't even articulate what 
other type of universe might be conceptually possible" ("Why the Universe," 
para. 3). Articulating new models of the universe—new diagrams—concerns 
addressing the deep-seated and commonsensical: what, in Deleuze's (1988) 
terms, is "seeable" and "sayable" as part of a certain configuration. Mounting 
resistance to diagrams would be akin to launching an attack on something as 
grand as "discipline" (one of Foucault's most famous diagrams) or "control" (one
of Deleuze's). It would involve imagining a universe that resists description in 
terms of the more-or-less calculable, one in which the twin polarities of order 
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and chaos lose their ability to organize a world—a world in which the 
calculability of everything imaginable itself becomes difficult to imagine. In this 
way, other diagrams become possible.
On the Agency of the Informatic (Once More)
The problem-space of information discloses the problematic of agency, 
conceived here as some ability to influence the shape, valence, contours, or 
effectivity of a social formation. Because social formations are assemblages that
help determine the capacities of the elements they assemble as part of their 
specific agencements, this ability to influence assemblages' compositions is an 
important object of inquiry for critical social and cultural theory. This chapter 
concludes by examining the figures of agency, the "agential imaginaries," that 
have become part and parcel of various grammars of information, which 
differentiate themselves precisely by foregrounding different modalities of 
information's mixed semiotics.
On the Agency of the Signifying
In information's signifying modality, "agency" typically refers to practices 
of (mis)appropriation and/or (mis)representation. It figures as a capacity to 
wield, protect, or otherwise utilize information object-commodities. In other 
words, agency pertains to a subject's relative ability to either use or protect 
information "about" something (often themselves); it refers to some faculty for 
controlling proliferations of representations. Recall that for Guattari signifying 
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semiologies operate on and with fully formed and discrete signs that traffic on 
the planes of content and expression. These signs have become bounded 
objects capable of being transported, circulated, controlled—and possessed.
In the context of (neo)liberal capitalism, this figure of agency frequently 
embraces an ethos that champions autonomous individuals' responsibility for 
their own information (in the face of entities, such as corporations, who may 
wish to mishandle or usurp it). This is precisely the agential imaginary at work, 
for instance, in various exhortations to protect one's "personal information". 
Such exhortations are in no short supply in places like the United States 
Federal Trade Commission's online "Consumer Information" guides, which 
implore citizens to "secure" their personal information, to "know who [sic] you 
share it with," to "store and dispose" of it diligently, to "ask questions before 
deciding to share" it, and to "maintain appropriate security" on portable 
electronic devices that carry it ("How to Keep," para. 1). Here is an agential 
imaginary that often aligns productively with discourses and apparatuses of 
responsibilization and individualization. It also underpins "data portability" 
discourses, which call for removing any and all constraints on individuals' 
abilities to "move" their information between various services (social networks, 
cloud storage lockers, and so forth). Google, for example, maintains its own 
"Data Liberation Blog," which keeps Google users abreast of ways "we're 
making it more convenient for you to retrieve your information however you 
want" (Lueck, 2012, para. 2).
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In its signifying register, informatic agency is a matter of sovereign 
individuals' capacity for managing various forms of possession: their 
possessions, the informatic commodities they generate and acquire, as well as 
their self-possession, their relative ability to leverage those commodities in 
efforts to increase their own freedom, autonomy, and rational decision making. 
Information functions to the extent that it reveals the truth about some set of 
conditions (or, rather, it can do so should an actor simply acquire enough of it), 
and can therefore aid efforts at adequately grasping "real" conditions. Agency is
the enactment of individual freedoms, an ability to overcome (or at least 
operate counter to) determinations. For decades, techno-utopians and social 
conservatives alike insisted that "information wants to be free." In activist Cory 
Doctorow's (2014) recent rebuke of the maxim is a more appropriate expression
of informatic liberty:
[...] Thirty years on, the phrase has gone from a useful way of provoking 
discussion about the philosophy of information society to a trite slogan 
that obscures more than it illuminates. It's time to kill it. The "desires" of 
information are totally irrelevant to the destiny of the Internet, the 
creative industries, or equitable society. Information is an abstraction, 
and it doesn't "want" anything. Information doesn't want to be free—
people do. (p. 94)
Whatever Doctorow's "philosophy of information society," information's 
own expressivity clearly has no place in it.
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On the Agency of the A-signifying
In information's a-signifying modality, "agency" names an ability to actuate
the possibilities certain arrangements afford, to manage collections of elements
by triggering particular affordances according to established logics. It refers to 
a capacity for modulating connections that facilitate various actions and 
relations. Agency is an ability to enact some prescription for reality.
In its a-signifying mode, informatic agency pertains to something "dynamic
and productive (capable of multiple articulations) but rigorously constrained" 
(Genosko, 2009, p. 103). As Genosko explains, "meaning is not essential in [a-
signifying] activity, but specific codes, algorithms, materials, and standards are"
(p. 103). This is to say, then, that the a-signifying dimension of agency involves 
not the subversion, contortion, or supersession of "structure" but rather the 
effective execution of established relationalities. Thus, to Genosko's list one 
might add "protocols," the non-semantic facilitators of informatic action outside
the register of representation. Here, agency is the actuation or activation of 
proscriptions for relation—an ability to modulate a field of connectivities and/or 
breaks, to "give out stop and start orders" (recall Guattari, 1995, p. 49). Popular
critics like Pariser tend to frame the question of informatic agency in non-
signifying terms; with regard to "filter bubbles," for example, "agency" pertains 
to those actions that involve particular boundary conditions (what links to what,
which relations become salient and significant, what gets displayed) according 
to particular established logics (in this case, the logics of the PageRank 
algorithm, which ensures "there is no standard Google any more" by shuffling 
connections according to past activities).
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Likewise, much writing on the agency of "code" expresses this a-signifying 
modality of information's mixed semiotics. Consider MacKenzie (2005, 2006), 
who takes issue with those accounts that would attribute to software a kind of 
"secondary agency"—that is, the simple capacity of "supporting or extending 
the agency of some primary agent: the programmer, the corporation, the 
hacker, the artist, the government or the user." He argues for the essentially 
agential nature of code (p. 8). For him, code harbors agential capabilities 
because it helps determine the speed, direction, and valence of certain 
intensities or lines of force—certain abilities to influence some arrangement. 
"We recognize other people as agents (to a lesser or greater extent) because 
they have the capacity to act," he writes. "But in milieus populated with bodies, 
things, systems, conventions and signs (and this is virtually everywhere), 
agency distributes itself between people or events and ensembles that generate
different attributions" (p. 10). In arguing for code as principally agential, then, 
MacKenzie implicitly recognizes code's non-semiological role in helping 
determine relationalities. This is to say that his "different attributions" 
materialize as differently-distributed capacities for acting (or acting effectively) 
and, by extension, for agency.
Interlude: Against the Resource Doctrine of Information
The resource doctrine of information makes use of those modalities of 
information's expressivity that treat information as a matter of content. 
Consequently, it straightjackets discussions of information—and of popular 
struggles over information—according to particular logics. For example, in his 
recent Information Politics, Tim Jordan details multiple forms of exploitation 
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central to struggles over information. He works to "locate the specificity of 
information as a form of exploitation and liberation in the twenty-first century" 
(Jordan, 2015, p. 3). Jordan is especially interested in identifying and 
(ultimately) avoiding political strategies that actually reinforce the very 
structures of power they seem designed to dismantle.
Many of these strategies, Jordan says, take two notions for granted: first, 
that information is property, and second, that struggles over information are 
therefore akin to other struggles over ownership and sovereignty. "Information 
about an individual [...] is fetishised as a quality of the individual, [sic] it may 
appear to the provider as their property because it derives from their self and 
their singularity" (p. 201). "However," he continues, "information about anyone 
or any thing is only made into property by certain social relations" (p. 201). 
Information-as-property is, in other words, a specific social, cultural, and 
economic production, one that, for Jordan, seriously misconstrues the true 
nature of information.
Using terminology from economics, Jordan describes information as a 
"non-rival good," something that fails the test of exclusivity and can belong to 
two parties simultaneously without significant depreciations in utility. And yet, 
Jordan says, contemporary struggles over information continue to treat 
information in a manner contrary to its essence: as a rival good, as something 
that can and should "belong" to some individuals and not others. In doing so, he
says, they risk leaving unchallenged the particular set of incorporeal 
transformations that transform information into property in the first place:
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Focusing on the rights of the network tempts us to base information 
liberation on a right to control information about one's self, which may 
have tactical efficacy or may be important in the connection to another 
political antagonism, but which pays for its efficacy by confirming the 
basis for privitisation of what could be collective information benefits. (p. 
216)
Information "by nature" lends itself to what Jordan calls "simultaneous 
complete use" (p. 201), or non-exclusive relations in which social actors share 
and do not exhaust the value of a good. Treating information otherwise would 
be to act in discord with this nature—and to unwittingly support the very actors
whose attempts at enclosure are the motor of information politics.
Jordan suggests, then, that completely realizing information's benefits 
means fighting for it to remain a non-rival good; he writes that "the enclosures 
of information platforms need then to be examined not so much in terms of the 
fact of enclosure" but rather in altogether new terms, "in terms of the benefits 
that are drawn from the enclosure of information that could potentially be 
available to many at once but which actually may only be available to the 
platform controller" (p. 204). Information should be available to all, Jordan 
implies; it should remain common, operate outside of or beyond private 
property relations. And we can ensure it does through the construction of 
"devices and network-protocols that prize information for its capacity for 
simultaneous complete use that delivers benefits through openness, access and 
making to all information citizens" (p. 217). Such would be a politics of 
information in line with information's essence as a non-rival good: an ability to 
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make use of information equitably, justly, and fairly in a world where "all 
[might] share simultaneously in any bit of information and [...] use that bit to its
full extent" (p. 23).
Jordan's hand-wringing over political strategies that refuse to disrupt or 
displace an informational commonplace (that information is, or should be, a 
kind of private property) is certainly not unfounded. And yet while Jordan 
readily recognizes the constructed nature of information-as-property (its 
"fetishization" through the work of various overlapping social, political, and 
economic apparatuses) he seems less capable of recognizing the very same fact 
about information's "natural" status as a "non-rival good." For this, too, is an 
articulation, one with powerful and pervasive effects—effects so powerful and 
pervasive, in fact, that they often manage to successfully mask the conditions of
their own artifice and operate as a set of taken-for-granted knowledges about 
information's "essence." For even as Jordan convincingly challenges the idea of 
information-as-property, he leaves untouched the notion of information-as-
resource; he balks at the idea that information should be enclosed, but seems to
take no issue with the notion that information remains something to be stored, 
amassed, tapped, etc.
Failing to question information's status as a resource limits the repertoire 
of effective political tactics available to actors attempting to resist informatic 
regimes of power. More specifically, conceiving information as a resource 
orients such tactics around questions of use. Jordan attempts to frame this 
question around a convenient bipolarity: that between the "rival" and the "non-
rival." Neither status jettisons the assumption that information remains 
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something to be tapped or used; each simply names a different approach to 
such use. Moreover, Jordan's descriptions clearly grant each polarity a specific 
ethical and political valence: the "rival" is detrimental and undesireable, while 
the "non-rival" is beneficial and desirable.
Unfortunately, Jordan's argument for ensuring information's status as a 
"non-rival good" fails to achieve the kind of solution he seeks, in part because 
the question of use is more complicated than a rival/non-rival binary can 
express. Jordan's dichotomy is meant to frame a distinction between the 
enclosed and/or delimited (i.e., the "rival") and the unencumbered or free (i.e., 
the "non-rival"), but nothing about a particular good's status as "non-rival" 
prevents multiple parties from sharing it while at the same time preventing still 
others from doing so. Many open source and free software licenses, for 
example, strictly limit the ways actors may share the goods these licenses 
govern. The reality of the ways in which people use and share goods—
informational or not—is more complex.
But more important than the conceptual limitations of Jordan's argument 
are the political ones. By dismissing the "rival" as categorically undesirable, 
Jordan risks ignoring one important way actors might struggle over 
information. In early October 2015, for instance, a European court invalidated 
15-year-old "safe harbor" regulations, which permitted companies in the United
States to treat data according to U.S. law (rather than European law, which is 
more strict) when shuttling it across the Atlantic. In light of reports that U.S. 
agencies were making regular use of mass surveillance techniques and 
technologies, European officials wanted to ensure that the U.S. government 
244 
"collect[s] personal information" only in ways that are in accordance with 
European data protection provisions (Levine, 2015, para. 6). Max Schrems, a 
28-year-old law student at the University of Vienna, initiated the decision when 
he filed suit against Facebook, which he discovered was not in compliance with 
European data retention provisions (Facebook mailed him "a CD [...] with more 
than 1,200 pages of information," some of which he'd assumed were safely 
deleted [Levine, 2005, para. 7]). Facebook's terms of service did not violate U.S.
laws—but they did not comply with Europe's. The case underscored critical 
differences between two vastly different legal traditions for addressing privacy 
(Scott, 2015). In this particular instance, however, U.S. corporations whose 
stock-in-trade is the accumulation and analysis of personal data for the purpose 
of selling targetted advertising appeared to champion Jordan's so-called "non-
rival" position on informational goods. By insisting that information should 
move uninhibited across international boundaries, they reinforced the belief 
that "sharing" information does not detract from that information's "essential" 
value—in which other users remain welcome to partake. Schrems' case insists 
that U.S. firms comply with European data retention laws, which dictate that 
only agencies from countries in which personal data are generated may attempt
to access those data; his suit initiates a counter-discourse predicated precisely 
on the notion of information as a rival good, something not everyone should 
share. It was for him a different kind of resource.
That resource, of course, is never without a subject that utilizes it. In 
Jordan's case, being a good "information citizen" means demonstrating 
"openness" with information-goods, demanding access to the information-stuff 
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that represents us (as did Schrems), and using information to make decisions as
part of and for the betterment of the polity. This is the political imaginary that 
fits hand-in-glove with a resource view of information, a decidedly liberal one in
which individual subjects draw on the informational assets at their disposal as 
part of their efforts at rational decision-making, all against a backdrop of 
institutional frameworks designed to either facilitate or hamper this practice. 
The resource doctrine's political imaginary therefore includes a specific 
agential imaginary, some shared belief in the status, role, and capacities of 
agents. It is a dualistic imaginary, one that pits agent-subject against structure-
object in struggles that either hamper or enhance the subject's ability to act 
autonomously. Consequently, an information politics built on the resource 
doctrine of information is a politics of appropriation in which the question of 
informatic power is a question of use.
On the Agency of the A-semiotic
In information's a-semiotic modality, "agency" typically articulates and 
encapsulates the problem of (in)coherence or (in)stability. It figures as a 
capacity to make redundant (to shore up, to stabilize) or to make novel or 
divergent (to disperse, to scramble). Indeed, this figure of agency "works" 
precisely because it is predicated on the knowledge—or rather, the 
diagrammatic configurations that articulate possibilities for knowing—that 
aspects of this world might exist in greater or lesser states of organization or 
disorganization (recall, for example, Barad's "agency" as articulated in agential 
realism). "Agency," in short, names something that operates on the ratio of 
order to disorder.
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Thus, "order" and "disorder" assume particular axiological valences 
depending on the contexts of their deployment and the proclivities or 
dispositions of those invoking them. For instance, some contemporary writing in
critical social theory (especially that inspired by the work of Gilles Deleuze) 
depicts agency as a capacity to dislodge reified structures, to rupture 
established patterns—or, in Deleuze's (and sometimes Guattari's) words, to 
become minoritarian, to move from a state of molarity (of structure or rigidity 
or homogeneity) to molecularity (to chaos or unpredictability or heterogeneity). 
Indeed, in certain strands of critical social and political theory today, this view 
of agency has become somewhat normative; agency here looks something like 
the act of "overcoming [molar] perspectives and tapping into molecular desires"
(Widder, 2012, p. 129), of deterritorializing the territorialized, of introducing 
confusion or irregularity into the otherwise smooth functioning of powerful 
forces that capture and reify flows of energy and desire (see also Grossberg, 
2014). For a progressive politics born of these conceptualizations, order (or 
territorialization) is undesirable while disorder (or deterritorialization) is 
desirable.
These valences lead popular commentators like Hayles (1999), for 
example, to label American information theory a principally conservative 
enterprise, given its propensity for privileging stasis over change (conservation 
above all else). For in Wiener's universe—where fragmentation and dissolution 
are purportedly "natural," inevitable, and ongoing processes—to be agential is 
to counter entropy, to persist in light of forces that fracture and dissolve. To be 
agential is to construct and maintain. As contemporary formations of power 
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multiply and hone their inducements to metamorphosize (to change, to become-
different, to become-singular), such acts of maintenance actually begin to 
assume some political purchase. Indeed, stability and maintenance might 
present some of the most incisive and strategic political possibilities imaginable
in certain situations. American information theories demonstrate, then, ways in 
which "conservation" might occasionally be resistive or politically progressive. 
At any rate, their respective political valences are, as the theories themselves, 
contextually specific.
As previous chapters have demonstrated, an ability to imagine the world 
as a particular balance between order and disorder is itself part and parcel of a 
diagram that discloses this possibility, one that gives rise to the problem of 
information as a mathematical concern. In fact (as previously explained), the 
concept of "the diagram" (one of Deleuze and Guattari's principal ordering 
mechanisms) is itself possible because of the philosophers' situation in 
epistemic and material configurations that make the world "knowable" as an 
ongoing state of (dis)organization. Considering information's a-semiotic 
modality underscores the social and historical contingency of the very problem 
that animates information as a problem-space.
Agency Beyond Subjectivity (or, Some Entropy)
Understanding each of these agential modalities facilitates attempts to 
track and diagnose relations of power inherent to contemporary struggles over 
information. It also assists the formulation of strategies and tactics for 
intervening in these struggles. This chapter parses information's mixed 
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semiotics in order to illuminate the complexity of information's dynamics in 
contemporary contexts—in the hope, of course, that better understanding this 
complexity assists efforts to tell stories that engage with it.
Today these stories tend to assume that information is a resource for 
which individual subject can (or should) take responsibility. What American 
information theory during the wartime and postwar periods reminds us, 
however (and what this dissertation has endeavored to demonstrate), is that the
problem of information need not necessarily, even primarily, be a problem of or 
for the subject. Indeed, reading mathematical theories of information 
recuperatively and unpacking the theoretical work they begat discloses a set of 
concerns much broader than a singular preoccupation with subjects and 
subjectivity will allow, for these mathematical theories of information arose at a 
time when the unity and self-assuredness of the euro-modern subject was less 
certain. Popular postwar theories of information (such as Shannon's and 
Wiener's) do not concern subjects, even if subsequent readers eventually read 
this work as doing so. These theories express a profound and compelling 
interest not in the ways subjects might use informational resource-objects, but 
rather with the ways fields of influence and effectivity get organized, the ways 
certain material arrangements might be modulated and controlled. Such an 
analytical focus shifts attention from the activities of individual (typically 
human) actors to the broader processes of organization that establish the 
conditions of possibilities for living and thriving under certain social conditions.
In short, it opens onto the question of agency beyond subjectivity.
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The question of what one might call "informatic agency" is therefore not 
simply a question of what one "does" with her or his "information." It is not 
merely a question how so-called "information technologies" inhibit, diminish, or 
otherwise usurp individual actors' relative autonomy. As a mixed semiotic 
approach to information demonstrates, information's problem-space addresses 
a number of concerns, including the ways "informatic" organizations take hold 
in particular social formations. The problem of information in its signifying 
modality concerns the ways subjects relate to (and cope with) what they come 
to "know" as informational objects—how they work to protect their "personal 
information" or sell "informational goods." But the problem of information in its 
a-signifying modality concerns precisely those processes that supersede or 
subtend individual subjects' actions, the machinic processes that modulate the 
conditions for action in accordance with certain aims or directives—how they 
manage and/or maintain various contingent relations, how they negotiate both 
their symbolic roles and embodied capacities in conjunction with various 
"information systems." And the problem of information in its a-semiotic 
modality addresses the very "fact" of a contingent universe itself, the pervasive 
and persistent tendency to conceive the world as a fluctuating probabilistic 
field, a nexus of order and disorder, certainty and uncertainty, in which 
particular positions, activities, and comportments become salient—how actors 
come to think "informationally" about their worlds, conceive them as 
unrelentingly contingent and binaristic milieus in desperate need of certain 
types of management.
250 
Politics under the auspices of the resource doctrine of information too 
quickly elide all but those informatic problems operating in a signifying 
register. This dissertation aims to enhance both discussions of struggles 
involving an "informational" component and attempts to intervene in those 
struggles. Understanding the problem-space of information—the particular 
issues, knowledges, logics, and histories this concept betokens and articulates—
can only enhance our engagement with it. For to understand information is, in 
part, to understand "what we are in the process of becoming" (Deleuze, 1992, 
p. 164).
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